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Abstract
The use of polls during election campaigns has become increasingly common-
place, its main purpose being to predict elections results. Some literature highlights
evidence that pre-electoral polls increase their predictive accuracy as the time be-
tween the interview and Election Day decreases. Understanding why some polls
get it right and others get it wrong is important to better ascertain the evolution
of election campaigns and voting intentions across time. A considerable literature
shows how the quality of poll predictions is affected by a variety of methodologi-
cal decisions taken by pollsters. This raises the question that underlies this thesis:
under what conditions are polls inaccurate as predictors of voters’ behaviour? In
order to answer this question, we analyze the last three Italian general elections.
The aim of this thesis is to estimate what has the greatest impact on inaccuracy in
Italian polling between the house effect and voters sentiment change. To do that,
we firstly revise the well-established accuracy measures used so far in order to fit the
Italian case and the new accuracy measure proposed for multi-party systems (Bw).
Then, we estimate the house effect using OLS and multivariate regression models,
where the days and polling houses and the methodologies employed by pollsters are
5
the explanatory variables respectively. To estimate the extent of voters sentiment
change in Italian voters, we apply the autoregressive model. The evidence provided
by the accuracy measures shows a high presence of inaccuracy in Italian polling.
Moreover, the OLS models provide strong evidence of the house effect, whereas the
autoregressive model does not confirm the hypothesis of voters sentiment change
across time. Therefore, the greater cause of inaccuracy in Italian polling is the
house effect rather than any movement in voting intentions in the last three general
elections.
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Chapter 1
Motivation
Gli uomini non possono essere compresi per
cio` che dicono o possono dire: anche se con la
miglior buona volonta` e sincerita`, cio` che la
gente racconta non corrisponde
necessariamente a quello che realmente fa o
fara`
W. Pareto
1.1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, the use of pre-electoral polls during election campaigns
has become increasingly commonplace. They are mostly used to show the likely
electoral results. “As long as there have been elections, people have tried to predict
the outcomes”(Hillygus 2011). Indeed, some of the literature provides evidence to
conclude that poll predictions are related to electoral results and, especially, that the
predictive accuracy of polls increases as the time between the interview and Election
8
Day decreases (Gelman and King 1993; Erikson and Wlezien 1999; Jennings and
Wlezien 2015).
However, their failure to predict the winner has caused concern about their re-
liability and accuracy (Crespi 1988; Converse and Traugott 1986; Callegaro and
Gasperoni 2008; Erikson and Wlezien 1999). Despite this, pre-electoral polls are
used during an election campaign in developed democracies in order to estimate
voters’ future behaviour. This raises the question underlying this thesis: to what
extent does polling accurately record real changes in electoral preference? To an-
swer this question, we will analyze the last three Italian general elections and their
outcomes, to see what evidence they provide concerning reliability and accuracy in
the Italian case.
The Italian experience of pre-electoral polls (hereafter referred to as polls) is
different from that of other European countries and the USA in at least two respects:
politically and culturally. Regarding the former, the reason lies in the features of
the Italian political system during the so-called First Republic. Indeed, it was
characterized by the presence of two large parties, the Christian Democrats and
the Italian Communist Party, that divided voters into two main groups. Therefore,
Italian election campaigns did not have a horse-race style, like the other Western
countries did, until the 1990s. The use of polls was considered pointless given the
absence of real competition between parties to win the elections. Regarding the
cultural aspect, the purpose in carrying out a poll was mainly academic before the
Clean Hands scandal. Italian public opinion was not considered an active actor in
9
political life. As matter of fact, the first Italian polling institution (Doxa) conducted
surveys on its own initiative until the 1990s, because none of the parties or other
institutions had ever commissioned one.
Forecasting an election is challenging and the understanding of why some polls
get it right and others get it wrong is important to better ascertain the evolution
of election campaigns and, above all, voters’ voting intentions across time. Indeed,
there is a vast literature showing that the quality of polls is affected by sampling er-
ror, non-response sets, and so on (Groves et al. 2009). For instance, random samples
may produce variation among polls because they include a sample of respondents
rather than of populations. This error is shown in the margin error and it could be
resolved by increasing the sample size. Another source of error is the design decision
undertaken by the pollster. Some academic works have provided evidence of bias
deriving, for instance, from the number and type of days in the field (Lau 1994).
According to this, there are a variety of methodological decisions taken by pollsters
that affect the quality of poll predictions, such as the definition of likely voters or
how to treat the share of undecided voters.
The estimation of poll accuracy is not the only way to assess the performance
of the pollsters, but it has certainly been the most common so far. Poll results vary
over the course of election campaigns and across polling organizations, making it
difficult to track genuine changes in voters’ support (Jackman 2005; Erikson and
Wlezein 1999; Pickup and Johnston 2008). Pollsters know that to maintain their
credibility they must forecast accurately. For instance, retrospective analysis of poll
10
accuracy also provides us information to assess the reputation of polling houses.
A good example is the death of the Literary Digest newspaper after its failure to
predict the 1936 Presidential election despite the fact that from 1916 to 1932 it was
able correctly to predict the election results.
This thesis tries to shed light on the relationship between voter behaviour and
polling. In particular, the aim is to explore the conditions under which the latter
is an inaccurate method of recording and predicting voters’ voting intentions. To
quote Roper’s words, “if a study deals with a matter of facts [...] it is more likely to
be accurate than if it is measuring an opinion [...] And surveys measuring opinion
are likely to be more accurate than those measuring future intentions” (1984:28).
1.2 Reasons
The literature on the predictive accuracy of Italian polling over election cam-
paigns has grown rapidly only in the last few years. When starting this thesis, there
were few academic works on Italian elections and none of them took into account the
accuracy of polls across elections. Instead, these studies focus on the performance of
polls in predicting the electoral results, only considering one election at a time and
just the two major parties/coalitions, according to the statistical measure applied
(Callegaro and Gasperoni 2008; D’Agata and Tomaselli 2013). None of these works
investigate the predictive accuracy of Italian polling across time taking into account
the multi-party and multi-coalition features of the Italian political system by revis-
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ing the accuracy measures. Moreover, the originality of the Italian case lies in the
fact that it allows us to fill at least three gaps in the literature. Firstly, Italy has a
multiparty system and so far, all the academic works have been mainly focused on
the American system concerning the accuracy and the reliability of poll predictions.
Specifically, we will employ several accuracy measures and revise them in order to
fit with a multi party system like Italy and a new measure designed for this political
system. In addition, the two hypotheses later drawn in this thesis estimate which
factor most affects the accuracy of poll predictions in the Italian polling. In other
words (to our knowledge), this thesis represents one of the few academic works in
the literature that simultaneously investigates the accuracy and the causes of inac-
curacy among poll predictions for a multi-party system across time. Secondly, the
most important purpose of this thesis is to show which factor most affects the accu-
racy of poll predictions. In other words, this thesis aims not only to show how many
polls are classified as inaccurate in Italian polling in the last three general elections,
but to investigate what causes inaccuracy among them using different approaches
and models. To do that, a statistical analysis of the two major factors that in the
literature are considered to affect poll inaccuracy the most will be undertaken: the
factors are the house effect and voters sentiment change. The purpose is to discover
which of them is more responsible for the discrepancy between poll predictions and
electoral results in Italian polling. Thirdly, the role of polls in election campaigns
has experienced a fast-growing importance in Western European countries over the
last few decades. Shedding light on the accuracy and the causes of inaccuracy of poll
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predictions also allows us to examine the election campaign itself in more depth.
1.3 Overview
In the next chapter, we will review the literature on the Italian polling experience
so far and all the issues linked with the use of polls as a forecast method. Specifically,
the first part of the chapter is devoted to explaining the Italian experience of polling
and we compare it to that of other countries. In addition, we will discuss the
use of polls during election campaigns, focusing on their role so we can ascertain
the fundamentals of election campaigns. The principal issues concerning the use of
polls to estimate election results will be discussed by introducing the methodological
problems linked with carrying them out during an election campaign (e.g. the
question wording). Following the literature on polling and the Italian experience,
we will describe the main research question and the hypotheses of this thesis. In
chapter 3, we will present the statistical methodologies employed in order to test
the two hypotheses on the main causes of inaccuracy in Italian polling. Specifically,
this chapter will discuss how to revise the well-established accuracy measures used
so far in order to fit the Italian case and the new accuracy measures proposed for
the multi-party system. These measures provide evidence of the amount of polls
classified as inaccurate and the overall degree of error in poll readings over the three
elections respectively. Then, we will describe the two main approaches to estimating
the house effect and we will introduce the autoregressive model and its application
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to estimate voters sentiment change in Italian voters. In addition, all sections will
describe how to revise these procedures in order to fit the Italian case. Chapters 4,
5, and 6 will be devoted to presenting the outcomes of analysis of accuracy, house
effect, and voters sentiment change over the last three Italian general elections (2006,
2008, and 2013). Specifically, each chapter will show the extent of inaccuracy and
the degree error given by house effect and/or voters sentiment change in Italian
polling over the three campaigns.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter is devoted to presenting a literature review of the main topics
concerning the accuracy of polls during election campaigns, the Italian experience of
polling, and the main factors that affect the predictive accuracy of polls. Specifically,
many scholars have shown concern about the use of polls to predict the winner in
an election competition (Crespi 1988; Coverse and Traugott 1986; Callegaro and
Gasperoni 2008; Erikson and Wlezien 1999). Despite this, in recent decades the
discussion of polls has mainly focused on the their capability of recording the level
of support for political parties at the time they are carried out (Hillygus 2011).
This seems to be particularly the case in Italy, where for a long time polls have
been the private business of pollsters and, in a few cases, something between pollsters
and politicians. Only since the 2006 general election have Italian campaigns begun
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to be characterized by the presence of polls but with the purpose of predicting the
winner rather than of just recording the level of support for the political parties over
the course of the election campaign.
With this in mind, the remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In
the next section, we will explain the Italian experience of polling particularly in
light of the experiences of other countries. In section three, we will discuss the
use of polls in the election campaigns focusing on their role in ascertaining their
fundamentals of election campaigns. In the last section, we will present the principal
issues concerning the use of polls to estimate the election results. Specifically, this
section will discuss the methodological problems linked to carrying out polls over
an election campaign (like the question wording). The last section will present the
research question and hypotheses of this thesis.
2.2 The Italian experience of polling and the elec-
toral system
The Italian experience of polling is different from that of other European coun-
tries and the US in at least two respects: politically and culturally. With regard
to the former, the first appearance of polls in Italy dates back to the beginning of
democracy immediately after the end of Fascism. In fact, the first poll was carried
out in Sicily in 1943 by the US army, with the purpose of investigating whether it
was a method applicable even in a non-democratic, non- Anglo Saxon country. How-
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ever, this American influence caused scepticism in the two largest Italian parties.
For instance, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) had a strongly critical attitude
to polls because it saw them as an American product, and therefore as something
inherently suspect given the influences of Marxist culture. Given such assumptions,
polls were viewed as tools to reduce and even destroy the role of the politics of
class-consciousness (Reda 2011; Rinauro 2002). The Italian political system of the
First Republic was characterized by two factors, the first being the deep-rootedness
of two large parties, known as “church-parties”, the Christian Democrats (DC) and
the PCI, which divided voters into two groups, to one or the other of which the
majority of them belonged. Secondly, there was no alternation in government. The
parties further to the right and the left were considered to be ‘anti-system’ and
therefore unavailable as potential governing partners. Under these circumstances
the DC, in the centre of the spectrum, was the largest party and the mainstay of
all feasible governing coalitions with no possibility of the opposition parties being
able to come together to offer voters the prospect of a governing alternative. For
this reason, Italian election campaigns had none of the horse race features charac-
teristic of contests between parties in systems that are bipolar. Before the 1990s,
then, polls were considered pointless due to the absence of majoritarian competition
between parties for control of the executive. This is also the reason why the fast-
growing presence of polls in Italian political life occurred only after the fall of the
Berlin Wall, which brought an end to the sharp ideological cleavage between the two
big parties in Italy, the DC and the PCI, and precipitated the Clean Hands (Mani
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Pulite) scandal. This gave public opinion a role it had never played before in Italian
political life, as well as bringing about the birth of Forza Italia, which was looking
for legitimation and support using new forms of political communication (in primis
opinion polls). With regard to the cultural factor (which is also a consequence of
the political factors), the former Italian pollsters were essentially only statisticians
rather than sociologists, political scientists or economists. Therefore, polls were
used more for the purpose of scientific and academic inquiry than for political mar-
ket analysis, as in most other European countries and the US. For instance, the first
Italian polling institution, Doxa, conducted surveys on its own initiative until the
1990s, because none of the parties or other institutions had ever commissioned any
from it. Before the so called ‘Second Republic’, the use of opinion polls was sporadic
and only carried out on the initiative of polling institutions themselves and in a few
cases by the DC. The latter recognized the capacity of polls to give it information
not only about who would be likely to vote for the party, but also about the public’s
attitudes with regard to political issues. For instance, the DC commissioned polls
to ascertain what the public wanted in terms of policy orientations. The Italian
pollster did not consider public opinion as an active actor in political life; rather,
it was seen as the audience and the principal news to talk about (Reda 2011). In
light of this, the early 1990s brought about a new relationship between politicians
and public opinion mediated by polls. The major factors surrounding the growing
use of polls in Italian political life are the decline of political parties and the greater
personalization of politics.
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The 1994 general election was the first Italian election campaign entirely man-
aged and addressed on the basis of directions provided by the Prime Minister can-
didates. This idea was further consolidated over the next five years thanks to Silvio
Berlusconi, who employed marketing strategies in election campaigns and also a
massive use of polls to select the issues for the ‘public’ to refer to. Meanwhile,
in 1993 the Italian parliament promulgated a law establishing an embargo on the
publication of polls during the fifteen days leading up to the days of elections; the
pollsters had to publish a form along with the polls containing all the methodological
features employed to carry them out. In 2000, this law was strengthened through
the following three points: the polls must not be published during the fifteen days
prior to Election Day; the Italian authority for the communications and publishing
(Agenzia per le comunicazioni - AGCOM) was the only one entitled to establish the
standards that pollsters must follow when carrying out a poll; and all the polls must
be published on the official website managed by AGCOM, including a form with the
methodological features. In the following years, attention given to polls experienced
a growth in Italian political life thanks to their publication in media such as TV
debates or newspapers.
Table 2.1: Number of polls published in Italy between 2000 and 2013
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Tot
23 148 139 59 227 262 303 319 345 308 438 N/A 342 650 3.563
Source: Self elaboration of data obtained from www.sondaggiopoliticoelettorali.it
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As table 2.1 shows, the number of polls published in the last 14 years shows a
rising trend. Indeed, their publication per year rose from 23 to 650. In the last
decade in Italy, polls have had a stable position in political life, allowing them to
estimate opinions among voters, especially close to and during the election campaign.
However, Reda (2011) has pointed out that this experience is different from that in
other countries like the US and France, where there is a more extensive publication
of polls. Indeed, one of the features of the Italian case is that there are still fewer
polls published across the year than in any other Western democracy. This is also
due to the role of television in Italian social and political life. In the light of this,
Mazzoleni and Sfardini (2009) have pointed out that polls have established their
position in Italian political life as strong communication tools used by the media
and, in particular, by television. In other words, polls became an important part
of infotaiment. Moreover, it was not unusual in the press to find a link between
this use of polls and Berlusconi’s entrepreneurial political style, especially during
election campaigns. For instance, Reda (2012) reported that there were 150 titles
in the press dedicated to the linkage between polls and Berlusconi over 12 years
(1998 - 2010). This never happened to either the left or to other Italian political
parties of the right. Therefore, the use of polls in Italy has been constantly linked
to Berlusconi, thanks also to his personal relationship with the director of Diakron
(polling institution) Gianni Pilo, who was also a deputy of the Casa delle Liberta`
between 1994 and 1996.
Moreover, Berlusconi applied a management strategy concerning the use of polls.
20
A positive poll results in terms of level of support for a given political party might
produce a double effect. On the one hand, it keeps the voters reassured about the
strength of the party, and on the other hand, the higher level of support frightens
rival parties. Berlusconi is the first politician in Italy clearly to use polls as a
strong communication tool for victory or to regain losses of share with the purpose
of taking advantage of the classical bandwagon and underdog effects. The first
happens when the voter is more likely to vote for the candidate who is the front-
runner in terms of the poll readings. In this case, the individuals’ knowledge that one
or the other candidate is favoured to win induces them to support that candidate,
thanks to psychological mechanisms that are either cognitive or affective or some
combination of both. In the former case the individual, required to make a choice,
has recourse to the fallacious argumentum ad populum (‘The majority of people
support Berlusconi so he must be the best candidate’) in order to decide. In the
latter case, the individual seeks to avoid the discomfort of feeling alone or in a
minority. Conversely, the underdog effect occurs when the voter is more likely to
vote for the candidate who is the loser according to the same forecast.
According to Pagnocelli and Vannucci (2006), there is a good correlation between
the declaration of voting intentions and expectations about who will be the winner
in the election. If the overall of sample is confident of a centre-left victory, the
percentage of voters declaring that they will vote for the centre-left increases. In
addition, the number of voters who declare they will vote for the centre-right does
not change as the overall sample is confident of a centre-right victory. The number of
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undecided voters decreases when the overall sample does not declare any preference.
A good example of this strategy is the 2006 General Election when Casa delle
Liberta` (the main centre-right coalition) strongly criticized the estimate from any
polls which showed the party as the loser in the race. Moreover, Berlusconi reported
that on the basis of a poll commissioned by himself from an American polling in-
stitution (PSB), the Casa delle Liberta` was actually leading the race. Berlusconi
pursued a strong communication strategy with the purpose of keeping the attention
of voters and, in particular, of undecided voters during the election. Other rea-
sons why the increased use of polls in Italian political life is linked to Berlusconi are
twofold: his formidable presence as Prime Minister over the last 20 years and, above
all, how he was able to bring the lessons from other Western countries of the use
of polls into the Italian context. Moreover, Berlusconi was able to ascertain when
to follow and not follow public opinion as reported in the polls concerning public
policies during his mandates.
This is also confirmed by Callegaro and Gasperoni (2008) who pointed out how
polls have played a more significant role in Italian political life since the 2006 gen-
eral elections thanks to the leader of the centre-right coalitions (Silvio Berlusconi),
who undertook an intensive election campaign constantly quoting their results and,
among others things, accusing Italian pollsters of being biased in favour of the
centre-left (Stella 2006). Moreover, the most important factor in the increasingly
significant role of polls in Italy was the change of voting system just a few months
before the election. Indeed, after the Clean Hands scandal, the pressure to adopt a
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majoritarian electoral system grew quickly in order to allow voters to choose their
representatives. One of the main effects of the majoritarian system was a strong
personalization of election campaigns focused on the Prime Ministerial candidates.
According to Pagnocelli and Vannucci (2006), the new electoral system increases
the attention given by all actors in the election campaign to the coalitions and,
in particular, to their Prime Ministerial candidates1. Consequently, the parties
composing the coalitions mainly spend their resources on developing good commu-
nication campaigns in order to direct as much of their voters’ attention as they can
to their Prime Ministerial candidates. This provides a higher chance of getting the
desired results. The effect of the new electoral system lies also in the fact that this
change represents a true overturning of the previous system. In other words, the lat-
ter combined the single member, simple-majority, and proportional systems, which
was actually a disadvantages for the centre-right: to a greater extent than was true
for the centre- left, those willing to support one of its parties in the proportional
arena were not always willing to cast their second, single-member, ballots for the
coalition’s candidate when the candidate was drawn from a party other than their
preferred one. The new system eliminated this advantage by allowing voters, if they
wished, to desert their party without having to desert the coalition; for it was to
be one of closed-list proportional representation with a majority premium2. Thanks
1One consequence of the 1993 electoral reform was the greater focus on the prime-ministerial
candidates in election campaigns than in the past.
2For the Chamber of Deputies, parties would present lists in multi-member constituencies and
would be able to field candidates independently or in coalition with others. Voters would make a
single choice of party. There were to be varying exclusion thresholds: four percent for independent
parties and parties in coalitions with less than ten percent; two percent or else a percentage such
as to make it the largest party below two percent for parties in coalition larger than this. The
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to the pressure it created on parties to run as parts of large coalitions (as a means
of reducing the exclusion thresholds they faced maximizing their combined chances
of winning the majority seat premium) this system favoured the government for
a second reason: the centre left was more fragmented and less cohesive than the
centre-right. Given this background, polls were more important and had a higher
profile than in previous elections; for among other things, competition was strongly
bipolar and, thanks to the electoral system, ‘undistorted’ by local variations due to
individual candidates.
2.3 Polls and election campaign
Polls and elections have an interconnected relationship and it is hard to imag-
ine an election campaign without polls. “Poll numbers provide fodder for media
coverage and election predictions, they shape candidate and voter behaviour, and
they are the basis of interpreting the meaning of election outcomes” (Hillygus 2011).
Since the 1960s, polls have been important for the campaign strategy especially for
determining the issues to emphasize because they are very important for voters and
for identifying the persuadable voters. For instance, Eisinger (2003) pointed out that
polls were an integral part of the US presidential campaign because they provided a
reading of public opinion which was independent of the media and political parties.
party or coalition achieving the largest number of votes nationally would, if they had not achieved
it already, automatically be given of 340 of the 630 seats. Arrangements for the Senate were to
be essentially the same with the significant difference that both the exclusion threshold and its
majority premium would be applied region by region.
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Gelman and King (1993) confirmed that the predictive accuracy of polls close to
Election Day is related to actual voting because they are able to record observable
political behaviour and, therefore, provide information on the fundamentals of the
campaign.
Therefore, why is the importance of polls growing over election campaigns? The
answer to this question is challenging. Scholars have pointed out that especially the
US presidential election outcomes in particular are predictable over the campaign at
one point at least (Gelman and King 1993, Cambell 2008). Although the electoral
outcomes may change from one election to the next, at some point the level of
support among voters tends to align as expected on Election Days. Ascertaining
voters sentiment allows us to explain the ‘fundamentals’ of election campaigns. “The
function of a campaign is, then, to inform voters about the fundamental variables
and their appropriate weights; notably, the candidate’s ideologies and their positions
on major issues” (Gelman and King 1993). As some scholars have pointed out, those
fundamentals come directly from the campaigns. The term ‘fundamentals’ here
refers to the set of economic and political circumstances which are known during
the election and make the results predictable even before the eventual outcomes
are stated in the polls. “The campaign effectively brings home the fundamentals to
voters” (Erikson and Wlezien 2012). In other words, the voters’ final decisions are
made up of several variables, which represent the fundamentals. When the campaign
is not able to bring home the fundamentals to voters, it represents a failure of the
campaign itself to fully communicate with the voters by Election Day. According to
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Franklin and Jackson (1983), there are two kinds of fundamental variables. The first
kind refers to the characteristics of voters, such as their positions on given issues,
party identifications and so on. The second refers to the voters’ perception of the
characteristics of candidates such as their ideology and of the incumbency effect.
Another way to define the fundamentals is to focus on their persistence effect
rather than on their ability to drive voters sentiment. Specifically, the fundamentals
are a set of variables that cause a long-term shift in voters’ preferences which lasts for
the rest of the election campaign. When and how those fundamentals appear during
the campaign changes even within the election itself, as well as from one campaign
to the next. For instance, some of them could appear even before the official election
campaign has started; others simply evolve during the course of the campaign. In
light of this, there are two different assumptions in the literature. The first is that
the influence of fundamentals highlights that the campaign does not matter in the
end. In other words, its predictability has minimal effects. The second assumption
is based on the “predictable campaign” of Campbell (2008), which refers to all
those strategies employed during the campaign in order to structure partisan votes.
In other words, the campaign does matter because there are substantial campaign
effects even if they are cancelled out.
Campaigns influence voters through the fundamentals in three ways: learning,
priming, and persuasion. According to the first way, the predictability of a campaign
also implies that the voters are enlightened by campaigns through their interest in
or their view of government performance (Gelman and King 1993). Some cross-
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sectional research has pointed out how the fundamentals can actually last even longer
than the election campaign (Stevenson and Vabreck 2000) because voters have more
time to ‘learn’ about them. On this basis, fundamentals help voters to learn and
stay focused on the positions of parties and candidates, as well as to increase their
political attention in order to decide as Election Day approaches. In a multiparty
system especially where there is lower visibility of candidates, the fundamentals of
election campaigns play a crucial role. For instance, low-visibility election speeches
provide information to voters in order to help them gauge the candidates’s ideology
or manifesto. The second way to influence voters using fundamentals is through the
knowledge that voters themselves have about to different topics.
In the literature, priming has mostly been investigated by attention to the acti-
vation of voters’ partisan predispositions (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954),
racial cues (Mendelberg, 2001), and gender (Kahn and Goldenberg 1991). For in-
stance, Vavreck (2009) has pointed out that the candidates choose the election
campaign issues according to their ability to gain the attention of voters and there-
fore, dictate the election outcome. The third way the campaign can influence voters
is through persuasion. Using Erikson and Wlezien’s (2012) words: ‘What matters
most, after all, is changing voters’ electoral preference” and to do that the campaign
must persuade voters to move their decision in candidates’ preferred directions (Bar-
tels 2006, Hillygus and Shields 2008). Despite the different ways the campaigns use
fundamentals to shift voters sentiments, we cannot rule out that the campaigns’
events include many political shocks that may produce changes in voters sentiment.
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In other words, all the campaign events (speeches, advertising, mobilization efforts
and so on) produce inputs that voters evaluate during an election campaign. The
difficulty is to estimate their effects on those evaluations and, in particular, on voters
sentiment. One way to estimate could be using polls, but a part of the ‘change’ re-
ported is also due to sampling error. In other words, the estimation is spurious and
the effects deriving directly from speeches or TV debates rarely have a long-term
impact. However, polls are the most common tool used over the election campaign
to record the response in terms of changes in voters sentiment because the true
change has a short temporary duration compared with the voters sentiment change
as reported in polls. According to this, if the campaign events do have effects on
voters sentiment, we should be able to observe this in poll movements over the course
of the campaign.
During an election campaign, voters do not have access to full information on
candidates but they do gather and increase this information over time, with the
largest increase just before Election Day. In other words, voters do not have the
necessary information at the beginning of the campaign to state their voting inten-
tions. Polls ask whether they intend to vote and for whom vote and, in doing so,
they provide basic information about the election race. Voters use this information
about the fundamentals variables and they report their ‘likely’ vote to the pollster.
However, it may be possible that responses reported in polls are biased because of
differences in the information available then, and on Election Day. In other words,
the discrepancy between polls and election results is also due to the extent to which
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voters’ information sets increase over the course of the election campaign. It assumes
that voters little by little improve their knowledge of their fundamentals variables
and gather all the essential information that they need by Election Day. According
to this, polls at the beginning of the election campaign are the result of the degree
of information available at that time. A good example of this is the work of Gelman
and King (1993), where the evidence of most of change among polls is given by
the change in voters’ perceptions of the relative importance of their fundamentals
variables, rather than the change in the value of those fundamentals.
In addition, Gelman and King (1993) have pointed out that campaign strategists
use the results provided by polls carried out at the start of the campaign in order
to create their strategies for the event. The latter become endogenous parts of
the campaign because strategists attempt to take advantage of this information
by selecting only certain groups of likely voters. However, these are short-term
strategies, because closer to Election Day, respondents gather their fundamentals
variables and weight them to maximize their interest or goal in the election.
In the light of the main purpose of this thesis, explaining what most causes the
inaccuracy of polls over an election competition, also allows us to explain to what
extent the fundamentals actually do matter and how voters sentiment has been
influenced by the campaign itself.
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2.4 Polls: definition
According to the literature, the poll is a tool to estimate people’s perceptions
of their own behaviour; what they think about themselves; or their representation
in the eyes of those who are asking them. More formally, polls are a method of
gathering information about a population through a list of questions asked of a
sample supposedly representative of a population (Barisione and Manheimer 1999).
Following Natale (2004), it is possible to classify polls into two different types on
the basis of their main purpose. The cognitive poll aims to ascertain deep opinions
in order to observe the most important issues linked with them in public opinion.
The forecast poll aims to estimate future intentions or behaviour in the near future
in public opinion. According to this, the first type is a snapshot of public opinion
at the time it is carried out. The second type provide information about the likely
development of intentions and/or behaviour among the public opinion. The best
example of a forecast poll is the pre-election poll, which obverses the actual level of
support among voters with the purpose of ‘predicting’ future voting intentions, e.g.
the electoral results. A poll is different from the pseudo-poll which is commonly used
in TV-shows. Here, the host poses a generic question on the main topic of the day
and the audience can answer yes or no simply by phone or by sending a text. In the
light of this, the pseudo-poll is not considered a proper poll for at least three reasons.
Firstly, it does not employ any statistical sampling procedures because it is based on
voluntary participation in the pseudo-poll of the TV-audience. Secondly, those who
30
are following the show can answer when the question is posed by the host. Thirdly,
anyone may call or send a text more than once providing an overestimation of his
own opinion. The first pre -election poll dates back to 1936 when the Washington
Post published the results of a poll conducted by Gallup. It is considered to be
an example of the first type of poll because it used a sampling procedure that had
never occurred before. Indeed, the first example of a poll was conducted in the
seventeenth century with the main purpose of estimating the size of a population
using the ‘count’ of a portion of the citizens. At the beginning of the eighteenth
century, modern statistical science introduced the theory of probability. This event
is important to the use of pre-election polls because it provided the theoretical
framework of inferential procedures to follow to collect data from a small part of
the population and, then, to extend the findings to the rest. An earlier version of
polls is represented by straw polls. These were generally taken among participants
in group meetings during the course of election campaigns with the main purpose
of ‘counting’ the opinions or public sentiments towards a given candidate. The best
(and likely first example) of straw polls is the questionnaire sent by the Literary
Digest to its subscribers concerning the outcomes of the 1936 Presidential elections,
to be filled in and sent back by post. However it cannot be considered a poll for
at least two reasons. Firstly, its sample was composed only of subscribers to the
magazine. Secondly, the delivery method meant that participation in the poll was
voluntary. In other words, the questionnaire was sent by post and the subscribers
were invited to fill it in and send it back by post.
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A poll is generally conducted through a structured interview, where the questions
posed are the same for all the sample. There are several ways to carry out a survey
or opinion-polls interview:
• Face - to - face interview using a paper work or an electronic questionnaire
stored on a personal computer (CAPI - Computer Assisted Personal Inter-
view);
• Phone interview using the CATI system (Computer Assisted Telephone Inter-
view);
• Post interview using the PAPI system (Paper and Pencil Interview);
• Web interview using the CAWI system (Computer Assisted Web Interview);
• Mobile interview using SMS.
The most commonly used so far is the CATI system because it is the least expen-
sive in terms of cost and time. However, in recent years the use of the CAWI system
has become increasingly commonplace and there is also an emerging literature on
the methodological issues concerning the use of the web in delivering social surveys.
There are at least two main disadvantages in using the CATI system. Firstly, there
is a methodological issue concerning the sampling procedure because, for instance,
not all the population has a landline or has agreed to be entered in the phone book.
A good example of this is the work of Mokrzycki, Keeter, and Kennedy (2009), which
has revealed a bias against Democratic candidates due to the exclusion of those not
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included in the phone book or being in cell-phone only households. Secondly, the
questions posed and the answers given must be clear and short as far as possible.
Given that the interview is carried out by phone, the interviewer must be clear and
fast in order to keep the interviewee’s attention throughout the whole interview.
To carry out a poll correctly, the following criteria should be satisfied:
• The main purpose and the general inference of the poll must be clear;
• The pollster must define the sample properly. Specifically, the sample must
be consistent with the survey design;
• The sample reproduces all the features of the population from which it has
been drawn;
• The proportion of replacement into the sample because of respondents who
are unreachable or refuse to answer must be kept under control;
• All the interviews are standardized, that is they are carried out in the same
way;
• The pollster must define a limited amount of time to carry out the poll (e.g.
three days or one week).
According to Barisione and Manheirmer (1999), these criteria must met over the
course of in eight principal stages. Firstly, the ‘unit of analysis’ must be defined,
that is how and/or what is being studied. The second and third stages focus on
the questionnaire: the design of the questions (known as question wording) and the
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testing of the questionnaire. In the fourth and fifth stages, the pollster deals with the
sampling procedure and the delivery of the questionnaire. Once the interview has
been undertaken, pollsters code and analyze the data collected (stage six) and they
report the outcome of descriptive and multivariate analysis (stage seven). Then,
pollsters disseminate the evidence and the causal interpretation of results.
According to Pagnoncelli and Vannucci (2006), polls allow us to better under-
stand the trends in voters’ support of political parties; to ascertain the behaviour
of voters belonging to other parties; to measure the most important issues and the
opinions about those among voters; and to identify and pursue the most efficient
communication strategy.
2.5 Polls: problem
The relationship between political polling on the one hand and voter behaviour
and action on the other has spawned a rich literature - one of the most influential
‘anti-polling’ pieces being the article in which Pierre Bourdieu claims that ‘public
opinion’ is in fact an artifact of pollsters’ attempts to measure it, and therefore a
term with a significant capacity to mislead (1979). As Susan Herbst (1992) has
pointed out, Bourdieu argues, among other things, that not everyone has the same
capacity to produce an opinion and one can only have an informed opinion if one per-
ceives the world in the same way as the pollsters; that some people’s opinions carry
more weight than others’; that in the normal course of events people form their opin-
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ions in the light of their knowledge of the positions of interest groups and others, so
that the neutrality and objectivity of poll questions, in avoiding mention of such po-
sitions, prevents ‘true’ opinions from emerging; that polls manufacture rather than
measure opinion because pollsters’ choices of questions are made without regard to
the extent to which the issues involved are meaningful or significant to the respon-
dents themselves. Bourdieu’s stance appears to echo the view of philosophers of
social sciences that actions and beliefs are logically, not causally connected and that
opinions and beliefs can never be known directly but only through the actions - such
as answers to pollsters’ questions - that manifest them (see e.g. Rosenberg 1988).
From this point of view, it is difficult to see the sense in which ‘public opinion’ can be
said to exist independently of pollsters’ attempts to capture it - but - consequently
it is easy to appreciate the potential of polls as political weapons, able to create the
illusion that there exists a public opinion as the mere sum of individuals’ opinions,
and thereby able to legitimate the policies and power relationships that inspire them
in the first place. Among more positive approaches, Ceri (1997) argues that politi-
cal polls have many functions including finding out about and transmitting political
demands; communicating political supply, and checking level of support, where polls
have come to be considered as the detectors, par excellence, of what voters think
and what they will vote for. In other words, polls seek to sound out respondents’
deep opinions, that is, they consolidate opinions based on the representations that
cause the feelings that push them towards action, for example, voting for one party
rather than another. Therefore, if polls are used to ascertain these opinions, they
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can do so only when they arouse and call back to conscious awareness strong and
shared feelings (McKelvey and Ordershook 1985, 1990). From this perspective, us-
ing polls to make forecasts is based on two assumptions. First, declared preferences
are mechanically translated into a choice to vote for the given political party. In
other words, it is as if there exists a direct causal relationship between attitude and
behaviour, between declaring a preference for a political party and actually voting
for it. Second, there is some over-time stability in voting choice (Page and Shapiro
1992). It assumes that in the population studied, changes of preference for political
parties during the time between the interview and the election are so small as to
not significantly influence the substantive accuracy of the estimation. The problem
with these assumptions is that they are revealed not to be true when we compare
declarations of voting intentions with election outcomes. What is the cause of the
discrepancy?
There are at least two elements that stand in the way of accurate forecasting
using the results of polls: the volatility of the voter over time and the distortions
inherent in polling methods themselves. With regard to the first element, the ten-
dency has been for voting behaviour to be seemingly more volatile in recent years.
In the case of Italy, the growth of political polling and the publication of poll results
has occurred at a time of growing movement of voters from one party to another (at
least within the same coalition) caused by changes in the bases of voter behaviour.
In particular, where once the latter was heavily influenced by those factors under-
lying the so-called ‘vote of belonging’ (Parisi and Pasquino 1977) - voting tending
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‘to be the expression of an automatic, unreflecting, subjective identification with
the political party seen as an entity organically linked to the social group to which
the voter belonged’ (Bull and Newell 2005) - voting is now more likely to be based
on specific preferences (for agendas, themes, and so on...) underlying the so-called
‘opinion vote’ with the voter changing party from one election to the next in ac-
cordance with these preferences. In addition, there is another kind of vote, the
so-called ‘trade vote’, whereby the voter supports a candidate in the expectation
that the candidate will give her something, or do something specific once elected
(for example, finding her a job). Under these circumstances, the political party
wants to know in advance how large the percentage of ‘undecided voters’ is, that
they might control this through the ‘trade vote’. The polls are, then, used both as
a mirror of public opinion, and as a tool by which to manipulate it.
According to Natale (2004), another source of error in carrying out polls comes
from the difficulty of properly estimating what people think without distorting this
eventually. Pagnoncelli and Vannuci (2006) have pointed out that there are at least
three factors which affect the forecast. Firstly, the interviewee tends to project
his own voting intention on a large scale. Secondly, the undecided voters may be
affected by the bandwagon effect because predicting that a given political party will
win is commonplace across the media. Thirdly, the voter is less likely to lie and
declare his real voting intention when he believes that it is also the voting intention
of the majority of voters. All of these factors have effects, such as distorting real
voting intentions because they function as a forecast of the winner; producing an
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‘error’ of expectations; the failure of polls (disagreement between poll results and
the true voting intentions).
According to the literature, polls may fail when used to predict election results
for a variety of reasons including: end-of campaign changes in voting intentions;
differential voter turnout; the effect of polls themselves on voting behaviour (Oskamp
and Schultz 2005). However, there are also three groups of significant methodological
problems underlying the use of polls to predict the outcomes of elections: sampling
error, design error, and house effects (Converse and Traugott 1986; Erikson and
Tedin 2011; Roper 1984). Regarding the first, one of most significant problems is
‘non response’ - a problem whose significance derives from its ambiguous quality and,
therefore, the role it plays with respect to the randomness and representativeness of
a sample. Non-response refers to an ‘obscure area’ covering: voters who are not at
home or do not reply when telephoned; voters who refuse to answer; the undecided
voter. For many scholars, refusal to reveal one’s voting intentions and genuine
indecision about the choice have been given heightened significance in the Italian
case thanks to the dramatic political and party -system change of the 1990s - which
saw the appearance of many political forces that were new and therefore unfamiliar
to many voters (Crespi 1988). The problem lies in the fact that the distribution
of the voting choices of non- respondents is in all probability different from the
distributions among respondents. The responses of the latter cannot, therefore, be
projected onto the sample as a whole. When someone is conducting a poll, one of
the most tricky moments comes in attempting to gain the cooperation of all people
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included in a sample. The randomness and the representativeness of a sample require
that every individual in the population has the same known probability of being
chosen as a respondent, and non-response influences the two essential requirements
of samples significantly. There are two biases to take into consideration: ‘design
bias’ (you might not find all the people included in your sample at home) and
‘participation bias’ (even if you find them in, it is not certain that they will agree
to be interviewed). If the random sample requires that every individual has the
same known probability of being included, then these biases ensure that a sample is
really random only at the moment of extraction of individuals. When the interviewee
refuses to answer or is not home, the pollster replaces her with one of a list extracted
from the same population and weights the answer gained by the number of non-
responses. These statistical procedures are based on the assumption that there
is a sufficient equivalence between the individual replaced and her replacement -
and yet they represent one of the major causes of the failure of polls to predict
election outcomes. “The greatest difficulty of all is the fact that election itself is
not a census, but an application of the sampling principle. Every poll is therefore
a sample of a sample (Crossley 1937)”. According to Crossley (1937), the exact
population to whom pollsters try to impute the information given is unknown: we
do not know who will vote on Election Day. Another problem linked with the sample
is the selection of likely voters. Crespi (1988) has pointed out how the forecast
changes on the basis of the method employed to define the expected voters. A good
example is represented by the work of Erikson, Panagolopous and Wlezien (2004)
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where the 19-point change in support from Gore to Bush over the 2000 Presidential
campaign is due to the artifact of Gallup’s likely voter screen. Indeed, it is common
among polling institutions to use self-reported measures of voter registrations or
voting histories rather than more up-to-date scholarly research explaining political
participation. The volatility of polls may be reduced by aggregating poll predictions.
Therefore, pooling polls improves the accuracy of polling estimates because a larger
sample size has a smaller margin of error. However, the simple aggregations made
by averaging all the available poll readings ignores important effects like the house
effect. In addition, it assumes that sources of error for each poll will cancel each
other out, but where the bias works in the same direction, the aggregation will not
reduce bias.
Regarding design error, there are at least two causes: timing and the question
wording. Firstly, if a question is asked too soon after an event, it may result in mea-
suring an initial or knee-jerk reaction and not a more considered opinion, the latter
being the purpose of polling (Lang and Lang 1984). Secondly, question wording
concerns both the form in which the question is cast (that is, open or closed ques-
tions) and the choice of words for each item (Lang and Lang 1984). Generally, polls
use closed questions, which require a selection from a fixed set of answers. Within
the category of closed questions, there are various forms, styles, and a number of
alternatives offered such as the explicit inclusion - or otherwise- of ‘don’t know’
or ‘no opinion’ as response categories. Regarding the choice of words, there are
a number of statement forms, variation amongst which tends to produce different
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results as well as their own inherent problems. A common form is the use of the
Likert statement with which respondents are asked to agree or disagree. There is a
predisposition on the part of people to agree with a statement in particular if the
statement regards something they have little knowledge about. The second related
form is known as the ‘yeasay’ effect, where similarity between the statements may
induce respondents to reply yes to unidirectional phrasing. Whichever form is used,
common wording issues can compound problems: for instance, the double negative
statement, which causes confusion and uncertainty in the respondent. Crespi and
Morris (1984) have pointed out that the question order produces different estimates
of support for a given candidate.
The house effect refers to biases caused by methodologies employed by different
polling institutions. Many important academic works show that surveys can vary
across houses due to differences in question wording, target populations, data collec-
tion mode, interviewer training, and procedures for coping with refusal (Converse
and Traugott 1986; Lau 1994; Crespi 1988; Erikson and Wlezien 1999). Accord-
ing to this, poll results vary from one day to the next in part because different
houses conduct them on different days. Therefore, this variation may be seen as
an artifact of the polling process rather than a true reflection of voting intention
volatility. Other works have pointed out how pooling together estimates from the
different polls produces a more accurate estimate, which limits the impact of both
random variation between polling samples and systematic effect generated by the
house effect (Erikson and Wlezien 1999; Jackman 2005; Pickup and Johnston 2008).
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Pagnoncelli and Vannucci (2006) have introduced the idea of ‘illusory variance’ of
polls. In other words, polls are conducted by different polling houses so that what
changes from one day to the next is not the level of support for parties among vot-
ers but the various methods employed by polling houses to ascertain the level of
support.
2.6 Research question and hypotheses
With this in mind, accuracy here refers to the correspondence between poll
results and the actual election outcomes. Despite the fact that many academic
works have pointed out that polls are not a method to forecast election outcomes,
they are still used both by academics and pollsters to predict voters’ behaviour
(Erikson and Wlezien 1999; Wlezien et al 2013). Therefore, the principal question
to address is:
• Under what conditions are polls inaccurate as predictors of voters’ behaviour?
The last two decades have experienced many cases of polls’ failure to accurately
predict the outcome of elections as in the British General Election of the 1992 and
2015 (Jowell, Hedge, Lynn, Farrant, and Heath, 1993); the 1998 Quebec Election
(Durand, Blais, and Vachon, 2001); the 2002 and 2007 French Presidential Election
(Durand, Blais, and Larochelle, 2004, Durand 2008). According to these studies, we
know pollsters get it wrong mainly for methodological reasons (they arguably create
as much as measure “public opinion”, sampling, question wording), and/or socio-
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political reasons (electoral system; characteristics of parties), and/or sociological
reasons (voters’ change their minds, socio- demographic characteristics) (Durand,
Deslauries, Goyder, and Foucalt 2010). What we know less is which of these various
factors are the most significant ones in causing inaccuracy. As already pointed
out, there is not existing academic work studying polling in Italy in terms of their
predictive accuracy over the last ten years. It is important to shed light on accuracy
because although polls can only measure opinion at the time they are taken, they are
used by pollsters and academics to predict voters’ future intentions. They therefore
become an integral part of election campaigns themselves, so shedding light on
the conditions under which they will be more or less accurate will also help us to
understand election campaigns better.
Figure 2.1: Different types of poll performance on the basis of their accu-
racy/inaccuracy
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With this in mind, there are four different types of accuracy/inaccuracy, as
follows (see figure 2.1 ):
1. Chance Predictor: the poll is statistically accurate but methodologically not
robust;
2. Good Predictor: the poll is statistically accurate and methodologically robust;
3. Bad Predictor: the poll is statistically inaccurate but methodologically robust;
4. Failed Predictor: the poll is statistically inaccurate and methodologically not
robust;
For the purpose of this thesis, we will analyze cases where statistical inaccuracy (3
and 4) occurs in order to explain the conditions under wich polls could be considered
‘inaccurate’ predictors of voters’ behaviour.
The main hypotheses are:
• H1: The inaccuracy of polls is caused by the house effect;
• H2: The inaccuracy of polls is caused by changes of voters intentions between
the time the polls are carried out and Election Day;
In order to test these hypotheses, two analyses will be carried out. Firstly, to
test the hypothesis of voters changing their mind as at least a partial source of error,
we need to look at the trend in true voters sentiment over the election campaign
assuming that the level of support for a given party is a function of yesterday’s
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level of support. If it is not, it suggests that voters are influenced by something else
that must have caused the ‘change’, for instance the house effect affecting polling
responses. Secondly, to test the first hypothesis, we will analyze the variance of poll
readings and their accuracy values using a well-established econometric method.
45
Chapter 3
Methodology
3.1 Introduction
As explained in the previous chapter, the use of polls to forecast an election
is based on two assumptions. Firstly, the declared preferences are mechanically
translated into a choice to vote for a given political party. Secondly, there is some
stability overtime in voting choices. In other words, the change of preference for
a given political party between the time of the interview and the Election Day is
so significantly small as not to influence the accuracy of the estimation. The main
purpose of this thesis is to investigate what are the causes of inaccuracy in polls and
to do that, we have derived two hypotheses from the literature:
• H1 the inaccuracy of polls is caused by the methodologies employed by dif-
ferent polling houses, the so called ‘house effect’;
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• H2 the inaccuracy of polls is caused by voters sentiment change during the
election campaign.
Moreover, the evidence provided by the analysis will also give information about
what has the greatest impact on inaccuracy in polls’ predictions. Before testing
these hypotheses, an analysis of the accuracy of polls over the last three Italian
general elections will be carried out. By using well-established accuracy measures,
we will be able to provide evidence of the number of polls classified as inaccurate and
the overall degree of error among poll readings over the three elections. Moreover,
we will also estimate the timing of accuracy in order to specify whether there are
more polls classified as accurate closer to or farther away from Election Day over all
the elections considered. Then, we will test the two hypotheses using the two models
proposed by Erikson and Wlezien (1999) and their revisions. Therefore, this chapter
is devoted to explaining all the methods employed in this thesis. Accordingly, in
the first section we will discuss the accuracy measures proposed so far. The second
section will describe the two main approaches to estimating the house effect. The
last section will introduce the autoregressive model and its application to estimate
the voters sentiment changes. In addition, all sections will describe how to revise
these procedures in order to fit the Italian case.
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3.2 Accuracy Measure
Polls play an important role during election campaigns and this may be larger
in some elections than others. The potential influence of polls over the course of the
campaign is always present and it means that their design and accuracy is important.
Indeed, the most common method used to estimate the predictive accuracy of poll
readings with regard to voting intentions is to compare the polling estimate for a
given (preferably the leading) party, or the difference between the competing parties,
to the election results. Poll accuracy measures essentially compare intentions to
vote for a particular candidate or political party with official voting results. The
former sets of data are drawn from polls before elections, from samples of voters
with different question wording. The official voting results, otherwise, are based on
actual expressions of preference. Therefore, this comparison is possible only if two
main assumptions are satisfied. Firstly, the data drawn from polls are respondents’
true voting intentions or there is almost perfect agreement between their declaration
and their actual voting intentions. Secondly, if there is any difference between the
polling data and actual votes, these will cancel each other out in the final count
(Geys 2006).
An alternative method is to evaluate the performance of polls throughout the
election campaign the main purpose being to estimate the accuracy of polls at the
time they are taken.
In the academic literature, most statistical measures of accuracy are based on
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the first measure proposed by Mosteller (1949). He introduced eight different meth-
ods to quantify the accuracy of polls, six of them being based upon the estimated
proportion of the vote received by the front-runner or the differences in the esti-
mated margin between the leaders. The most commonly used methods (and the
ones he himself preferred) are methods three and five. The first captures “the error
by averaging the deviation in percentage points between predicted and observed
results for each party (without regard to sign)”(Mosteller 1949). The second uses
“the difference of the oriented difference between predicted and the actual results
for the two major candidates” (Mosteller 1949).
Since then, there has developed a significant literature which has reviewed these
measures. For instance, one of Mitofsky’s works enhanced those measures by ad-
dressing the problem of the undecided voters proposing four allocation techniques
(Mitofsky, 1998). The main conclusion of his work on the Presidential election in
1996 is that the proportional allocation of undecided voters based on the final re-
sults (technique 1) is the most consistent with results when comparing different
polls. Moreover, Mitofsky’s work confirmed that methods three and five yield a
better evaluation of the accuracy of polls. Over time, the two methods have been
reviewed on the basis of aims of research or features of elections. A good example is
Jowell et al.’s (1993) work on the 1992 British General Election based on Mosteller’s
method three or Curtice’s (1997) work on the 1997 British General Election using
the Mosteller’s method five. However, the most extensive work has been conducted
by Crewe (1997), who applied methods one, three, and five to assess the accuracy
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of polls from 1945 to 1997 over the British General election campaigns. One of the
main conclusions of his work is that the mean deviation between the average forecast
for each party’s vote share and the actual vote share is the best measure to estimate
the accuracy of polls. In 1996, Lau introduced another measure of accuracy, which
does not take into account the electoral results. Specifically, it is the difference
between a specific poll and “the average of all available polls results (weighted by
sample size) except the poll whose accuracy is being judged” (Lau, 1994). One of
his main conclusions and contributions to the literature on accuracy measures is
that the report of margin error based on the survey size does not provide correct
information on the accuracy of polls in tracking voters’ true voting intentions. In
addition, he strongly advised the introduction of a new measure based on the re-
sponse rates for each party or candidate or coalition rather than on the margin error.
Durand (2002) applied Lau’s measure in order to estimate the biases among polls
towards the Quebec Liberal party in the 2000 Canadian Federal Election. Specif-
ically, she revised Lau’s measure using the difference between the estimate of each
poll and the estimate from a time-series analysis. In other words, Durand created
a time-series analysis using the daily poll average and then, she plotted them on a
chart including 95% of margin trend lines. This procedure allowed her to compare
each poll to the average at a specific point in time to assess its accuracy (Durand,
2002). Her main finding was that the at national level, polls in terms of statistical
bias underestimated the performance of the Quebec Liberal Party.
The main disadvantages of the measures proposed so far are that none of them
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deals with the sampling error of polls and the allocation of undecided voters, which
are important factors when considering poll’s predictive failure. To solve these
disadvantages, in 2005 Martin, Traugott, and Kennedy proposed a new measure
of accuracy called A to obtain a measure unaffected by the size of the undecided
voter category and which takes into account the sampling error. This is a natural
logarithm of the odds ratio between the outcomes in a poll and the outcomes of the
election:
A = ln
[
(r/d)
(R/D)
]
(3.1)
where r and d are the number or percentage of polls respondents who favour the
Republican and Democratic candidates whereas R and S are the actual number or
percentage of voters cast for the Republican and Democratic candidates. According
to this, a significantly negative (positive) value indicates that the poll underesti-
mated (overestimated) support for the Republican Party. A value equal to 0 reflects
a perfect agreement between the poll and the actual election results. The choice
of natural logarithm is based on the desire to create a measure that is symmetric
around zero and then to simplify the calculation of variance, formally expressed as
follows:
V ariance(A) = 1/(n · r · d) (3.2)
where n is the number of respondents to the polls. This new measure has a
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number of advantages such as allowing a comparison of accuracy across elections.
For the purpose of this thesis, the most important advantage is that it produces
a signed statistic rather than an absolute value. In other words, it is informative
of how poll estimates differ from the actual outcomes in terms of direction. A is
less vulnerable to variations in the size of the undecided category than are other
measures, based as it is on relative, rather than absolute distributions of voter
preferences. However, like others, it is slightly affected by variations in the size of
the category of the undecided and, therefore, by fluctuations in the way pollsters
handle these voters. One weakness of A lies in the fact that it has been designed with
the American political system in mind, and therefore only “evaluates the accuracy
of a poll’s forecast of the split between the two major party candidates in a partisan
election” (Martin, Traugott and Kennedy 2005). In Italy, there are more than
two parties in competition, and in recent years, the evolution of the Italian system
has seen the emergence of party coalitions rather than individual parties as the
representatives of the main political (left-right) cleavage in the country. Indeed, in
a scenario with n-parties, the formula 3.1 can be rewritten as follows:
A
′
B = ln
[
(b/(c+ d+ ...+ z))
(B/(C +D + ...+ Z))
]
(3.3)
where b and B are the poll prediction and actual electoral results for party B, c
and C are the poll prediction and actual electoral results for party C, and so on1.
1Accordingly, the formula 3.2 of variance is revised as follows:
V ariance(A) = 1/(n · b · c · d · ... · z) (3.4)
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However, in this version A
′
B does depend on the reference party, where a positive
value of A
′
B indicates an overestimation for the reference party whereas a negative
value indicates an underestimation for the reference party. In order to avoid this
dependency, Arkheirmer and Evans 2014 rewrite formula 3.3 as follows:
B =
∑k
i=1 |A
′|
k
(3.5)
where k is the number of parties.
To correct the inflation due to the inaccurate polls for small parties which gain a
small share of the vote, Arzheimer and Evans propose a weighted version of B (Bw)
using the relative share of votes of total vote. The value of B and Bw comprises the
degree of error in the poll’s estimate: the higher its value, the higher the error in
the estimate. However, to test the null hypothesis of no bias, Arzheimer and Evans
employ two statistical tests of χ2 and G2 using the conventional criterion of p ≤ 0.05.
Unlike A measure, Bw does not classify polls as accurate or inaccurate but provides
the important information about the overall error in each poll reading. However,
Castro and Tomaselli (2015) highlighted the high sensibility of this measure to the
number of parties/coalitions taken into account in its computation. Therefore, in
order to reduce the likely error given the inflation derived from the presence of small
parties in the race in this thesis only the Bw will be employed in analysis .
Given that the main purpose of this thesis is to investigate the main causes of
where n refers to the number of respondents, b is the poll prediction for party B, c is the poll
prediction for party C, and so on.
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inaccuracy in Italian polling, we employ two statistical measures of the predictive
accuracy of polls on the basis of the information provided by them. Specifically,
we firstly employ the A
′
measure in order to quantify the number of polls classified
as inaccurate. Moreover, this measure also estimates the over- or underestimation
of each coalition over the three election campaigns. Secondly, we will employ the
new measure Bw in order to quantify the overall degree of error in Italian polling.
Both the measures have the great advantage of being used as dependent variables
in dynamic models of poll accuracy. As will be explained in the next sections, the
two indexes (A
′
and Bw) will be included in the multivariate regression model in
order to estimate the house effect in Italian polling, which represents one of the
hypotheses of this thesis.
3.3 House Effect Measure
The house effect refers to biases caused by methodologies employed by different
polling houses. Many important academic works show that surveys can vary across
houses due to differences in question wording, target population, data collection
mode, interviewer training, and procedures for coping with refusal (Converse and
Traugott 1986; Lau 1994; Crespi 1988; Erikson and Wlezien 1999). According to
this, poll results vary from one day to the next in part because different houses
conduct them on different days. Therefore, this variation may be seen as a result
of the polling process and not as a true reflection of voting intention volatility.
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Other works have pointed out how pooling together estimates from the different
polls produces a more accurate estimate. This procedure limits the impact of both
random variation between polling samples and systematic effects generated by the
house effect (Erikson and Wlezien 1999; Jackman 2005; Pickup and Johnston 2008).
These works use different models to ascertain the impact of the house effect in polls.
Indeed, there are two main streams of analysis used to estimate the house effect:
frequentist and Bayesian models. The former follows the model proposed by Erikson
and Wlezien in 1999, regressing the poll readings in a set on survey houses (N − 1)
and z dummy variables for each day with at least one poll reading. This is formally
expressed as follows:
V i,j =
Z∑
z=1
βziz +
N−1∑
n=1
γnjn + µ (3.6)
where V refers to the poll series, i refers to the day the polls appeared, and
j refers to polling institution. The house effect is comprised by the coefficients
of day dummy variables. In addition, they employ the well-established procedure
by Cleveland (1979) and re-discussed by Beck and Jackman (1998) and Jacoby
(1997): lowess. The latter allows computation of new values for each time point on
the basis of the outcomes of regression using a given number of data points. The
temporal distance from the points in question creates a weighted prediction value
from the regressions, which are essential to compute the new values. The robust
locally weighted regression (known as lowess) enhances the information provided by
scatterplot. Assuming points of scatterplot are (xi, yi), i = 1, ..., n, the smoothed
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points are (xi, yˆi), where yˆi is the fitted line value at xi and represents the location
of Y for X = xi. Specifically, (xi, yˆi) shows the location of the distribution of the
variable on the vertical axis (Y) given that the value of the variables on the horizontal
axis is (X = x). The smoothed regression has been drawn for data formally expressed
as follows:
yi = g(xi) + i (3.7)
where g refers to the smooth function and i refers to random variables with
mean 0 and constant scale. According to this, yˆi estimates g(xi). Therefore, points
surroundings (xi, yi) are formed by yˆi. The use of smoothed point allows us to
employ a nonparametric regression of Y on X. In other words, the lowess portrays
the fitted value at xk represented by “a line fit to the data using weighted least
square where the weight for (xi, yi) is large if xi is close to xk, and small if xi is
not close to xk” (Cleveland, 1981). To do that, the bandwidth or the percentages
of time points in the full series must be established in order to generate smoothed
values. Specifically, the increase of surroundings points is determined by f which
increases the smoothness of smoothed points (xi, yˆi). The main driver in picking
bandwidth of f is a value as large as possible, which both minimizes the variability
in the smoothed points and does not distort the trend of the data. Indeed, assuming
W (x) is the weight function which decreases for increasing nonnegative x, then the
weights wk(xi) decrease as the distance of xk increases from xi. In other words,
points closer to xi play a significant role in determining yˆi. Otherwise, all far away
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points are less significant. Formally, hi is the distance for each i from xi to r-th
closer neighbour of xi. Therefore, hi the r-th smallest number among |xi − xj| for
j = 1, ...., n. The weight function (W) must have the following properties:
1. W(x) > 0 for |x| < 1;
2. W(-x) = W(x)
3. W(x) is a nonincreasing function for x > 0
4. W(x) = 0 for |x| > 1
where 0 < f 6 1 and r is a fn rounded to the closer integer. Consequently, weights
(wk(xi)) are defined for all xk, k = 1, ..., n using the weight function W for each xi.
By centering W at xi, the point at which W first becomes 0 is the r-th closer to
the neighbour of xi. Therefore, the fitted value yˆi at each xi is the fitted value of a
dth degree of polynomial fit to the data using weighted least squares with weights
wk(xi) (Cleveland 1979). Erikson and Wlezien (1999) pointed out that one of the
advantages of using this procedure is that it follows the data closely.
In a similar vein, Panagopoulos (2009) ascertains the predictive accuracy of
poll readings using a multivariate regression analysis where poll methodologies are
explanatory variables. Specifically, he includes in the model information such as
likely voters and the delivery method employed by polling houses as independent
variables. In addition, he employs both the OLS and Probit models using the same
variables. These models do not provide different evidence in terms of the statistical
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significance of coefficients. However, the sign of some coefficient changes direction
on the basis of the model used. For instance, using the OLS regression the registered
voters (likely voters) has a negative relationship with the predictive accuracy index
(A) across the 2008 US Presidential poll readings. Conversely, using the Probit
regression, this relationship becomes positive. However, the main conclusion is
that the predictive accuracy of polls is mainly affected by likely voters and delivery
methods employed by different polling houses.
The second approach has been proposed by Jackman’s works on the 2004 Aus-
tralian federal election published in 2005. Since its appearance, the literature has
witnessed a growing use of Bayesian models to estimate the house effect as well as
voter sentiment change. This model assumes that each poll estimates the level of
support (yi) of political parties with a standard deviation that is a function of yi
and the poll’s sample size, formally written as follows:
yi ∼ N(µi, σ2i ) (3.8)
Due to each polling institution ji produces n polls on a given field date ti, the
formula 3.8 is rewritten as follows:
µi = αti + σjt (3.9)
and αti is the parameter estimate used in order to capture the house effect.
To estimate voters sentiment change, Jackman’s model assumes that party support
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follows a simple random walk model with a normal distribution, formally expressed
as:
αt ∼ N(αt−1, ω2), t = 2, ..., T (3.10)
αt ∼ Uniform(0.4, 0.6) (3.11)
In other words, this model assumes that the level of support for a party or
coalition is given by the level of support of the previous day except for random
shocks deriving from a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation
ω. In addition, and especially to estimate the house effect, there is the constraint
of actual election outcomes that must be applied. “This is an important constraint;
without being able to anchor the estimated levels of Coalition support to actual
election outcome, the model unravels, it being impossible to simultaneously estimate
underlying levels of support for the Coalition and house effect. Accordingly, the
model cannot be used for ‘real-time’ tracking over the course of the campaign unless
we impose a priori restrictions on the house effect” (Jackman, 2005:509).
Pickup and Johnston (2008) use both approaches in order to address sampling
error and house bias during the 2004 US Presidential trial heats. Specifically, they
employ the Erikson’s and Wlezien’s model as a starting point to remove the house
bias from the voting intention as estimated by polls. Given that this model does not
remove the noise from the sampling error, they apply the Kalmar filter to further
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filter the estimate of voting intentions using a state-space approach. In other words,
the house-adjusted series is set in a state-space form where the measured opinions are
the product of two unobserved components estimated by Bayesian analysis (Pickup
and Johnston 2008).
3.3.1 Model and Revision
Given the purpose of this thesis, we opt to employ both the model proposed
by Erikson and Wlezein (1999) and Panogopoulos (2009) in order to estimate how
much of the inaccuracy is due to variance of days and which methodologies cause
most error in Italian polling respectively. Given that Erikson’s and Wlezien’s model
has been developed on the basis of the American system, we will run the analysis
for each coalition in order to investigate the house effect in Italian polling. Doing so,
we will estimate the extent to which the house effect affects the accuracy of polls’
estimate of the support for each coalition as well as the overall accuracy od poll
predictions. Formula 3.6 is rewritten as follows:
V i,jB =
Z∑
z=1
βziz +
N−1∑
n=1
γnjn + µ (3.12)
where V i,jB is the polls series for B party/coalition, i refers to the day the poll
readings appeared, and j refers to the polling institution. This model is based on the
consolidated tradition of application in econometric analysis. In addition, we carried
out the analysis using the predictive accuracy indexes A
′
for each party/coalition
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and with the main purpose of estimating its relationship with the variance of day
and polling house. The model is formally expressed as follows:
A
′
B =
Z∑
z=1
βziz +
N−1∑
n=1
γnjn + µ (3.13)
where A
′
B refers to the predictive accuracy index for B party/coalition, i refers to
the day the poll readings appeared, and j refers to polling institution. This model
will be also applied using the predictive accuracy indexes A and Bw to estimate
how much the overall error is affected by the variance of days and polling houses2.
Accordingly, we expect inaccuracy in Italian polling to be made up of significant
high Adjusted R2 and the statistical significance of the regression model using the
ANOVA test. In addition, the smoothed versions (Lowess) of the polls series provide
a better picture of how any movement of the series is caused by the house effect
and/or voters sentiment change.
In order to estimate which methodologies employed by polling houses affects the
predictive accuracy of Italian polls the most, we follow the multivariate regression
model employed by Panogopoulos (2009). Unlike his approach, dependent variables
employed in this analysis are the accuracy measures A, A
′
, and Bw. On the basis of
Italian law, pollsters must publish a form along with the poll results on the website
managed by the Department of Information and Publishing, which contains infor-
2By employing the A and Bw measures as dependent variables, model 3.13 is rewritten as
follows:
AI =
Z∑
z=1
βziz +
N−1∑
n=1
γnjn + µ (3.14)
where AI is the accuracy index series.
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mation about the sample, the delivery method, the buyer, and where its results have
been disseminated (media). To test the hypothesis on the house effect, a multivari-
ate model will be employed using all the information provided by Italian pollsters
on methodologies employed, the buyer, and media. Accordingly, the methodologies
taken into consideration are sample and delivery method. Specifically, we include
in the model a dummy variable for random sample and a dummy variable for a
sample other than a random one. We expect a negative relationship between the
random sample and the degree of error estimated by the three accuracy measures.
In other words, the use of random samples decreases the error in poll readings. Con-
cerning the delivery method, we include in the model a dummy variable for each
of two methods employed: CATI and CAWI. The main expectations are a positive
relationship between both of them and the dependent variable. For instance, some
studies show there is a growing number of cell-phone only individuals and, therefore,
they might not be reachable using the CATI system (Keeter, Dimock, and Christian
2008). In addition, we will also include the information about who commissioned the
poll (buyer) and where its results have been disseminated (media). Specifically, we
include in the model dummy variables for each of the actors who commissioned the
polls (media, political, and polling houses) and dummy variables for each section of
the media where its results have been disseminated (TV, newspaper, and internet).
For each of the methodologies employed, we expect a different relationship with the
accuracy measures. A positive relationship is expected with the media and political
commissioners. Conversely, a negative relationship is expected with the rest of the
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variables. In addition, we include in the model a variable on difference estimated
by polls between the two major parties/coalitions (DCEP). According to the Italian
election results, our main expectation is that there is a positive relationship with
the dependent variable. In other words, the higher the difference between the two
major parties/coalitions, the higher is the error estimated in polls.
The model is formally expressed as follows:
AI(i,j) = α +
Z∑
z=1
βzM
(i,j)
z + βk+1DCEP
(i,j) + µ (3.15)
where AI is the accuracy index series, i refers to the day when the poll was
published, j refers to the polling institution, M i,j is a given methodology employed
by the j -th polling house, and DCEP i,j is the difference between the two major par-
ties/coalitions. The house effect is given by the coefficient of explanatory variables.
In addition, the use of this model allows us also to estimate the methodological
robustness of polls in line with the types of accuracy/ inaccuracy cases described in
the previous chapter (see figure 2.1).
3.4 Voter Sentiment Measure
Voters sentiment change between the time interviews are carried out and Elec-
tion Day may be responsible for the failure of polls accurately to predict election
outcomes. Using panel data, Hillygus and Shield (2009) showed that more than
40% of respondents change their voting intentions at least once over the course
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of an election campaign. In 2002, Eriskon and Wlezein analyzed the dynamics of
polls, attributing to sampling error (as well as the shocks brought about the real
movements, especially at the beginning of the election campaign) 50% of variability
among polls. The second hypothesis of this thesis is that the inaccuracy of polls is
due to change in voters sentiment. The previous section explained that using Jack-
man’s model it is possible also to estimate the change in voters sentiment beyond
the house effect. As we prefer to employ a well established econometric model to
estimate the house effect, we will analyze the voters sentiment change over the last
three Italian general elections again using Erikson and Wlezien model (1999). Before
applying this model, it is necessary to undertake an analysis of variance of the poll
results in order to examine how much of the observed movement over the time is a
true movement of public sentiment rather than sampling error. To do that, we will
estimate the observed variance, the sampling error, error variance, true variance,
and reliability. The observed variance is the variance of the poll results themselves.
The sampling error is formally expressed as follows:
√
p ∗ (1− p)/N (3.16)
where p is the proportion voting for a given party and N is the number of respon-
dents. The error variance is the average of error. Accordingly, the true variance is
the difference between the observed variance and error variance. Instead, reliability
is the ratio between the true variance and the observed variance. The last two mea-
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sures comprise the presence of voters sentiment change over the election campaign.
According to this, when the sampling error (and thus, the error variance) is higher
than the observed variance, it possible to argue that the inaccuracy of polls is due
to sampling procedures applied by polling houses. Otherwise, the amount of true
variance and reliability reflects the extent of voters sentiment change over time. As
for the accuracy and house effect measures, we will run this analysis for each coali-
tion in order to estimate the voters sentiment change for each of them. In addition,
if the analysis of variance confirms that the inaccuracy of polls is not only caused
by sampling error for each coalition, then we will apply a sophisticated model to
investigate those movements. Otherwise, we will not apply the model for the given
party/coalition.
How do we estimate voters sentiment change over an election campaign? As
with the house effect, we follow the model proposed by Erikson and Wlezien (1999).
Specifically, they assume when pooling together poll results, the series follows an
autoregressive process of order 1 (AR(1)). Before proceeding to explain the full
model, it is useful briefly to describe what an autoregressive process is. The latter is
a stochastic process where the time series is a linear function of its past values plus a
white noise. In other words, the model works like a regression where the explanatory
variables are the past values of the dependent variable, formally expressed as follows:
yt = ϕ1yt−1 + ...+ ϕpyt−p + t (3.17)
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where t refers to white noise. The latter may be interpreted as the error in
a regression model, which is the difference between yt and its conditional mean.
However, white noise is a stochastic process composed of an infinite number of
random variables with mean 0 and constant variance:
E(t) = 0 (3.18)
E(2t ) = V (t) = σ
2 (3.19)
γk = 0 for |k| > 0 (3.20)
The random variables are not correlated with each other, but this does not
mean that they are independent. This property of white noise allows that the
conditional mean is not a linear function of the past and, therefore, it is a stochastic
process which does not have persistence. Indeed, a time series is characterized
by the presence of ‘memory’ across time. A stochastic process is roughly defined
as a “statistical phenomenon that evolves in time according to probabilistic laws”
(Chatfield, 2004). Mathematically, it is a long collection of random variables with a
memory based on the degree of connection between those variables. The stochastic
process must have the following properties:
• it is possible to define a density function of process (f(..., xt−1, xt, xt+1, ...));
• it is possible to marginalize the density function for each subset of its compo-
nents. Accordingly, there are defined marginal density functions for each xt,
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but also for each couple of elements (xt, xt+1), and so on;
• if the density function has moments, then E(xt) = µt, V (xt) = σ2t , Cov(xt, xt−k) =
γk,t and so on;
• and it is possible to define the conditional density function (and its moments).
However, a stochastic process may be stationary or ergodic. The former is
strictly stationary when the distributional characteristic of marginal subsets are
constant across time. Specifically, let k be a stochastic process and its subset
W kt = (xt, ..., xt+k−1). If the density function does not depend on t and W
k
t distri-
bution is equal to W kt+1, W
k
t+2 and so on, then the process is strictly stationary when
this invariance occurs for each k. Conversely, a stochastic process has a weak sta-
tionary process when for all the double random variables W 2t = (xt, xt+1) have first
and second moments constant across time. Accordingly, there are second crossed
moments E(xt · xt+k) for each k and they do not depend on time t. The ergodic
property refers to the limited memory of process. In other words, the presence of
persistence is unremarkable not characterizing the process even if it is long. There-
fore, the memory in an ergodic process is weak across time and it is affected or
the size of sample increases. Indeed, for this kind of process it is possible to use
the information obtained across time in order to infer the characteristics (known as
ergodic theorem). According to these properties, let AR(1) be a stationary process
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with constant mean (µ), therefore:
µ = E(yt) = ϕE(yt−1) + E(t) = ϕµ (3.21)
This is true:
• if µ = 0 and it is true for any value of ϕ;
• if ϕ = 1 and it is true for any value of µ and the mean of process is undermined.
Therefore, the process has a unit root, because the value of z where y(z) = 0 is
1. Conversely, if a process is a moving average (MA) and, then, |ϕ| < 1:
yt = (1 + ϕL+ ϕ
2L2 + ...)t = C(L)t (3.22)
where L refers to the grade p and MA with θi = ϕ
i, which has a mean equal to
0, the E(yt) = 0. To compute the second moment, let us assume that the variance
of white noise t is equal to σ
2 and V is the variance of yt and it is constant across
time, then:
V = E(y2t ) = E[(ϕyt−1 + t)
2] = ϕ2V + σ2 + 2ϕE(yt−1t) (3.23)
However, the last element of the sum is equal to 0 given yt−1 = C(L)t−1 and,
therefore, E(yt−1t) is a linear combination of auto covariance of white noise. Ac-
cordingly,
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V = ϕ2V + σ2 ⇒ V = σ
2
1− ϕ2 (3.24)
This provides two main pieces of information. Firstly, it is possible to consider
a process with variance constant across time only if |ϕ| < 1. Indeed, this condition
excludes from the stationary AR(1) process those with |ϕ| > 1. Secondly, the non-
conditional variance (V ) of yt is always greater than σ
2 and the difference between
them is higher as ϕ is closer to 1. In other words, the higher the persistence over the
process, the lower is the non-conditional variance and, therefore, the knowledge of
value of yt−1 reduces the uncertainty on the value of yt the longer is the persistence
over the series. Accordingly, the autocovariance of AR(1) is formally written as
follows:
γ1 = E(ytyt−1) = E[(ϕyt−1 + t)yt−1] = ϕV (3.25)
therefore
γk = E(ytyt−k) = E[(ϕyt−1 + t)yt−k] = ϕγk−1 (3.26)
and so
γk = ϕ
k σ
2
1− ϕ2 (3.27)
Autocorrelations represent an index of memory of process. Accordingly, the
69
higher their (absolute) values, the higher is the (absolute) value of ϕ, which is the
persistence parameter. Given limk→∞ γk = 0, γk is always different from 0. The
memory of process is infinite but the remote past does not play an important role.
If we include the intercept to the AR(1) process, then the formula 3.17 is rewritten
as follows:
yt = µ+ ϕyt−1 + t → (1− ϕL)yt = µ+ t (3.28)
therefore
yt = (1 + ϕ+ ϕ
2 + ...)µ+ C(L)t =
µ
1− ϕ + C(L)t (3.29)
and so E(yt) =
µ
1−ϕ . The generalization of AR(p) is derived from the inversion
of the polynomial of the p-th grade of a moving average process, as follows:
C(L) = A(L)−1 =
P∏
j=1
(1− λjL)−1 (3.30)
where λj is the reciprocal root of A(L). An AR(p) process is stationary only if
|λj| < 1 for each j. The properties of the AR(p) process are:
• it has an infinite memory but the autocorrelations geometrically decrease as
k increases;
• if the intercept is different from 0, its expected value is µ
A(1)
, where A(1) is the
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polynomial A(z), with z = 13.
An extreme case of AR(1) is a random walk (I(1))process where the character-
istics of persistence are so strong as to affect the qualitative features of the process
itself. Indeed, a process (yt) follows a random walk, if ∆yt is a white noise. There-
fore, if yt = yt−1 + t and replacing yt−1 to the past value, then
yt = yt−n +
n−1∑
i=0
t−i (3.31)
The characteristics of this kind of process are that the variance is unlimited, the
mean is not reverting (as in the stationary process), and memory is permanent. A
random walk with drift is a nonstationary process, formally written as follows:
∆yt = µ+ t (3.32)
where yt comprises a random walk on a linear function across time. If the drift
(which is the constant µ) is positive, then the process tends to increase with stronger
fluctuations surrounding this trend across time. Then, formula 3.32 is rewritten as
follows:
yt =
t∑
i=0
i + µ · t (3.33)
where the second element is a linear trend with slope µ.
In 1999, Erikson and Wlezien proposed to employ the AR(1) process to estimate
3Specifically, A(1) =
∑p
i=0 ai
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the dynamics of time series polls. They assumed that the true voter sentiment of
one day is explained as a function of voter sentiment on the previous day and shocks
from the election campaign broadly speaking, formally written as follows:
Pt = α + γPt−1 + µt (3.34)
where α is the constant, Pt refers to the polls at time t, and µ refers to the new
shocks for day t. Therefore, the variance of daily shocks (µt) and their persistence
will comprise the real movement when it occurs. This model assesses the degree
to which the sampled voting intention may vary over time as a function of the
time lapse between readings. If the campaign follows a simple AR(1) stationary
time series, the autoregressive parameter (γ) is less than 1 and the true correlation
between poll readings over m days is γm. In addition, the correlation between poll
readings decreases geometrically as the number of days between polls increases.
Specifically, the more γ is close to 0, the more only recent events over the election
campaign matter. Conversely, the closer γ is to 1, the more effects there are from the
remote past. However, if the campaign effects quickly disappear and matter less on
Election Day, then the values of γ decreases across the time series. If the parameter
γ > 1, then the process follows an integrated series (also knows as random walk),
where the variance grows over time and the values of parameters are likely to go
up and down. If voters sentiment change follows an integrated series, the current
preferences are functions of campaign shocks both from the past and present and,
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for this reason, the value of γ may go up and down across the time series. To assess
the underestimation of true over-time correlation between polls due to sampling
error, they employ the statistical theory of reliability proposed by Heise (1969).
In other words, they estimate the true correlations from observed correlations and
statistical reliability (rel) of poll readings as follows: the observed correlation is the
true correlations γ multiplied by rel over 1 day; it is γ2rel over 2 days, and so on.
There is also statistical error added by random error.
As with the house effect model, we will run the AR(1) for each coalition in order
to investigate whether voters sentiment change occurs for each coalition over time.
Before proceeding with the analysis of pooled poll results, we will undertake an
analysis of variance as explained above in order to identify the cases where it is
possible to argue that voters sentiment change towards a given coalition.
3.5 Conclusion
What causes inaccuracy in Italian polling? To answer this question, two main
hypotheses have been derived: the house effect and voters sentiment change. This
chapter has been devoted to explaining the statistical models employed to verify the
two hypotheses. The next three chapters will show the empirical evidence provided
by these models. Moreover, this chapter showed the revision applied to each model
employed in the literature so far in order to apply them to the Italian case with its
many parties and coalitions. Accordingly, we firstly revised the well-established A
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measure for the accuracy of polls’ prediction by introducing the A
′
measure which
allows us to quantify the over- or underestimate for a given political party. Sec-
ondly, we further applied the Erikson and Wlezien (1999) approach to estimate
the house effect across election campaigns by regressing the poll readings for each
party/coalition in the election race on the set of dummy variables for each day with
at least one poll readings and the dummy polling house variables. In addition, we
ran the model by using the accuracy indexes (A, A
′
, and Bw) as dependent variables
in order to estimate the extent to which their variance is explained by the variance
of days and polling houses. Thirdly, we revise the Panogopoulus (2009) model by
using the accuracy indexes as dependent variables to estimate the extent of the
house effect deriving from the methodologies employed by polling houses in Italian
polling. Fourthly, we further applied the AR(1) model proposed by Erikson and
Wlezien (1999) to each party/coalition in the election competition to investigate
voters sentiment change across campaigns concerning the given party/coalition.
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Chapter 4
2006 Italian General Election
4.1 Introduction
The 2006 Italian general election was characterized by the presence of two main
coalitions and a very small number of unaligned parties. The election results were:
49.8% for Unione, 49.7% for Casa delle Liberta`, and 0.5% for other parties. Accord-
ing to this, the results gave a narrow victory to the centre-left. As already pointed
out, this election was also characterized by two important new factors. Firstly, the
electoral system was once more proportional with a majority bonus for the party/
coalition with the highest support. One of the effects of the bonus was to emphasize
the tendency of the Italian system to be a multi-coalition rather than a multy-party
system. Secondly, the centre-right coalition election campaign was focused among
other things on a constant reference to poll readings. In the light of this, the role
of polls during the Italian election campaign became more important than in any
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previous election.
This chapter is devoted to providing evidence concerning the accuracy and the
causes of inaccuracy in polls that were published during the 2006 Italian general
election campaign and that asked respondent about their voting intentions for the
Chamber of Deputies. According to this, we analyzed the polls published on the
official website between 1 October and 24 March 20061.
With this in mind, the remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The
next section will be devoted to presenting an analysis of accuracy using both A, A
′
,
and Bw measures and to discussing the evidence provided by their outcomes. In the
third section, we will present the house effect analysis in order to estimate how much
the variance of poll readings is affected by the methodologies employed by differ-
ent polling houses. To do that, we will firstly apply a well-established econometric
method (OLS) and the lowess procedure (Cleveland 1979) following the approach
proposed by Erikson and Wlezein (1999). Then, we employ a multivariate regres-
sion model to estimate the extent of the house effect caused by the methodologies
employed by polling houses using the accuracy indexes as dependent variables. In
the fourth section, we will employ two different analyses in order to estimate the
extent of change in voters sentiment for each coalition over the election campaign.
Specifically, we will undertake a traditional analysis of variance, using measures like
sampling error and reliability to estimate the error in the poll readings. Then, we
will employ a more sophisticated analysis using an autoregressive model (AR(1)) in
1That means 175 days before Election Day, which cover the entire electoral campaign. On the
basis of Italian law, polls cannot be published during the 15 days before Election Day.
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order to estimate whether the error is due to sampling procedures or voters senti-
ment change. Finally, in the fifth section we will draw the main conclusions on the
basis of evidence provided by all the analysis undertaken.
4.2 Accuracy Results
Recalling the formula 3.1, to measure the accuracy of polls in the 2006 Italian
national election, we apply the formula to the Unione and Casa delle Liberta` treating
each coalition as a party and a third coalition, composed of those small parties
unaligned as third-party candidates (“Others”). So as well as applying the original
formula to the two main coalitions, we adapt the measure to enable us to take
account of this. Therefore, we rewrite equation 3.1 as follows:
A
′
cdl = ln
[
(cdl/(u+ o))
(CDL/(U +O))
]
(4.1)
where cdl is the Casa delle Liberta` poll prediction, u is the Unione poll prediction,
and o is the Others poll prediction. Conversely, CDL is the actual results obtained
by the Casa dell Liberta`, U is the actual results for the Unione, and O is the actual
results achieved by the others. We do the same for the other two parties2.
Recalling the Martin, Traugott, and Kennedy’s measure, if the value of A
′
is
positive, the poll overestimates support for the party. Conversely, when the value is
negative, the poll underestimates support. Finally, we need a measure of the extent
2Please refer to the Appendix for the full list of A
′
measures.
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to which under- and over-estimates are significant as opposed to falling within the
margins of what can be expected due to sampling error. We obtain this by calculat-
ing the standard error of A
′
and by using a 95% confidence interval. Therefore, polls
given values of A
′
falling outside the confidence interval we regard as inaccurate,
those given value within it as accurate. To simplify the calculation of variance, the
odds ratio has to be transformed by taking its natural log. Recalling equation 4.1,
we rewrite the equation 3.2 as follows:
V ariance(A
′
cdl) = 1/(n · cdl · (u+ o)) (4.2)
where n is the number of respondents and cdl, u, and o are Casa delle Liberta`,
Unione and Others respectively3.
We will also employ the original measure (equation 3.1) in order to compare the
outcomes between the two formulas. Therefore, the Casa delle Liberta` and Unione
coalitions will be considered as parties:
A06 = ln
[
(cdl/u)
(CDL/U)
]
(4.3)
To estimate the overall error for each poll readings, we employ the measure
B proposed by Arzheimer and Evans (2014) which takes into account all the par-
ties/coalitions competing the election at the same time, and which corrects for the
dependency of A
′
on the reference party (see formula 3.5). Given the presence of
3Please refer to the Appendix for the full list of measure for the variance of A
′
.
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small unaligned parties in the Italian political system, we apply the weighted version
of this measure: Bw.
Following the literature on election studies, we expect the 2006 polls to be more
accurate closer to Election Day. To estimate this assumption, we will check the
timing of accuracy/inaccuracy on the basis of evidence provided by the A, A
′
, and
Bw measures. Specifically, we compare the monthly averages of three measures and
the monthly percentages of the polls classified as inaccurate by A and A
′
and the
monthly percentages of the polls that are statistically biased according to the χ2
test using the threshold p ≤ 0.05 for the Bw measures.
4.2.1 Findings
Were the Italian pollsters really wrong in 2006? To answer this question, we have
undertaken an empirical analysis of the accuracy of the polls published during the
six months prior to Election Day that asked about voting intentions. The analysis
only covers polls concerning voting intentions for the Chamber of Deputies excluding
those for the Senate. In addition, we also include in the analysis those polls where
the pollster did not specify which of the two branches of Parliament was being
referred to. On this basis, there were 75 polls for the Chamber of Deputies.
As figure 4.1 shows, the poll readings over the election campaign concerning the
three coalitions present the same unstable trend. In other words, all the shares
vary within a range of ±10%. In particular, the poll readings for ‘Others’ present a
persistent oscillating trend which decreases closer to Election Day reaching a peak
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Figure 4.1: 2006 Italian General Election polls for the three coalitions over
the six months of the election campaign.
y-axis = percentage support according to poll readings. x-axis = dates n which poll readings were taken.
at the beginning of the last month of the election campaign (10%). With this in
mind, we have undertaken an accuracy analysis of these poll readings. Table 4.1
compares the percentages of polls classified as inaccurate when measures of A, A
′
,
and Bw are applied. Recalling the main difference between the three measures, when
A′ is applied, it provides an estimate of the accuracy of poll predictions for each
party rather than an estimate of overall accuracy of poll predictions provided by A
measure. The Bw gives information on the degree of error estimated for each poll
prediction taking into account all the parties/coalitions in the electoral race.
Focusing on the first column of the table, when A is applied only 32% of polls are
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Table 4.1: 2006 Italian General Election polls on Chamber of Deputies:
comparison of percentage of inaccuracy applying A, A
′
, and Bw measures.
The percentages for the A and A
′
measures refer to their values falling outside the 95% confidence interval. The A
measure is computed considering only two coalitions (CDL and Unione) using the formula 4.3. The A
′
measures is
computed using all the coalitions competing the election (formula 4.1, A.1, and A.2). The percentages for the Bw
measure refer to the proportion that are statistically biased on the basis of χ2 test using p ≤ 0.05 threshold. The
Bw measure is computed using the formula 3.5.
Polls CDL Unione Others
A 32% — — —
A
′
— 60% 91% 73%
Bw 76% — — —
N 75 75 75 75
classified as inaccurate. Instead, the total percentage of polls statistically biased us-
ing the χ2 test for the Bw measure rises to 76%. When A
′
is applied the percentages
are 60, 91, and 73 for the Casa delle Liberta´, the Unione, and Others respectively.
These results are more in line with the percentage of polls statistically biased using
the Bw rather than the A measure. Therefore, according to table 4.1 in the 2006
general election there is a high percentage of inaccuracy among polls concerning
all coalitions. Looking in more depth at those percentages of poll inaccuracy, table
4.2 compares the monthly averages and percentages of polls accuracy predictions
using A, A
′
, and Bw measures during the entire election campaign. The second
column of table 4.2 reports the monthly averages and the percentages of polls that
are statistically biased using the χ2 test for the Bw measure. Accordingly, when A
is applied there is a constant underestimation across time given its negative sign,
except during the first month of the election campaign. In particular, the average
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of A values in the last two months of the election is 0. Indeed, the percentage of
polls classified as inaccurate using the A measure lessens closer to the Election Day.
This is also confirmed by the Bw measure, where the percentage of polls that are
statistically biased decreases from 100% in the first month of the campaign to 60%
in the last one.
Table 4.2: 2006 Italian General Election polls on Chamber of Deputies:
monthly average and percentage of inaccuracy of A, A
′
, and Bw measures.
The percentages for the A and A
′
measures refer to their values falling outside the 95% confidence interval. The A
measure is computed considering only two coalitions (CDL and Unione) using the formula 4.3. The A
′
measure is
computed using all the coalitions competing the election (formula 4.1, A.1, and A.2). The percentages for the Bw
measure refer to the proportion that are statistically biased on the basis of the χ2 test using p ≤ 0.05 threshold.
The Bw measure is computed using the formula 3.5.
* the values of A
′
for the given month are both positive and negative.
Polls CDL Unione Others
A Bw A
′
A
′
A
′
October average 0.802 0.151 -0.207 0.217 1.812
% 63 100 100 88 100
November average -0.189 0.192 -0.242 0.329 1.918
% 100 100 100 100 100
December average -0.091 0.130 -0.147 0.146 1.868
% 50 100 75 75 100
January average -0.116 0.120 -0.150 0.207 1.298
% 27 80 87 100 80
February average -0.090 0.097 -0.113 0.166 0.989*
% 6 77 33 89 78
March average -0.092 0.101 -0.107 0.174 0.472*
% 33 60 44 89 52
For the sake of simplicity, we will interpret the outcomes of the A
′
measures by
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discussing each coalition separately. Regarding the Casa delle Liberta´ coalition, ac-
cording to table 4.2 there was a constant underestimation across time. Despite this,
the proportion of inaccurate polls decreases closer to Election Day. For instance,
from January to February the proportion of polls that are inaccurate falls by more
than half, dropping from 87% to 33%. Regarding the Unione coalition, table 4.2
shows a constant overestimation of polls with a significant positive average value of
A
′
throughout the six months of the campaign. Focusing on the timing of inaccu-
racy, the percentage of inaccurate polls is high in each month even if there is a slight
decrease over the last two months. This is consistent with the 91% polls classified
as inaccurate (see table 4.1). Regarding the group of small parties not aligned with
any coalitions (‘Others’), table 4.2 shows that there was a constant overestimation
of their support. As for the overall polls (A) and the Casa delle Liberta´ coalition,
the percentage of polls that are inaccurate decreases over time. Specifically, from
the 100% of the first three months, the inaccuracy rates decrease with an average
decrease of 20% less for each of the last three months reaching 52% in March 2006.
To look in more depth at these trends, figure 4.2 shows the values of A and A
′
and their confidence interval for the Casa delle Liberta´, the Unione, and Others.
All the values outside the confidence intervals are classified as inaccurate and vice
versa. According to figure 4.2(a), almost all of the inaccurate polls are in the first
two months and the most accurate are in the last months of the election campaign,
where some values reach or are very close to 0.
According to table 4.2 and figure 4.2(b), none of the values of A
′
for the Casa
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Figure 4.2: Accuracy values applying A and A
′
measures and their confidence
intervals
y-axis = the accuracy values using the formula 4.34.1, A.1, and A.2 for panel (a), (b), (c), and (d) respectively.
x-axis = dates on which poll readings were taken.
(a) A (CDL and Unione) (b) CDL
(c) Unione (d) Others
delle Liberta` reach the line of 0 nor, above all, have a positive sign. Indeed, those
values are almost always higher than - 0.100, which represents a good distance from
0 (that is the perfect agreement between poll predictions and election results).
As figure 4.2(c) shows, the values of A
′
for the accuracy of prediction of support of
the Unione almost always fall outside the confidence interval. The most interesting
information is that the only value inside the confidence interval belongs to the
American polling house whose poll was commissioned by Berlusconi (leader of the
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Casa delle Liberta´ coalition), who claimed that Italian pollsters were biased in favour
of the centre-left over the entire election campaign. Moreover, those values are the
only negative value of the sample and they have values closer to 0 as the number of
days to Election Day decreases.
According to figure 4.2(d), over the six months before Election Day the values of
A
′
for the group of small parties present an oscillating trend. As for the Unione and
the overall poll readings, there are few cases that reach the line of 0 and, as already
explained above, there is a constant decay in the last part of the election campaign.
In fact, there is also the presence of negative values of A
′
. This is the reason why
the average of values of A
′
for February and March are lower than in the previous
months (see table 4.2).
According to these outcomes, all the accuracy measures employed revealed that a
large proportion of polls conducted during the 2006 Italian general election were in-
accurate and, except for the case of the Unione coalition, these percentages decrease
over time.
4.3 House Effect Results
In the previous section, we showed that in the 2006 Italian general election there
was a high percentage of polls classified as inaccurate for the two main coalitions
(Casa delle Liberta´ and Unione) and for the group of small parties not aligned
with coalitions (‘Others’). Moreover, the Bw measure revealed the presence of a
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significant degree of error bias among poll readings.
Therefore, what causes this high percentage of inaccuracy? In this thesis, two
hypotheses have been derived concerning this: the house effect and the voters senti-
ment changes. In this section, we undertake a statistical analysis of the house effect,
where the latter refers to biases caused by the methodologies employed by different
polling institutions.
The model proposed by Erikson and Wlezien (1999) assumes that the variance
of poll readings from one day to the next is caused by the house effect. To estimate
it, they regress with no intercept the poll readings in a set on N-1 polling houses
and k dummy variables for each day with at least one poll reading (see formula 3.6).
The coefficient of day dummy variables expresses the house effect. In addition, they
employ the lowess procedure proposed by Cleveland (1979) to estimate the presence
of random error in the series. In order to estimate which methodology used by
polling houses affects most the predictive accuracy of Italian polling, we employ a
multivariate regression model where the A, A
′
, and Bw measures are the dependent
variables (see formula 3.15).
4.3.1 Findings
As for the accuracy measures, the house effect model proposed by Erikson and
Wlezien (1999) has been developed on the basis of the American system. Therefore,
to adopt to the Italian case, we will apply the OLS method to each coalition. In
other words, we will regress the poll readings for each coalition on a set of 13 dummy
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variables for the polling houses (N - 1) and 57 dummy variables for each day with
at least one poll reading. Then, we will apply the lowess procedure in order to
estimate the amount of random error in the series. Applying this model to each
coalition will allow us to estimate the house effect separately. In other words, it be
possible that the methodologies employed by different polling houses may affect one
coalition more than others.
Table 4.3 compares the outcomes of three models to investigate the house effect
for the 2006 Italian general election. In addition, the first panel of the table refers
to the model using the poll readings for each coalition plus the group of small
unaligned parties (‘Others’) as the dependent variable. The last panel refers to
the model using the values of A, A
′
, and Bw as dependent variables. The reason
for using the accuracy values measures as dependent variables lies with the main
purpose of investigating in depth the causes of inaccuracy. In other words, in the
light of explaining why the Italian polls were so highly inaccurate in the 2006 general
election, using the values of A, A
′
, and Bw as dependent variables rather than the
poll readings allows us to examine in more depth how much of the variance of
inaccuracy values is due to the house effect. Recalling the expectation, the variance
of days and houses explains the variance of poll readings and accuracy values: that
it is inaccurate.
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Table 4.3 shows the outcomes of three models applied both to poll readings and
accuracy values using different independent variables. For the sake of simplicity,
the outcomes will be presented for each model. In the first model, we regress poll
readings (accuracy values) on the dummy variables of days in which at least one
poll reading was taken. According to table 4.3, all Adjusted R2 are higher than
0.80, meaning the variance in poll readings and accuracy values depends in large
part on the variance of days. Only for the accuracy values of ‘Others’ and the Bw
measure, Adjusted R2 lower than the rest (0.69 and 0.70 respectively). Therefore,
we may argue that other factors affected their accuracy. In the second model, the
poll readings (accuracy values) are regressed on the dummy variables of the polling
houses. As for the previous model, table 4.3 provides evidence of high Adjusted R2
values, which vary between 0.84 and 0.96. As for the first model, poll readings and
accuracy values for the ‘Others’ report the lowest Adjusted R2 and this occurs also
when the Bw measure is employed as the dependent variable. In the third model,
we fully apply the model proposed by Erikson and Wlezien (1999) regressing the
poll readings (accuracy values) on the dummy variable days where one poll at least
appeared and on the dummy variable for polling houses. According to table 4.3,
in all regressions Adjusted R2 varies between 0.84 and 0.98 except when the Bw
measure is employed as the dependent variable. Indeed, the last column of table
4.3 shows that the degree of error estimated by the Bw measure is less affected by
the variance of days and the polling houses than all the other measures. Moreover,
all the regressions using the three models meet the highest level of significance
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using the ANOVA test, and, therefore, it may be possible to draw substantial and
reliable conclusions. According to these outcomes, the hypothesis that the predictive
accuracy of polls in 2006 was highly affected by the house effect has been confirmed
in all three models proposed.
Despite the high variance explained by the house effect over the three coalitions,
the previous analysis also shows that there was a certain amount of error, especially
concerning the Others coalition. In order to estimate random error among the house-
adjusted series for each coalition, we will employ the well established statistical
procedure designed by Cleveland (1979), known as lowess. Recalling this procedure,
it has the merit of creating a new value for each time point based on the outcomes
of regression using a designed number of surrounding data points (Cleveland 1979,
Beck and Jackman 1998). In other words, it is a procedure making it possible to
fit better the line following the trend of regression results. The new values are
generated using weighted predicted values based on their temporal distance from a
specific point in question. The degree to which the line follows the data depends
on the bandwidth used to generate the smoothed values. The lower the bandwidth,
the more the fitted line represents the random error. We will apply the following
bandwidths for each smoothed house-adjusted series: 0.40, 0.30, 0.20, and 0.104. For
the sake of simplicity, we report only the smoothed scatterplot using the bandwidth
of 0.30 and 0.10 given that generate better fitted lines for the purpose of this thesis.
4We also applied the bandwidth 0.05, which is considered the most robust in order to estimate
the random error, but the scatterplot obtained was illegible because the fitted line was outside the
box figure. Please refer to the Appendix for the smoothed scatterplot with bandwidth 0.40 and
0.20.
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As for the other analysis presented in this chapter, the outcomes provided by
scatter plot and the smoothed version of house-adjusted series will be discussed for
each coalition separately. Therefore figure 4.3 shows the linear and the smoothed
scatter plots using different bandwidths (0.30 and 0.10) with regard to the Casa
delle Liberta´ coalition.
Figure 4.3: Linear and smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggre-
gated by date: Casa Delle Liberta´.
y-axis = house-adjusted polls the poll readings. x-axis = days remaining before Election Day.
The smoothed scatter plot is computed following model 3.7.
(a) Linear
(b) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.30 (c) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.10
Figure 4.3(a) shows, using a linear scatter plot, a negative correlation between
the house-adjusted poll readings for the Casa delle Liberta` coalition and the numbers
of days between Election Day and the dates on which the poll readings were taken.
In other words, figure 4.3(a) shows that as the number of days remaining before
91
Election Day decreases, the impact of the house effect on polls readings concerning
this coalition increases.
The bottom right panel (4.3(c)) shows that the fitted line using the smoothed
procedure using the bandwidth of 0.10 is able to follow almost perfectly the series
presenting low random error. The lowess procedure concerning the Casa della Lib-
erta´ confirms the negative correlation between the house effect and the number of
days provided by the previous analysis as well as the presence of random error. In
other words, despite the robust evidence provided by the outcomes of these analyses,
we cannot completely rule out that the inaccuracy of polls in predicting the Casa
delle Liberta´ election results is also due to movement in voters sentiment and the
degree of random error presented in the smoothed series comprises that movement.
Figure 4.4 shows the correlation between the house-adjusted poll readings and
the number of days between the poll readings and Election Day for the Unione
coalition using linear and smoothed scatter plots. According to this figure 4.4(a),
there is a slightly negative relationship between the two variables. Specifically, all
the values of poll readings for the Unione vary between 45% and 54%. As figure
4.4(a) shows, the greater the time gap between Election Day and the dates on which
poll readings were taken, the higher is the dispersion among them.
Using the lowess procedure, the series presents a similar pattern to that for
the Casa delle Liberta´. Specifically, the lower the bandwidth, the more the new
values created by the smoothed version follow the house-adjusted series (4.4(c)).
Because of this, we may argue that, despite the strong impact of the house effect,
92
Figure 4.4: Linear and smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggre-
gated by date: Unione.
y-axis = house-adjusted polls the poll readings. x-axis = days remaining before Election Day.
The smoothed scatter plot is computed following model 3.7.
(a) Linear
(b) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.30 (c) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.10
the inaccuracy of poll readings in predicting the Unione election outcome presents
more random effects than the Casa delle Liberta´ smoothed series, which may be due
to voters sentiment change over the election campaign.
Figure 4.5 shows the positive relationship between the house-adjusted poll read-
ings for the ‘Others’ coalition and the number of days between Election Day and poll
readings using linear and smoothed scatter plots. Indeed, there is less dispersion
close to Election Day and the poll readings vary between 1% and 2%. Instead, at the
beginning of the election campaign, the gap widens to 6% of the share showing more
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Figure 4.5: Linear and smoothed plots of house-adjusted polls aggregated
by date: Others.
y-axis = house-adjusted polls the poll readings. x-axis = days remaining before Election Day.
The smoothed scatter plot is computed following model 3.7.
(a) Linear (b) Smoothed Bandwidth = 0.30
(c) Smoothed Bandwidth = 0.10
dispersion. In other words, as the number of days before Election Day decreases so
the impact of the house effect on polling accuracy in predicting the election outcome
decreases.
As for the Casa delle Liberta´ and Unione coalitions, we apply the lowess proce-
dure to Others in order to estimate the fitted line to regression outcomes. Figures
4.5(b) and 4.5(c) show the evidence of the smoothed versions of the house-adjusted
series for Others. The bottom right panel shows the smoothed fitted line using the
lower bandwidth 0.10 (4.5(c)). As for the previous analysis, the fitted lines of new
values generated by the lowess procedure follow the original series closely showing
the presence of significant number of random effect (more than in the other two
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coalitions). Indeed, figure 4.5(b) shows that the smoothed series generated using
the higher bandwidth is less sensitive and therefore, it follows to a lesser degree the
trend of values of the original series. Moreover, these outcomes provide evidence
of greater change in voters sentiment over the election campaign than in the Casa
delle Liberta´ and Unione coalitions: it is shown in the random error present in the
smoothed version of the series.
In the light of the positive relationship between house-adjusted poll readings and
the number of days and the random error present in the smoothed series, we may
argue that the inaccuracy of poll readings regarding the Others is also due to voters
sentiment change more than in the other two coalitions.
All the evidence provided by the lowess procedure confirms the outcomes of the
house effect regression analysis. Recalling table 4.3, in all three models applied Ad-
justed R2 for the Others is the lowest and, in particular, running the model with
only the house polling as independent variables. Specifically, this model estimates
that only the 65% and 60% of variance of poll readings and accuracy values respec-
tively are explained by the variance of house polling. This is consistent with the
degree of random effect present in the smoothed versions of Others’ series.
According to the aim of this thesis - to ascertain the factors that cause bias in
Italian polling - we employ a multivariate regression model using the methodologies
used by different polling houses as explanatory variables (see model 3.15). Table
4.4 reports the outcomes of this model applied to the 2006 Italian general elections,
using the accuracy indexes as dependent variables.
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Table 4.4: House effect across the 2006 Italian General Election polls on
Chamber of Deputies: Multivariate Regression Model using A, A
′
and Bw
measures as dependent variables.
The model is computed using formula 3.15, where a set of methodologies employed by polling houses and the
difference between the two major party/coalitions (referred as DCEP) are the explanatory variables . The A, A
′
and Bw measures used as dependent variables are computed using the formula 4.3, 4.1, A.1, A.2, and 3.5. The
standard errors for the coefficient are in parentheses and the statistical level of significance follows the rule: ***
p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
Bw A A
′
- CDL A
′
- Unione A
′
- Others
Random -0.188* -0.001*** -0.017* -0.009 0.440
(0.101) (0.001) (0.009) (0.006) (0.268)
Other Sample 0.123 0.001 0.023 0.014 -0.834
(0.347) (0.002) (0.032) (0.020) (0.920)
CATI -0.177 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.317
(0.210) (0.001) (0.020) (0.013) (0.582)
CAWI -0.172 0.003 0.055* 0.035* -2.392***
(0.350) (0.002) (0.032) (0.020) (0.925)
B: Media 1.039** -0.002 -0.027 -0.015 1.391
(0.422) (0.002) (0.039) (0.025) (1.117)
B: Polling House 1.102** -0.003 -0.035 -0.021 1.382
(0.441) (0.002) (0.040) (0.026) (1.167)
B: Political Party 0.711* -0.003 -0.012 -0.006 1.079
(0.416) (0.002) (0.038) (0.024) (1.102)
M: TV -0.603** 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.1078
(0.294) (0.002) (0.027) (0.017) (0.779)
M: Newspaper -0.546** 0.001 0.013 0.007 -0.696
(0.271) (0.001) (0.025) (0.016) (0.718)
M: Internet 0.733** 0.000 -0.008 -0.006 0.086
(0.323) (0.002) (0.030) (0.019) (0.856)
DCEP 0.052** 0.021*** 0.019*** -0.040*** 0.004
(0.021) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.056)
Constant 0.465 0.007*** -0.015 -0.012 0.472
(0.280) (0.002) (0.026) (0.016) (0.742)
R2 0.253 0.999 0.679 0.958 0.273
Adjusted R2 0.122 0.998 0.623 0.951 0.146
ANOVA 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029
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Recalling the model, we regress the accuracy index on a set of dummy variables
for each methodology employed as documented by the polling houses and an exoge-
nous variable (the difference between the two main parties/coalitions as reported
by poll readings) to estimate the house effect. Specifically, we take into account
the sampling procedure (random and no- random), the delivery method (CATI and
CAWI), who commissioned the poll (media, polling house, and political parties) and
where its results have been disseminated (TV, newspapers, and the Internet). For
each dummy variables we expect a different relationship with the accuracy index.
Accordingly, the main expectations are a positive relationship between the accuracy
index and the following variables: no-random samples, CATI, CAWI, media and po-
litical parties as buyers, and the difference between the two main parties/coalitions
estimated in the poll readings (hereafter referred as DCEP). For instance, the use
of samples other than random ones increases the inaccuracy (error) of poll read-
ings5. For the rest, we expect a negative relationship and, therefore, these variables
increase (decrease) the accuracy (error) in Italian polling. For the sake of simplic-
ity, the results will be discussed for each accuracy measure separately. We start by
considering the model where Bw is the dependent variable. According to table 4.4,
the majority of the explanatory variables included in the model meet the statistical
level of significance. Focusing on these variables, almost all of them fulfill the ex-
pectations concerning the relationship with the Bw measure. Specifically, the use of
random sampling procedures and the dissemination of their results in TV shows and
5Please refer to section 3.3.1 of chapter 3 for further explanation.
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in newspaper articles decreases the overall error estimated by the accuracy index.
Conversely, the higher the difference estimated by the polls between the two main
coalitions across the campaign, the higher the overall error in Italian polling in the
2006 general elections. There is also a statistically significant positive relationship
between the Bw measure and the dummy variables employed as buyer. This fulfills
our expectations only in part given that we assumed that when a poll is carried
on an institution’s own initiative there is a negative impact on the degree of error
estimated by the Bw measure.
Regarding the model where the A measure is the dependent variable, table 4.4
reports that only random sampling and the DCEP meet the statistical level of
significance (p < 0.01). Moreover, the sign of their coefficient fulfills our expectations
given that random sampling has a negative relationship with the A measure whereas
the DCEP has a positive one. All the other variables in the model did not meet
the statistical level of significance and, therefore, we cannot draw any substantial
conclusions.
Focusing on the last three columns of table 4.4, the accuracy index concerning the
Casa delle Liberta` coalition has a negative relationship with the random sampling
procedure as expected. Conversely, the use of CAWI as the delivery system for the
interview and the DCEP have a positive relationship fulfilling our expectations. The
rest of the variables did not meet the statistical level of significance. Concerning
the the accuracy index for the Unione coalition, almost all the variables taken into
account do not meet the statistical level of significance except the cases of the
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CAWI and the DCEP. According to table 4.4, only the delivery method fulfills our
expectations given the DCEP surprisingly shows a negative relationship with the
accuracy index concerning the Unione coalitions. Considering the model using the
accuracy index concerning the Other coalition, the CAWI delivery system is the only
explanatory variable employed that meets the statistical level of significance fulfilling
the main expectation of a positive relationship. In other words, by using this delivery
method the inaccuracy of polls prediction for the small parties unaligned with any
coalition increases.
4.4 Voter Sentiment Results
Although the previous section confirmed one of two hypotheses on which this
thesis has drawn, it is not possible to rule out completely that voters sentiment
change (even if small) over the election campaign cause inaccuracy in Italian polling.
In order to estimate it, we will undertake a statistical analysis using two approaches.
Firstly, we will estimate error in our sample span in both the last six and in the last
two months of the election campaign to see what evidence it provides concerning the
true voters sentiment change and, therefore, the reliability of the polls. Secondly,
we will employ the autoregressive model to investigate the extent of the true over
time voters sentiment change during the course of the 2006 general election using
the well-established model proposed by Erikson and Wlezien (1999). As already
pointed out many times, the nature of Italian system is a multiparty and multi-
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coalition one and the procedures in the literature have been designed on the basis
of the American system, which is a two party one. In order to estimate the true
over time voters sentiment change, we will employ the autoregressive model using
the poll readings for each coalition as the dependent variable. In doing so, we will
able to estimate the change for each coalition and the degree of these movements.
4.4.1 Analysis of Variance
The accuracy of poll predictions may consist of different measures on the basis
of their various purposes. In this thesis, specific measures (A, A
′
, and Bw) have
already been applied to estimate the difference between the poll readings and the
election outcomes. The evidence provided so far shows the presence of a high degree
of inaccuracy in Italian polling during the 2006 general elections in all the measures
employed. Following the main purpose of this thesis - to estimate the major and,
in particular, the strongest cause of inaccuracy - we undertake analysis of variance
of the poll readings in order to identify their amount of error and the voters senti-
ment change. To do that, we employed the following measures: observed variance,
error variance (and sampling error), true variance, and reliability. According to the
evidence provided by house effect analysis, the expectation is that the presence of
voters sentiment change for the three coalitions - and, in particular, for the group of
Others - is composed of the true variance and reliability measures. In other words,
when the amount of true variance is higher than the error measures.
Table 4.5 shows the outcomes of those measures covering the entire six months
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Table 4.5: 2006 Italian General Election polls on Chamber of Deputies:
analysis of variance all sample (October - March).
The analysis of variance is applied to all the competing parties/coalitions over the six months of the campaign. The
Observed Variance (OV) refers to the variance of poll readings. The Error Variance (EV) is the average of error.
The Sampling Error (SE) refers to formula 3.16. The True Variance (TV) is the difference between OV and EV.
The Reliability is the ratio between TV and OV.
CDL Unione Others Sample
Mean 46.35 51.49 1.95 2172
Observed Variance 1.77 2.05 2.47 —
Error Variance 1.14 1.15 0.09 —
Sampling Error 1.07 1.07 0.30 —
True Variance 0.62 0.90 2.38 —
Reliability 0.35 0.44 0.96 —
for each coalition plus the group of small parties not aligned with any coalition
(‘Others’). For the sake of simplicity, the outcomes are discussed for each coalition
separately. According to table 4.5, the poll readings concerning the Casa delle
Liberta´ have 1.77 as observed variance and error variance of 1.14 (and its square
root - sampling error - is 1.07). Subtracting the latter from the former, we obtained
that true variance for the Casa delle Liberta´ is 0.62. In other words, the variance of
polls reading, which is not due to sampling procedures by polling houses, comprises
a small shift of voters sentiment over the election campaign. Moreover, this is
confirmed by the estimation of statistical reliability (the ratio of true variance and
observed variance), which is only 0.35. In other words, the evidence provided by
these outcomes suggests that the poll readings for the Casa delle Liberta´ are affected
more by sampling procedure than voters sentiment change during the 2006 Italian
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election campaign. This has also been confirmed by the multivariate regression
model in the previous section (see table 4.4). In order to estimate whether the
inaccuracy in the last months of the election campaign is also due to voters sentiment
change despite the evidence provided by house effect analysis, we will carry out the
same analysis considering only the months of February and March.
Table 4.6: 2006 Italian General Election polls on Chamber of Deputies:
analysis of variance two months (February and March).
The analysis of variance is applied to all the competing parties/coalitions over the last two months of the campaign.
The Observed Variance (OV) refers to the variance of poll readings. The Error Variance (EV) is the average of
error. The Sampling Error (SE) refers to formula 3.16. The True Variance (TV) is the difference between OV and
EV. The Reliability is the ratio between TV and OV.
CDL Unione Others Sample
Mean 46.95 51.56 1.30 2609
Observed Variance 0.90 1.78 1.36 —
Variance Error 0.95 0.96 0.04 —
Sampling Error 0.98 0.98 0.22 —
True Variance -0.05 0.83 1.31 —
Reliability -0.06 0.46 0.96 —
According to table 4.6, it would be not possible to argue that there was any voters
movement during those months because the true variance and reliability outcomes
are negative. In other words, the error variance and the sampling error are higher
than the observed variance. Therefore, all the inaccuracy in polls in the last period
of the election campaign is caused by the house effect, as already confirmed in the
previous analyses.
Regarding the Unione, table 4.5 shows that the observed variance (2.05) of poll
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readings for this coalition is higher than that for the Casa delle Liberta´ (1.77).
What is interesting in the outcomes provided by this table is that the poll readings
for the Unione have almost the same amount of error variance (1.15) as those for
the Casa delle Liberta´ (1.14). In other words, these polls are affected by the same
degree of error due to the sampling procedure employed by the polling house. This
is only in part confirmed by the multivariate regression model where the use of a
random sample has a statistically significant negative relationship with the accuracy
values concerning the Casa delle Liberta` (see table 4.4). However, true variance and
reliability are higher because of observed variance: 0.90 and 0.44 respectively. Nev-
ertheless, those measures comprise a low level of voters sentiment change throughout
the entire election campaign. This is also consistent with the evidence provided by
table 4.6, where the true variance and reliability of Unione did not change in the
last two months. Therefore, we may argue that there is weak evidence of voters
sentiment change over the election campaign both in the long and short term with
regard to the Unione coalition.
Instead, the evidence in table 4.5 regarding the group of small parties not aligned
with any coalition (‘Others’) estimates a higher level of voters sentiment change. In
other words, the true variance and the reliability are 2.38 and 0.96 respectively.
Those values are due to a very low error variance (0.09) and high observed variance
(2.47) in the poll readings over the entire election campaigns. In other words, the
inaccuracy of polls in predicting the election outcomes for the Others coalition are
due to voters sentiment change rather than the sampling procedure employed by the
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polling house. Moreover, table 4.6 also provides the evidence that this also occurred
during the last two months of the election campaign with a lesser magnitude. Indeed,
there is less observed variance (1.36), and error variance is only 0.04. These outcomes
are consistent with the evidence provided by all the models employed for the house
effect analysis.
4.4.2 AR(1) Results
The previous analysis of variance in poll readings for each coalition provided the
evidence of a slight shift in voters sentiment over the election campaign in particular
in the case of the Casa delle Liberta´ and the Unione. In order properly to estimate
the degree of these movements, we will apply the autoregressive model (AR(1))
following the approach proposed by Erikson and Wlezien (1999, 2012). Recalling
the model, it assumes that the true voters sentiment on one day is to be explained
as a function of voters sentiment on previous days and shocks from the election
campaign (see formula 3.34). Specifically, the variance of daily shocks and their
persistence will comprise the real movement when it occurs. Assuming that the poll
readings are a stationary series, the autoregressive parameter value will be between
0 and 1 and it will geometrically decay as the number of days between poll readings
increases.
As for the previous analysis, we will discuss the outcomes of the AR(1) model
for each coalition separately. Table 4.7 presents the outcomes of AR(1) applied to
Casa delle Liberta´ poll readings. The first column reports the observed correlations
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between the poll readings and their lagged values over 1 to 7 days.
Table 4.7: 2006 Italian General Election: true voters sentiment change using
AR(1) for the Casa Delle Liberta´.
In the column called ‘Correlation’, the values refer to the coefficient using the AR(1) - formula 3.34 -with different
lag of days. In the column called ‘True Correlation’, Heise’s procedure (1969) is applied by multiplying the observed
correlation to reliability (last row of table 4.5). The statistical level of significance follows the rules: *** p < 0.01;
** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
Correlation (γ) True Correlation (γ ∗ rel) R2 RMSE
Lag 1 0.317* 0.111 0.24 1.18
Lag 2 0.344** 0.120 0.29 1.15
Lag 3 0.560*** 0.196 0.23 1.12
Lag 4 0.399*** 0.140 0.32 1.46
Lag 5 0.490*** 0.172 0.21 1.24
Lag 6 0.432*** 0.151 0.21 1.25
Lag 7 0.421*** 0.147 0.20 1.27
The main expectation is to observe a geometrical decay of values of parameter
(γ), which comprise the movement in voters sentiment, as the number of days be-
tween poll readings increases. Instead, the evidence provided by the table shows
the following pattern: 0.317, 0.344, 0.560, 0.399, 0.490, 0.432, and 0.421. Although
it is not a stable increasing trend, those outcomes are not consistent with the ex-
pectation. In other words, for the Casa delle Liberta´ poll readings the values of
the parameter increases as the number of days between polls increases. Specifically,
using the first three lags over 1, 2, and 3 days respectively, the values of the pa-
rameter follow an increasing pattern and then, there is a slightly drop (0.399) with
4 days lagged values increasing again using 5 days as lag. Then, the values of the
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parameter decay as between poll readings increasing to 6 and 7 days.
Now, we take into account the reliability of the polls to estimate the degree
of movement in voters sentiment change - true over-time correlation - excluding
the amount of error that would result from random sampling. To do that, we
simply multiply the values of parameter reliability for the six months of the election
campaign (0.35). The second column of table 4.7 presents the outcomes of true over-
time correlations but the pattern of values of the parameter does not change so much.
Specifically, the true over time correlation increases as the number of days between
poll readings increases. Those outcomes are in line with the evidence provided by
either the previous analyses (house effect and variance). In other words, there is not
a clear and large voters sentiment change concerning the Casa delle Liberta´. The
slight movement observed in the AR(1) and Heise (1969) procedure is present over
the longer lags between poll readings. On this basis, it is possible to argue that any
movement occurs as a persistent-term effect from the election campaign and not as
short-term effect.
Table 4.8 shows the results of AR(1) and Heise (1969) procedures for poll readings
concerning the Unione. In contrast to the Casa delle Liberta´, all the values of the
parameter are negative and none of them meets the statistical level of significance.
Therefore, it is not possible to draw any statistically significant conclusions from
those outcomes. Nevertheless, the values of the parameter increase as the number
of days between poll readings increases. In addition, none of those values satisfy the
condition of stationary series that the parameter must be between 0 and 1.
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Table 4.8: 2006 Italian General Election: true voters sentiment change using
AR(1) for the Unione.
In the column called ‘Correlation’, the values refer to the coefficient using the AR(1) - formula 3.34 -with different
lag of days. In the column called ‘True Correlation’, Heise’s procedure (1969) is applied by multiplying the observed
correlation to reliability (last row of table 4.5). The statistical level of significance follows the rules: *** p < 0.01;
** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
Correlation (γ) True Correlation (γ ∗ rel) R2 RMSE
Lag 1 -0.029 -0.013 0.001 1.47
Lag 2 -0.043 -0.019 0.002 1.48
Lag 3 -0.068 -0.030 0.005 1.47
Lag 4 -0.076 -0.033 0.006 1.46
Lag 5 -0.080 -0.035 0.010 1.47
Lag 6 -0.078 -0.034 0.006 1.48
Lag 7 -0.068 -0.030 0.038 1.48
The pattern of values of the parameter does not change when taking into account
the reliability of poll readings for the six months of the election campaign (0.44).
The second column of table 4.8 shows that the values of the parameter multiplied
by the reliability increase as the number of days between poll readings increases,
reaching their peak using the lag of 5 days, and then, slightly decreasing using the
lag of 6 and 7 days. Therefore, there is a small movement among voters concerning
the Unione.
According to this evidence, it is possible to argue that the inaccuracy of poll
readings is certainly due to the house effect rather than a significant voters sentiment
change throughout the election campaign.
Table 4.9 shows the outcome of AR(1) and Heise (1969) procedures applied to
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Table 4.9: 2006 Italian General Election: true voters sentiment change using
AR(1) for the Others.
In the column called ‘Correlation’, the values refer to the coefficient using the AR(1) - formula 3.34 - with different
lag of days. In the column called ‘True Correlation’, Heise’s procedure (1969) is applied by multiplying the observed
correlation to reliability (last row of table 4.5). The statistical level of significance follows the rules: *** p < 0.01;
** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
Correlation (γ) True Correlation (γ ∗ rel) R2 RMSE
Lag 1 0.249** 0.239 0.131 1.50
Lag 2 0.175 0.168 0.130 1.50
Lag 3 0.134 0.129 0.158 1.47
Lag 4 0.216 0.207 0.128 1.50
Lag 5 0.289** 0.277 0.096 1.54
Lag 6 0.020 0.019 0.137 1.51
Lag 7 0.333** 0.320 0.094 1.56
poll readings concerning the group of small parties not aligned with any coalition
(Others). According to the first column, the values of the parameter are unstable
given there is an oscillating pattern. In addition, only three out of seven values meet
the statistical level of significance. Taking into account the reliability of those poll
readings for the six months of the election campaign, the values of the parameter
follow the same pattern (second column of table 4.9). Therefore, we may argue
that even for the Others the degree of movement of voters sentiment was not as
strong as expected. Indeed, this evidence is surprising because the main expectation
concerning them was to estimate a stronger voters sentiment change according to
the evidence provided both by the house effect and the variance analysis.
In the light of this evidence, it is possible to argue that there is a slight voters
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sentiment change in the Others poll readings. However, their inaccuracy seems to
be more due to the house effect than to change in voters sentiment.
4.5 Conclusion
Were the Italian pollsters really wrong in 2006? In the light of what has emerged
from the analysis presented in this chapter, the answer to the question is: yes, they
were wrong. Specifically, we estimated a high presence of inaccuracy using the A, A
′
,
and Bw measures. Then, the OLS regression for each coalition and their accuracy
values confirmed that the poll readings for the Casa delle Liberta´, the Unione, and
the Others has been strongly influenced by the house effect. In addition, the lowess
procedure showed that although there is a degree of random error among the series,
it is so small as to be consistent with the evidence provided by the house effect
model. Using the multivariate model to estimate the impact of each methodology
employed by the polling house on the predictive accuracy of poll readings, we can
draw at least three main conclusions. Firstly, the difference estimated between the
two main coalitions by poll readings has a positive relationship with all the accuracy
measures employed. In other words, the higher its value, the higher is the inaccuracy
estimated. Secondly, the delivery method plays an important role in the predictive
accuracy of polls using the A
′
measure. Indeed, it is the only variable that always
meets the statistical level of significance without regard to the coalitions. However,
it increases the predictive accuracy of polls regarding the small parties not aligned
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with any coalitions (Others). Thirdly, random sampling increases the predictive
accuracy of polls especially when it is estimated using the overall indexes (A and
Bw) as dependent variables.
To estimate whether the inaccuracy of polls is also due to voters sentiment
change, in the previous section we presented the outcomes provided by two different
analyses: variance and autoregressive models. Despite the presence of true variance
in the series over the entire election campaign, the autoregressive model provides
evidence that voters sentiment movement was so small that it did not affect the
poll readings especially in the short term. With this in mind, rather than the
polls, which itself as a method does not have the capacity to predict future voting
intentions because of voters sentiment change, the inaccuracy of polls in the 2006
Italian general election was due to the so called house effect.
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Chapter 5
2008 Italian General Election
5.1 Introduction
The 2008 Italian general election was characterized by the presence of three main
coalitions, the centre party (UDC) running on its own and a group of unaligned
parties (Others). The actual results of the elections were: 37.6% for the Partito
Democratico, 3.1% for the Sinistra Arcobaleno, 46.8% for the Popolo delle Liberta`,
5.5% for the UDC, and 6.9% for other parties. The election results gave a victory
to the centre-right coalition.
This chapter is devoted to providing evidence concerning the accuracy and the
causes of inaccuracy of all polls published during the 2008 Italian general election
campaign that asked about voting intentions for the Chamber of Deputies.
According to this, we analyzed the polls published on the official website be-
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tween 1 October and 28 March 20081. With this in mind, the remainder of this
chapter is structured as follows. The next section will be devoted to presenting the
analysis of accuracy using the A, A
′
and Bw measures and a discussion of evidence
provided by their outcomes. In the third section, we will present the house effect
analysis in order to estimate how much the variance of poll readings is affected by
the methodologies employed by different polling houses. To do that, we will firstly
apply well-established econometric methods (OLS) and the lowess procedure (Cleve-
land 1979) following the approach proposed by Erikson and Wlezein (1999). Then,
we employ a multivariate regression model to estimate the extent of the house effect
caused by the methodologies employed by polling houses using the accuracy indexes
as dependent variables. In the fourth section, we will employ two different anal-
yses in order to estimate the extent of voters sentiment change for each coalition
over the election campaign. Specifically, we will undertake a traditional analysis
of variance, using measures like the sampling error and reliability, to estimate the
error in the poll readings. Then, we will employ a more sophisticated analysis using
an autoregressive model (AR(1)) in order to estimate whether the error is due to
sampling procedures or voters sentiment change. Finally, in section five, we will
draw the main conclusions on the basis of the evidence provided by all the analysis
undertaken.
1That means 179 days before Election day, which covers the election campaign. On the basis
of Italian law, polls cannot be published during the 15 days before Election day.
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5.2 Accuracy Results
Before discussing the evidence provided by the accuracy analysis, it is useful
to recall its formula and its revision in order to fit the Italian case. Recalling the
formula 3.1, to measure the accuracy of polls in the 2008 Italian national election, we
applied the formula to the Partito Democratico (PD), Popolo delle Liberta` (PDL),
treating each coalition as a party and the three small parties/coalitions, composed
of the Sinistra Arcobaleno (SA), the Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e di Centro
(UDC) and those small parties unaligned (“Others”) respectively, as third-, fourth-
and fifth-party candidates. So as well as applying the original formula to the two
main coalitions, we adapted the measure to enable us to take account of these.
Therefore, we rewrite equation 3.1 as follows:
A
′
pdl = ln
[
(pdl/(pd+ sa+ udc+ o))
(PDL/(PD + SA+ UDC +O))
]
(5.1)
where pdl is the Popolo delle Liberta` poll prediction, pd is the Partito Demo-
cratico poll prediction, sa is the Sinistra Arcobaleno poll prediction, udc is the
Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e di Centro (UDC) and o is the Others poll pre-
diction. Conversely, PDL is the actual result obtained by the Popolo delle Liberta`,
PD is the actual results for the Partito Democratico, SA is the actual results for
Sinistra Arcobaleno, UDC is the actual results for Unione dei Democratici Cristiani
e di Centro (UDC), and O is the actual results achieved by the others. We did the
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same for the other four parties2.
As for the 2006 election, if the value of A
′
is positive, the poll overestimates
support for the party. Conversely, if the value is negative, the poll underestimates
support. To measure the extent to which under- and overestimates are significant
as opposed to falling within the margins of what can be expected due to sampling
error, we obtain it by the calculating standard error of A
′
and using a 95% confidence
interval. Therefore, polls given values of A
′
falling outside the confidence we regard
as inaccurate, those giving value within it as accurate. Recalling equation 5.1, we
rewrite equation 3.2 as follows:
V ariance(A
′
pdl) = 1/(n · pdl · (pd+ sa+ udc+ o)) (5.2)
where n is the number of respondents and pdl, pd, sa, udc, and o are Popolo delle
Liberta´, Partito Democratico, Sinistra Arcobaleno, Unione di Centro, and Others
polls respectively3. To compare the results with the other two elections, we apply
the formula 3.1 to the Partito Democratico (plus Sinistra Arcobaleno), the Popolo
delle Liberta` (plus UDC), treating each coalition as a party and those small parties
unaligned (“Others”) respectively, as third-party candidates4:
A
′
coal;pdl = ln
[
(pdl/(pd+ o))
(PDL/(PD +O))
]
(5.3)
2Please refer to the Appendix for the full list of A
′
measures.
3Please refer to the Appendix for a full list of the variance of A
′
measures.
4Please refer to the Appendix for the full list of A
′
measures.
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In addition, we will employ the original formula in order to compare the outcome
with the other two general elections. Following Martin, Traugott, and Kennedy’s
measure, Popolo delle Liberta` and Partito Democratico coalitions will be treated as
parties5.
To estimate the overall error for each poll readings, we employ the measure
(B) proposed by Arzheimer and Evans (2014) that takes into account all the par-
ties/coalitions competing in the elections at the same time and which corrects for
the dependency of A
′
on the reference party (see formula 3.5). Given the presence
of small unaligned parties in the Italian political system, we apply the weighted
version of this measure: Bw.
Following the literature on election studies, we expect that the 2008 polls will
have been accurate closer to Election Day. To test this assumption, we will check
the timing of accuracy/inaccuracy on the basis of the evidence provided by the A,
A
′
, and Bw measures. Specifically, we compare the monthly averages of all measures
and the monthly percentages of the polls classified as inaccurate by A and A
′
and
the monthly percentages of polls statistically biased by the χ2 for the Bw measures
using the threshold of p ≤ 0.05.
5.2.1 Findings
Were Italian pollsters more accurate in 2008 than in the previous election? To
answer this question, we have undertaken an empirical analysis of the accuracy of
5Please refer to the Appendix for the measure.
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the polls published during the six months prior to Election Day that asked about
voting intentions. The analysis only covers polls concerning voting intentions for the
Chamber of Deputies excluding those for the Senate6. In addition, we also include in
the analysis those polls where the pollster did not specify which of the two branches
of Parliament was being referred to.
Figure 5.1: 2008 Italian General Election polls for the five parties/coalitions
over the six months of election campaign
y-axis = percentage support according to poll readings. x-axis = date n which poll readings were taken.
On this basis there were 86 polls for the Chamber of Deputies. Figure 5.1 presents
the poll readings series for each coalition over the election campaign. According to
6Given the difference in the electoral system for the two chamber of Italian Parliament, we
prefer to exclude from the analysis those polls referring to the Senate.
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this, all predictions concerning the two major centre-right and -left coalitions fall
within a range between 30% and 55% of the share. In contrast to 2006, the centre-
right coalition (Popolo delle Liberta´) was leading the race on the basis of these
predictions. The remaining parties had shares that were between 0% and 10% of
the share.
What is interesting in this figure is that over the entire election campaign all the
poll readings present an oscillating trend irrespective of the coalition they refer to.
Before proceeding with the discussion of the evidence provided by accuracy mea-
sures, it is necessary recall their main differences. When A
′
is applied, it produces
an estimate of poll prediction for each party/coalition rather than an estimate of
overall polls accuracy which is provided by A measure. As explained earlier, we
revised the A measure in two versions in order to allow us to assess the extent of
inaccuracy at the three Italian general elections. Doing so, we are also able to esti-
mate whether there is a rising or decreasing trend in terms of extent of inaccuracy in
Italian polling during the elections. The Bw gives information on the degree of error
for each polls taking into account all the parties/coalitions in the electoral race.
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Table 5.1 compares the percentage of polls classified as inaccurate where the
first row reports the outcomes using the measure A, the second row reports the
outcomes using the measure A
′
applied to three coalitions; the third row reports
the outcomes using the measure A
′
applied to all coalitions and the last two rows
document the total percentage of polls that are statistically biased using the χ2 test
for the Bw measure computed using three and five parties/coalitions respectively.
For the sake of simplicity, we will discuss the results for each measure separately.
Focusing on the first row where the measure A (formula 3.1) is applied, overall only
29% of polls are classified as inaccurate. Compared with 2006 (32%, see table 4.1),
there is a slight decrease in inaccuracy. Moving to the second row where the first
version of measure of A
′
(formula 5.3, A.13, and A.14) is applied, the percentage of
inaccurate polls rises to 56, 78, and 56 for Popolo delle Liberta`, Partito Democratico,
and Others respectively. Compared with the 2006 inaccuracy percentages, there
was a significant decrease with regard to the centre left coalition and the group of
small parties not aligned with any coalition: almost 20% fewer polls are classified as
inaccurate (see table 4.1). Instead, this is not the case with the Centre - Right, where
there is a slight decrease of 4% in the proportion of polls classified as inaccurate.
On the basis of the outcomes reported in the third row of table 5.1 where the
second version of measure A
′
(formula 5.1, A.5, A.6, A.7, and A.8) is applied, the
percentages of polls that are inaccurate among all coalitions are 42, 22, 35, 98,
and 55 for Popolo delle Liberta´, Partito Democratico, the Sinistra Arcobaleno, the
UDC, and Others respectively. According to the literature, adding the predictions
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for parties creates a more accurate forecast because this procedure decreases the
error. However, the evidence provided by table 5.1 shows that when adding the
poll readings of coalitions7 on the basis of their centre-right or -left orientation, the
extent of inaccuracy rise in particular for the centre-left coalitions. In addition, the
percentage of polls classified as inaccurate concerning the Others coalition does not
change when using the two versions of A
′
. Concerning the Bw measure, there is
a high percentage of polls that are statistically biased using the χ2 test without
regard to the number of parties/coalitions taken into account. Therefore, the Bw
measure estimates a significant degree of error in Italian polling. Compared to the
previous election, the percentage of statistically biased polls decreases from 76%
to the 65% (see tables 4.1 and 5.1). As Castro and Tomaselli (2015) have pointed
out, the Bw measure is highly sensitive to the number of parties/coalitions taken
into account in the computation process. This is confirmed by table 5.1, which
documents that the percentages of statistically biased polls rise by 20% using 5
rather than 3 parties/coalitions.
To look in more depth at the percentages of polls that are inaccurate, tables 5.2
and 5.3 compare the monthly averages and the percentages of poll predictions using
A and second versions of A
′
and the first version of A
′
respectively. In the second
column, table 5.2 reports the monthly averages and the percentages of polls that
are statistically biased using the χ2 test for the Bw measure.
7For the centre-right, we add the Popolo delle Liberta´ and UDC poll readings. For the centre-
left, we add Partito Democratico and Sinistra Arcobaleno poll readings.
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For the sake of simplicity, we will first discuss the evidence provided by table 5.2
and then that concerning table 5.3 for each coalition separately.
According to table 5.2, when the Ameasure is applied, there is an overall under-
estimation in Italian polling. In other words, the monthly average of A has negative
values, but they are not significantly different from 0 (the perfect agreement be-
tween poll prediction and election results). In addition, the higher percentages of
polls classified as inaccurate occurs closer to Election Day rather than further back.
This is also confirmed by the Bw measure, where almost all the monthly percentage
of statistically biased polls stand at 100% except in December when the proportion
drops to 66%. Moreover, the monthly averages of the Bw measure decrease over the
last two months of the election campaign. Regarding the major centre-right coali-
tion, table 5.2 shows that there was a constant underestimation in the last part of
the election campaign. In other words, 42% of those polls constantly underestimate
the winner of the election. In addition, the monthly average of A
′
values is not so
significantly different from 0 except in the last two months. Indeed, the monthly
percentage of polls classified as inaccurate in the first three months (from October to
December) of the election campaign is the same as the outcomes using the original A
measure but assuming positive values not different from 0. Then, comparing the last
three months (from January to March), those percentages are doubled and change
their sign (from positive to negative), and the polls underestimate the major centre
right coalition. Regarding the major centre-left coalition, table 5.2 shows that there
was a constant underestimation during the election campaign. In addition, the val-
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ues of A
′
are not so significantly different from 0 and, in particular, the last months
are characterized by the presence of both positive and negative values. Looking at
the timing of the inaccuracy, the percentages of polls classified as inaccurate are
almost the same for each month except for January (100%) and March (10%)(see
table 5.2). It should be also noted that the overall percentages using the second
version of A
′
for the Partito Democratico is only 22%, therefore those monthly per-
centages comprise a small set of polls classified as inaccurate. Regarding the UDC
coalition, table 5.2 shows that there was both an under- and overestimation in the
polls, comprised in the monthly average of accuracy values. Indeed, until January
the polls underestimated the electoral results except in December, where all polls
are classified as accurate and the average of their values is significantly close to 0.
In addition, although in the last two months of the election campaign there was
an overestimation of this coalition, values of accuracy measure A
′
are not signif-
icantly different from 0 and this is also due to the presence of both positive and
negative values over the month of March. The seventh column of table 5.2 reports
the monthly average and percentage of values of accuracy measure A
′
applied to
the small centre-left coalition Sinistra Arcobaleno. As already pointed out when
discussing table 5.1, there was a seriously high percentage (98%) of polls classified
overall as inaccurate with regard to this coalition. This is consistent with what
emerges also from table 5.2, where the monthly average of accuracy values has a
positive value significantly different from 0. In addition, almost throughout the en-
tire election campaign the percentage of polls classified as inaccurate reaches 100%,
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except in December where the average of accuracy values is also lower than the rest.
Regarding the group of small parties not aligned with any coalition (Others), table
5.1 reports that an overall 55% of polls are classified as inaccurate. According to
table 5.2, there was a constant and significant underestimation of those small parties
throughout the election campaign. Specifically, all the monthly average of accuracy
values are negative and significantly different from 0. Only in the last two months
of the election campaign is the monthly average lower and closer to 0.
To look in more depth at these results, we report the values of the accuracy mea-
sures employed (A and A
′
) and their confidence interval over the election campaign
for the Popolo delle Liberta` and Partito Democratico. When the values fall outside
the confidence interval, they are classified as inaccurate and vice versa.
According to figure 5.2(a), the trend of values of A was unstable especially
in the first part of the election campaign reaching a peak by the end of January
assuming positive values and, then, dropping below the line of 0 in early February. In
particular, the figure shows that although table 5.2 provided evidence that there were
more polls classified as inaccurate in the last two months of the election campaign
rather than in the previous months, all those polls date from late February and early
March. Therefore, we may argue that in the very last days of the election campaign,
when it is still possible to publish polls, their performance was accurate.
According to figure 5.2(b), the trend of values of A
′
for Popolo delle Liberta`
was more unstable and oscillating than the overall accuracy values of the polls.
During the first part of the election campaign, as the positive values for the accuracy
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Figure 5.2: Accuracy values applying A and A′ measures and their confidence
intervals: Popolo delle Liberta` and Partito Democratico
y-axis = accuracy values using the formula 3.1, 5.1 and A.5 for panel (a), (b), and (c) respectively.
x-axis= dates on which poll readings are taken.
(a) A: PDL and PD (b) PdL
(c) PD
measure show, support for the Popolo delle Liberta´ has been overestimated. In
contrast, the negative values for the accuracy measure in figure 5.2(b) show that
from the second part of January, support for this coalition was underestimated.
Only a few of these reach the 0 line (indicating perfect agreement between the poll
readings and the election results).
Regarding the Partito Democratico, figure 5.2(c) shows that in the first part
of the election campaign there are significant negative values for accuracy which
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comprise the initial underestimation of this coalition in Italian polling. Closer to
the beginning of February, the accuracy values become positive and, in a few cases,
the values are very close to or overlapping the line of 0. In other words, in the
last two months of the election campaign, polls were more accurate in predicting
the electoral performance of the major centre-left coalition and, in some cases, they
were also able to forecast correctly.
Figure 5.3: Accuracy values applying A′ measures and their confidence in-
tervals: UDC, SA, and Others
y-axis = accuracy values using the formula A.7, A.6, and A.8 for panel (a), (b), and (c) respectively.
x-axis = dates on which poll readings are taken.
(a) UDC (b) SA
(c) Others
With regard to the UDC party, figure 5.3(a) shows an oscillating trend which
from a significant negative value in the first part of the election campaign rises
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to a positive one but more accurate value especially in the last two months of the
election campaign. Figure 5.3(b) clearly shows how strong the overestimation of this
small centre-left coalition (SA) throughout the election campaign has been and there
are only a few cases where the accuracy values fall inside the confidence interval,
classifying them as accurate.
According to figure 5.3(c) concerning the Others coalition, from initial significant
underestimation in the first two months of the election campaign, poll predictions
become more accurate closer to Election Day and, in some cases, their accuracy
values reach the line of 0.
Table 5.3 reports the outcomes computing the A
′
and Bw accuracy measures by
considering only three coalitions. Specifically, the centre-right coalition has been
obtained by adding the Popolo delle Liberta` and UDC poll predictions whereas the
centre-left coalition is composed of the Partito Democratico and Sinistra Arcobaleno
poll predictions. Focusing on the Bw measure, the monthly averages decrease closer
to Election Day. This is also confirmed by a lower percentage of statistically biased
polls during the last two months of the campaign.
According to the A
′
measures, there was a constant underestimation comprised
in the monthly negative average values for the centre right coalitions, except in
December where there is the presence of both positive and accurate values. Figure
5.4(a) shows the values of the accuracy measure A
′
and its confidence interval for
the centre-right coalition.
In contrast to the previous outcomes concerning the Popolo delle Liberta´ and
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Table 5.3: 2008 Italian General Election polls on Chamber of Deputies:
monthly average and percentage of inaccuracy of A
′
and Bw using three
coalitions.
The percentages A
′
measures refer to their values falling outside the 95% confidence interval. In the last three
column, the A
′
measures is computed using only three parties/coalitions competing the election (formula 5.3, A.13,
and A.14). The percentages for the Bw measure refer to the proportion of their values that statistically biased on
the basis of the χ2 test using p ≤ 0.05 threshold. The Bw measure is computed using the formula 3.5.
* the values of A
′
over the given month are both positive and negative.
Centre-Right Centre-Left Others Bw
October average -0.088 0.228 -2.012 0.234
% 20 100 100 100
November average -0.025 0.172 -2.234 0.252
% 0 67 100 100
December average 0.007* 0.039 0.297 0.057
% 0 33 67 66
January average -0.061 0.069 -1.209 0.236
% 40 60 100 100
February average -0.140 0.178 -0.401 0.116
% 67 72 44 50
March average -0.167 0.212 -0.323 0.113
% 63 83 48 60
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Figure 5.4: Accuracy values applying A′ measures and their confidence in-
tervals: Centre Right and Centre Left Coalition
y-axis = there are the accuracy values using the formula 5.3, A.13, and A.14 for panel (a), (b), and (c) respectively.
x-axis = dates on which poll readings were taken.
(a) Centre Right (b) Centre Left
(c) Others Coal.
the UDC separately, this figure shows that the polls were more accurate in predict-
ing the electoral outcomes of centre-right coalition in the last part of the election
campaign. In other words, closer to Election Day, more polls are classified as accu-
rate. Regarding the centre-left coalition, table 5.3 shows that there was a constant
overestimation even if the monthly average of accuracy values is not so significantly
different from 0. This is consistent with what has already emerged from the previous
table 5.2 concerning both the coalitions separately. Indeed, the monthly averages of
129
accuracy values for the Partito Democratico coalition are negative and, conversely,
the monthly averages for the Sinistra Arcobaleno are significantly positive. In other
words, the monthly positive average accuracy values are due to the significant posi-
tive values for the Sinistra Arcobaleno rather than the better accuracy performance
of poll predictions concerning the Partito Democratico. This is also consistent with
the overall percentage of polls which rise up to 78% (see table 5.1) due to the 98%
of poll predictions classified as inaccurate for the Sinistra Arcobaleno. Figure 5.4(b)
shows the values of the accuracy measure A
′
and its confidence interval for the
centre-left coalition.
The trend of accuracy values present in figure 5.4(b) is very similar to figure
5.3(b) for the Sinistra Arcobaleno. In other words, it can easily be seen that all
the accuracy values are positively outside the confidence interval especially in the
last part of the election campaign and there are only a few cases with negative but
accurate values. The last column of table 5.3 reports the outcomes of accuracy values
of measure A
′
applied to Others as the third coalition. The outcomes do not change
very much from table 5.2. In other words, there is a constant underestimation of
these small parties throughout the election campaign. In addition, the monthly
percentage of polls classified as inaccurate is also the same as that reported in table
5.2. This is also confirmed by figure 5.4(c), which shows the accuracy values and
confidence interval.
Comparing figures 5.3(c) and 5.4(c), we do not notice remarkable differences be-
tween them. Therefore, using two different versions of accuracy measure A
′
provides
130
the same results with regard to the Others coalition, where there was a significant
underestimation in the first part of the election campaign. Conversely, in the last
two months closer to Election Day, there was less significant overestimation and,
therefore, a more accurate poll predictions.
5.3 House Effect Results
In the previous section, we showed that in the 2008 Italian general election
there was a slight decrease in the overall percentage of inaccurate poll readings and
also with regard to each party/coalition. Indeed, this has been confirmed by the
different versions of the revised accuracy measure A
′
employed. Specifically, all
the coalitions have been underestimated during the last election campaign with few
exceptions. For instance, the small centre left coalition, Sinistra Arcobaleno, has
been highly overestimated over the entire election campaign. In addition, adding
its poll predictions to the major centre-left coalition (Partito Democratico) in order
to reduce the error and to compare its performance with other elections, it had
the worst overall poll performance in terms of predicting the centre-left coalitions
electoral outcome. Therefore, what causes this high percentage of inaccuracy? In
this thesis, two hypotheses have been described concerning the causes of inaccuracy:
the house effect and voters sentiment change. In this section, we undertaken a
statistical analysis of the house effect. The latter refers to biases caused by the
methodologies employed by different polling institutions.
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The model proposed by Erikson and Wlezien (1999) assumes that the variance
of poll readings from one day to the next is caused by the house effect. To estimate
it, they regress with no intercept the poll readings in a set on N-1 polling houses and
k dummy variables for each day with at least one poll readings (see formula 3.6).
The coefficient of day dummy variables expresses the house effect. In addition, they
employ the lowess procedure proposed by Cleveland (1979) to estimate the presence
of random error in the series. In order to estimate which methodology used by
polling houses most affects the predictive accuracy of Italian polling, we employ a
multivariate regression model where the A, A
′
and Bw are the dependent variables
(see formula 3.15).
5.3.1 Findings
As for the accuracy measures, the house effect model proposed by Erikson and
Wlezien (1999) has been drawn on the basis of the American system. Therefore, to
fit with the Italian case, we apply the OLS to each party/coalition. In other words,
we will regress the poll readings for each coalition on a set of 22 dummy polling
houses variables (N - 1) and 47 dummy variables for each day with at least one poll
reading. Then, we will apply the lowess procedure in order to estimate the amount
of random error in the series. Applying this model to each coalition will allow us
to estimate the house effect separately. In other words, it may be possible that the
methodologies employed by different polling houses may affect one coalition more
than others. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 present the outcomes of three models to investigate
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the house effect for the 2008 general election. Specifically, the first table (5.4) refers
to the models using the poll readings for each coalition as dependent variables. In
contrast, the second table (5.5) reports the models using the values of A, A
′
and
Bw as dependent variables. As already explained in the previous chapter devoted
to the 2006 general election, the reason for using the accuracy values measures
as dependent variables lies with the main purpose of investigating the causes of
inaccuracy in depth. In other words, to explain why the Italian polls were inaccurate
in 2008 general election, using the values of A, A
′
, and Bw as dependent variables
rather than the poll readings allows us to estimate their variance over the days due
to the house effect. Moreover, this procedure allows us to examine in more depth
how much of the variance of inaccuracy values is specifically due to the house effect.
Recalling the expectation, the variance of days and houses explains the variance
of poll readings and accuracy values, that is their inaccuracy. We will discuss the
results of poll readings and accuracy values as dependent variables separately.
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Table 5.4 reports the outcomes of OLS regression using the poll readings for
each coalition as dependent variables. In addition, the last two columns of the
table report the outcomes for the centre-right coalition obtained by adding the
Popolo delle Liberta` and UDC poll readings and for the centre-left coalition obtained
by adding the Partito Democratico and Sinistra Arcobaleno poll readings. For
the sake of simplicity, the discussion of the evidence provided by table 5.4 will be
presented for each model separately. Concerning the first model where the poll
readings are regressed only on dummy days variables, all the Adjusted R2 are higher
than 0.93, meaning the variance of these poll readings depends almost completely
on the variance of days. What is most interesting is that the Adjusted R2 of centre-
right and -left coalitions are the same as for the Popolo delle Liberta` and the Partito
Democratico, which are the two major coalitions of the centre- right and centre-left
coalitions respectively. Instead, the lower Adjusted R2 belongs to the three small
coalitions of UDC, Sinistra Arcobaleno, and Others. Comparing these outcomes
with those in the 2006 general election, all the coalitions seem to be more affected
by the variance of days than in the previous election (see table 4.3), especially, the
Adjusted R2 concerning the Others coalition, which rises from 0.65 up to 0.93. In
the second model, the poll readings are regressed only on dummy polling houses
variables. As for the previous model, table 5.4 provides evidence of a high Adjusted
R2 , which varies between 0.78 and 0.96. Indeed, in this model the Others coalition
is also affected less by the house effect than the rest of the coalitions. In addition,
these results are higher than the 2006 poll readings (see table 4.3). In the third
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model, we fully apply the model proposed by Erikson and Wlezien (1999) regressing
the poll readings on the days and polling houses dummy variables. As reported in
table 5.4, the Adjusted R2 varies between 0.96 and 0.98. Therefore, there is strong
evidence that in 2008 the poll readings were affected by the methodologies employed
by several polling houses on different days. In the light of this evidence, one of the
hypotheses of this thesis has been strongly confirmed by all the models employed.
Moreover, all these outcomes provided stronger evidence of house effect in the 2008
Italian polling than in the previous election.
Table 5.5 reports the outcomes using the accuracy values for each coalition as
dependent variables. Specifically, the first panel of the table refers to the accuracy
values (A
′
) applying the formula 5.1, A.5, A.6, A.7, and A.8 (see Appendix) and Bw
measure. The second panel of the table refers to the accuracy values applying the
formula 5.3, A.13, and A.14 (see Appendix) and Bw measure. The third panel refers
to accuracy values applying the A measure (formula 3.1). For the sake of simplicity
we will discuss the evidence provided in table 5.5 for each model separately as for
the previous table.
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In the first model (dummy days as explanatory variables), Adjusted R2 varies
between 0.49 and 0.92. Specifically, the lower accuracy values affected by the days
are the Partito Democratico and the UDC. This is consistent with the evidence
provided by accuracy analysis presented in the previous section (see table 5.1),
where the poll readings throughout the election campaign for those coalitions are
the most accurate in the sample. Moreover, the outcomes of this model are in line
with the accuracy analysis results for the other two points. Firstly, the accuracy
values of Sinistra Arcobaleno are the most affected by the variance of days and its
poll predictions are the most inaccurate in the sample (see table 5.1). Secondly,
the performance of accuracy of poll prediction concerning the Others coalition does
not change when the A
′
measure is employed and Adjusted R2 of Others coalition
does not change in panel 1 and 2. In the second model (dummy polling houses as
explanatory variables), values of Adjusted R2 vary more than in the previous model:
0.12 (Partito Democratico) and 0.95 (Sinistra Arcobaleno). Also in this model,
these results are consistent with the evidence provided by accuracy analysis and
explained above. With this in mind, we can argue that in 2008 the accuracy values
of poll readings are less affected by different polling houses than in the previous
election. However, this could also be due to (slightly) better performance in terms
of accuracy of the 2008 poll readings than in 2006. Indeed, focusing only on the
outcomes reported in the second and third panels in table 5.5, the Adjusted R2
varies between 0.54 and 0.80. In other words, the accuracy values of centre-right
and -left coalitions and the overall performance of poll readings are more affected
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by the polling houses than the accuracy values for each coalition separately. In
the third model (dummy days and polling houses as explanatory variables), the
Adjusted R2 varies between 0.40 and 0.96 in all the accuracy values. Therefore, the
accuracy values of poll readings for each coalition, centre -right and -left coalition,
and the overall performance of poll readings are more affected by the variance of
both days and polling houses than in the other two models applied. Moreover, all
the regressions using the three models meet the highest level of significance and,
therefore, it may possible to draw substantial and reliable conclusions. According
to this evidence, the hypothesis concerning the house effect as the main causes of
inaccuracy in Italian polling has been confirmed by all the models employed.
Figure 5.5 shows the correlation between the house-adjusted poll readings for
Popolo delle Liberta` and the number of days between the poll readings and Election
Days using linear and smoothed scatter plots. According to 5.5(a) there is a posi-
tive correlation between the number of days and the house effect in poll readings,
confirming the previous analysis. Despite the high variance explained by the house
effect in all coalitions, the previous analysis also shows a certain amount of error. In
order to estimate the latter among the house-adjusted series for each coalition, we
will employ the well-established statistical procedure designed by Cleveland (1979),
which is known as lowess. Recalling this procedure, it has the merit of creating
a new value for each point in time based on the outcomes of regression using a
designed number of surrounding data points (Cleveland 1979; Beck and Jackman
1998). In other words, it is a procedure that better fits the line following the trend
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Figure 5.5: Linear and smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggre-
gated by date: Popolo delle Liberta`
y-axis = house-adjusted polls the poll readings. x-axis = number of days remaining before Election Day.
The smoothed scatter plot is computed following the model 3.7.
(a) Linear
(b) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.30 (c) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.10
of regression results. The new values are generated using weighted predicted val-
ues based on their temporal distance from a specific point in question. The degree
to which the line follows the data depends on the bandwidth used to generate the
smoothed values. The lower the bandwidth, the more the fitted line represents the
random error. We will apply the following bandwidths for each smoothed house-
adjusted series: 0.40, 0.30, 0.20, and 0.10 8. For the sake of simplicity, we report
8We also applied the bandwidth 0.05, which is considered the most robust in order to estimate
the random error, but all the scatterplots obtained were illegible because the fitted lines were
outside the box figure. Please refer to the Appendix for the smoothed scatterplot with bandwidth
0.40 and 0.20.
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only the smoothed scatterplot using the bandwidths of 0.30 and 0.10 given that they
generate better fitted lines for the purpose of this thesis.
As for the other analysis presented in this chapter, the outcomes provided by
the linear and the smoothed plots of the house-adjusted series will be presented for
each coalition separately.
The bottom right panel (5.5(c)) shows the fitted line using the bandwidth of 0.10,
which is able to follow the series presenting lower random error. Indeed, the bottom
left panel 5.5(b) with the higher bandwidth shows a less sensitive smoothed series
in representing the random error. Therefore, the outcomes of the lowess procedure
for the Popolo delle Liberta` provide evidence that the inaccuracy of poll readings is
also due to a certain amount of random error rather than only a strong presence of
the house effect.
Figure 5.6 shows the correlation between the house-adjusted poll readings for
Partito Democratico and the number of days between poll readings and Election
Day. According to figure 5.6(a), there is a slightly positive correlation especially
in the last 60 days of the election campaign. Specifically, all the values for the
last two months vary between 36% and 40% of the share. In the first part of
the election campaign, the house-adjusted poll readings present higher dispersion
varying between 30% and 44% of the share. Therefore, the bigger the difference
between the Election Day and the poll readings, the higher is the dispersion among
them. This is also consistent with the evidence provided by the accuracy (see table
5.1) and house effect analysis (see tables 5.4 and 5.5).
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Figure 5.6: Linear and smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggre-
gated by date: Partito Democratico
y-axis = house-adjusted polls the poll readings. x-axis = number of days remaining before Election Day.
The smoothed scatter plot is computed following the model 3.7.
(a) Linear
(b) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.30 (c) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.10
Using the lowess procedure, the series presents a similar pattern to the Popolo
delle Liberta`. In this case too, the lower is the bandwidth, the more the new
values created by the smoothed version follow the house-adjusted series (5.6(c))9.
However, figures 5.6 show a high presence of random effect in the series. In the
light of this evidence, we may argue that the inaccuracy of poll readings may be due
more to other factors than the house effect estimate in the previous analysis. This
9In addition, the other series created using higher bandwidth (0.40, 0.30, and 0.20) are very
similar to each other, which means that none of them are able to estimate correctly the degree of
random error in the Partito Democratico house-adjusted series. Please refer to the Appendix for
figures.
142
is consistent with the better performance of polls in terms of accuracy and the high
degree of random error estimated among the house-adjusted series.
Figure 5.7: Linear and smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggre-
gated by date: UDC
y-axis= house-adjusted polls the poll readings. x-axis = number of days remaining before Election Day.
The smoothed scatter plot is computed following the model 3.7.
(a) Linear
(b) Smoothed Bandwidth = 0.30 (c) Smoothed Bandwidth = 0.10
Figure 5.7(a) shows the correlation between the house-adjusted polls reading for
the UDC and the number of days between poll readings and Election Day. As can
be easily seen, there is a lot of dispersion among the house-adjusted poll readings,
especially in the first part of the election campaign. Indeed, the poll readings vary
between 2.5% and 6% of the share. However, the story does not change so much
also in the last two months of the election campaign, where the poll readings vary
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between 3% and 8% of the share. Therefore, it is not possible to draw any substantial
and clear relationship between them. In the light of this, we will apply the lowess
procedure to estimate the degree of random error in the house-adjusted series for
the UDC.
The bottom right panel of figure 5.7(c) shows that using the bandwidth of 0.10
the new values created by the smoothed version are highly sensitive in terms of
following the house-adjusted series. In other words, the bottom right panel estimates
better the degree of random error in the series of UDC. According to this, we may
draw the conclusion that the inaccuracy of poll readings is also due to factors other
than just the house effect.
Figure 5.8 shows the correlation between the house-adjusted poll readings for
Sinistra Arcobaleno and the number of days between the poll readings and Election
Day using linear and smoother scatter plots. More than in the other coalitions,
figure 5.8(a) shows a positive correlation between them: as the number of days
decreases, so too does the house effect in poll readings.
Indeed, the first part of the election campaign contains a higher presence of
dispersion among the house-adjusted poll readings.
Therefore, we apply the lowess procedure in order to estimate the degree of
random error in the house-adjusted poll readings for the Sinistra Arcobaleno. In the
bottom right panel (5.8(c)), the new values created by the smoothed version allows
us to estimate the random error in the series. In other words, the smoothed series
follows closely the house-adjusted series presenting lower random error compared
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Figure 5.8: Linear and smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggre-
gated by date: Sinistra Arcobaleno
y-axis = house-adjusted polls the poll readings. x-axis = number of days remaining before Election Day.
The smoothed scatter plot is computed following the model 3.7.
(a) Linear
(b) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.30 (c) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.10
with the other smoothed series (5.8(b)). With this in mind, we may argue that the
poll readings for the Sinistra Arcobaleno were greatly affected by the house effect
even if there is a small degree of random error - which could be due to other factors.
Figure 5.9(a) shows the correlation between the house-adjusted poll readings
for the Others coalition and the number of days between the poll readings and
Election Day. According to this figure, there is a negative relationship between
them: when the number of days decreases, the house effect among poll readings and
their dispersion increases.
145
Figure 5.9: Linear and smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggre-
gated by date: Others
y-axis = house-adjusted polls the poll readings. x-axis = number of days remaining before Election Day.
The smoothed scatter plot is computed following the model 3.7.
(a) Linear
(b) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.30 (c) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.10
According to figure 5.9(b), the bandwidth of 0.30 is not able to estimate the
random error among the house-adjusted series. Conversely, the bottom right panel
5.9(c) shows the presence of random error. However, we cannot exclude the hypoth-
esis that the inaccuracy of polls is also due to factors other than the house effect on
the basis of the random error estimated by the smoothed series.
Figure 5.10 shows the correlation between the house-adjusted poll readings for
the centre-right10 coalition and the number of days between the poll readings and
10As already explained earlier, the centre right coalition is obtained adding the Popolo delle
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Figure 5.10: Linear and smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls ag-
gregated by date: Centre Right Coalition
y-axis= house-adjusted polls the poll readings. x-axis = number of days remaining before Election Day.
The smoothed scatter plot is computed following the model 3.7.
(a) Linear
(b) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.30 (c) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.10
Election Day using linear and smoothed scatter plots. According to this figure,
there is a high presence of dispersion in the series. However, we may draw a slightly
positive relationship between the house-adjusted poll readings and the number of
days between the latter and Election Day.
As figures 5.10(b) and 5.10(c) show, only the lower bandwidth (0.10) is able
to follow sensitively the house-adjusted series more than the other three series.
However, all the smoothed versions estimate a high presence of dispersion that may
Liberta` and UDC poll readings.
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allow us to argue that other factors affected the accuracy of poll readings jointly
with the house effect.
Figure 5.11: Linear and smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls ag-
gregated by date: Centre Left Coalition
y-axis = house-adjusted polls the poll readings. x-axis = number days remaining before Election Day.
The smoothed scatter plot is computed following the model 3.7.
(a) Linear
(b) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.30 (c) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.10
Figure 5.11(a) shows the correlation between the house-adjusted poll readings
for the centre-left11 coalition and the number of days between the poll readings
and Election Day. According to this figure, there is a slightly positive relationship
between them even if there is a high presence of dispersion in the series. Indeed, in
11As already explained earlier, the centre-left coalition is obtained by adding the Partito Demo-
cratico and Sinistra Arcobaleno poll readings.
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the last part of the election campaign the poll readings vary between the 40% and
47% of the share.
Using the lowess procedure, the series presents a similar pattern to the house-
adjusted series. According to figures 5.11(b) and 5.11(c), there is a certain degree
of random error in the series using different bandwidths (0.30 and 0.10). Moreover,
the bottom right panel (5.11(c)) shows that the smoothed version using the band-
width 0.10 is more able to estimate the random error in the series. As for the other
coalitions, the other panel (5.11(b)) presents a smoothed version which is less sen-
sitive and unable to estimate the random error. With this in mind, we may argue
that also in this case the degree of random error presented in the smoothed version
of the house-adjusted series for the centre-left coalition suggests that other factors
may affect the accuracy of polls jointly with the strong house effect estimated in the
previous analysis.
According to the aim of this thesis - to ascertain the factors that cause bias
in Italian polling - we employ a multivariate regression model using the method-
ologies used by different polling houses as explanatory variables (see model 3.15).
Recalling the model, we regress the accuracy index on a set of dummy variables
for each methodology employed as documented by the polling house and an exoge-
nous variable (the difference between the two main parties/coalitions as reported
by poll readings) to estimate the house effect. Specifically, we take into account the
sampling procedure (random and no-random), the delivery method (CATI12), who
12In contrast to the 2006 Italian general elections, none of polling houses reported using the
CAWI delivery system. Therefore, we do not include its dummy variable in the models.
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commissioned the poll (media, polling house, and political parties) and where its re-
sults have been disseminated (TV, newspapers, and the Internet). For each dummy
variable we expect a different relationship with the accuracy index. Accordingly,
the main expectations are a positive relationship between the accuracy index and
the following variables: no-random samples, CATI, media and political parties as
buyers, and the difference between the two main parties/coalitions estimated in the
poll readings (hereafter referred to as DCEP). For instance, the use of no-random
sample increases the inaccuracy (error) of poll readings13. For the rest, we expect a
negative relationship and, therefore, these variables increase (decrease) the accuracy
(error) in Italian polling. For the sake of simplicity, the results will be discussed
separately for each accuracy measure. Table 5.6 reports the outcomes of this model
applied to the 2008 Italian General Elections using the two overall accuracy indexes
A and Bw as dependent variables.
We start by considering the model where Bw is the dependent variable. Ac-
cording to table 5.6, the only methodologies that meet the level of significance and,
therefore, affect the error estimated in polls are the use of the CATI delivery sys-
tem. This also occurs when using only three parties/coalitions to compute the Bw
measure. Specifically, there is a significant relationship between the CATI delivery
system and the overall error estimated (see table 5.6) fulfilling the expectation.
Regarding the model where A is the dependent variable, the predictive accu-
racy of polls is affected by the Newspapers and DCEP variables. In other words,
13Please refer to section 3.3.1 of chapter 3 for further explanation.
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Table 5.6: House effect across the 2008 Italian General Election polls on
Chamber of Deputies: Multivariate Regression model using A and Bw mea-
sures as dependent variables
The model is computed using formula 3.15, where set of methodologies employed by the polling house and the
difference between the two major party/coalitions (referred as DCEP) are the explanatory variables. The A and
Bw measures used as dependent variables are computed using the formula 3.1 and 3.5. The standard errors for the
coefficient are in parentheses and the statistical level of significance follows the rule: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *
p < 0.10.
Bw - 5 Par./Coal. Bw - 3 Part./Coal. A
Random 0.027 0.010 0.006
(0.063) (0.063) (0.008)
CATI 0.030* 0.152* 0.017
(0.087) (0.088) (0.010)
B: Media 0.204 0.204 0.028
(0.200) (0.200) (0.024)
B: Polling House 0.227 0.227 0.024
(0.198) (0.198) (0.024)
M: TV 0.041 0.041 -0.008
(0.112) (0.112) (0.013)
M: Newspaper -0.127 -0.127 -0.025**
(0.103) (0.103) (0.012)
M: Internet -0.010 -0.010 -0.004
(0.103) (0.103) (0.012)
DCEP 0.016 0.016 0.013***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.001)
Constant -0.026 -0.127 -0.244***
(0.224) (0.226) (0.027)
R2 0.107 0.138 0.624
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.049 0.585
ANOVA 0.338 0.155 0.000
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the dissemination of the poll results using newspapers decreases its inaccuracy
(β = −0.025 p < 0.05). However, the higher the difference between the two main
parties/coalitions estimated by poll readings, the higher is the predictive inaccuracy
(β = 0.013 p < 0.01). These results are consistent with expectations.
Table 5.7 reports the outcomes of the multivariate regression model applied to
A
′
measures for all the parties/coalitions as dependent variables. As with the other
analysis, we discuss the results for each coalition separately.
We start by considering the outcomes of the model where the A
′
measure for
Partito delle Liberta` coalition is the dependent variable. According to table 5.7, the
predictive accuracy for this coalition has been affected by the following variables:
CATI, Media (as buyer), Polling Houses, and DCEP. Specifically, use of the CATI
delivery system increases the predictive accuracy of polls for the Partito delle Liberta`
coalition (β = 0.047 p < 0.05). As for the A measure, the higher the difference
estimated in the poll readings between this coalition and the Partito Democratico,
the higher the predictive inaccuracy (β = 0.032 p < 0.01). Conversely, table 5.7
reports that when the poll is commissioned by the media and it is carried out under
the Polling House’s own initiative, its predictive accuracy increases. This evidence
is in line with our main expectations.
As regard the model where the A
′
measure for the Partito Democratico coalition
is the dependent variable, table 5.7 documents that the following variables affected
the predictive accuracy of poll readings: CATI and DCEP. However, the assumptions
about their relationship are only in part fulfilled. Although the CATI delivery has a
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Table 5.7: House effect across the 2008 Italian General Election polls on
Chamber of Deputies: Multivariate Regression model using A
′
measures for
all the parties/coalitions as dependent variables.
The model is computed using formula 3.15, where set of methodologies employed by the polling house and the
difference between the two major party/coalitions (referred as DCEP) are the explanatory variables. The A
′
measures used as dependent variables are computed using the formula 5.1, A.5, A.7, A.6, and A.8. The standard
errors for the coefficient are in parentheses and the statistical level of significance follows the rule: *** p < 0.01; **
p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
PDL PD UDC SA Others
Random 0.003 -0.014 – – 0.017
(0.015) (0.012) – – (0.176)
Other Sample – – -0.125** -0.045 –
– – (0.060) (0.050) –
CATI 0.047** 0.040** 0.054 -0.096 -0.525**
(0.021) (0.017) (0.083) (0.069) (0.243)
B: Media -0.081* -0.047 0.358* 0.073 0.477
(0.048) (0.038) (0.190) (0.158) (0.557)
B: Polling House -0.114** -0.054 0.378** 0.056 0.997*
(0.047) (0.038) (0.188) (0.156) (0.550)
M: TV -0.029 -0.019 -0.035 0.009 0.553*
(0.027) (0.021) (0.106) (0.088) (0.310)
M: Newspaper 0.011 0.014 -0.112 0.030 -0.020
(0.024) (0.020) (0.097) (0.081) (0.285)
M: Internet 0.022 0.007 -0.237** -0.167** 0.107
(0.022) (0.020) (0.098) (0.082) (0.287)
DCEP 0.032*** -0.040*** -0.035*** 0.029*** -0.038
(0.003) (0.002) (0.010) (0.009) (0.030)
Constant -0.296*** 0.345*** 0.112 0.749*** -0.561
(0.054) (0.043) (0.212) (0.177) (0.626)
R2 0.758 0.836 0.354 0.249 0.253
Adjusted R2 0.733 0.819 0.286 0.170 0.176
ANOVA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.003
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significant positive relationship (β = 0.040 p < 0.05), the higher difference between
this coalition and the Partito delle Liberta` one increases the predictive accuracy
of the poll readings (β = −0.040 p < 0.01). However, this is consistent with the
evidence provided by table 5.1, where the overall percentages of accuracy values
significantly different from 0 for this coalition is the lower in the sample.
Moving to the model where the A
′
measure for the UDC party is the dependent
variable, its predictive accuracy during the 2008 election campaign has been affected
by the following variables: Other Sample, Media (as buyer), Polling House, Internet,
and DCEP. In contrast with the other models, the use of no-random sampling proce-
dures the predictive accuracy of poll readings for this party (β = −0.125 p < 0.05).
According to table 5.7, there is also a significant negative relationship when the
medium used to disseminate poll results is the Internet (β = −0.237 p < 0.01) and
when the difference estimated between the two main coalitions by poll readings de-
creases (β = −0.035 p < 0.01). Surprisingly, the predictive accuracy of poll readings
for the UDC party decreases when the Polling Houses carry out them on their own
initiative (β = 0.378 p < 0.10). The same relationship is documented when the poll
has been commissioned by Media actors (β = 0.358 p < 0.10).
Regarding the model where the A
′
measure for the Sinistra Arcobaleno party
is the dependent variable, table 5.7 reports that the following variables affect the
predictive accuracy of poll readings: Internet and DCEP. The relationships fulfill
our expectations and, therefore, the dissemination of poll results using the Internet
increases the predictive accuracy for this party (β = −0.167 p < 0.05) whereas the
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higher difference estimated between the two main coalitions increases its inaccuracy
(β = 0.029 p < 0.01).
Moving to the model where the A
′
measure for the small coalition Others is the
dependent variable, the evidence provided by table 5.7 does not confirm any of our
expectations. Indeed, there is a positive relationship between the TV (as media)
variable and the predictive accuracy for this coalition (β = 0.553 p < 0.10). In
addition, the significant negative relationship with the CATI delivery system does
not fulfill our expectations (β = −0.525 p < 0.05). Surprisingly, the predictive
accuracy for the Others coalitions decreases when the polls is carried out on the
Polling House’s own initiative (β = 0.997 p < 0.10). Moreover, this is the only
model where the DCEP variable does not meet the statistical level of significance.
Table 5.8 reports the outcomes of the multivariate regression model applied to
A
′
measures for only three parties/coalitions as dependent variables. As with the
previous analysis, we discuss the results for each coalition separately. We start by
considering the model where the A
′
measure for the Centre Right coalition is the
dependent variable.
According to table 5.8, the predictive accuracy of poll readings concerning this
coalition has been affected by the following variables: CATI, TV, Newspapers, and
DCEP. All the evidence fulfills our expectations about the relationships between
them and the predictive accuracy of the polls. Indeed, the CATI delivery system and
DCEP have a significant positive relationship increasing the inaccuracy of poll read-
ings. Conversely, the dissemination of their results using the Internet and publishing
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Table 5.8: House effect across the 2008 Italian General Election polls on
Chamber of Deputies: Multivariate Regression model using A
′
measures for
only three parties/coalitions as dependent variables.
The model is computed using formula 3.15, where set of methodologies employed by the polling house and the
difference between the two major party/coalitions (referred as DCEP) are the explanatory variables. The A
′
measures used as dependent variables are computed using the formula 5.3, A.13, and A.14. The standard errors for
the coefficient are in parentheses and the statistical level of significance follows the rule: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05;
* p < 0.10.
Centre Right Centre Left Others
Random 0.014 -0.009 0.012
(0.014) (0.016) (0.174)
CATI 0.082*** -0.009 -0.532**
(0.019) (0.022) (0.241)
B: Media 0.016 -0.069 0.457
(0.044) (0.051) (0.551)
B: Polling House -0.009 -0.070 0.974*
(0.043) (0.050) (0.545)
M: TV -0.043* 0.003 0.555*
(0.024) (0.028) (0.307)
M: Newspaper -0.044* 0.046* -0.010
(0.022) (0.026) (0.282)
M: Internet -0.023 -0.001 0.129
(0.023) (0.026) (0.285)
DCEP 0.022*** -0.025*** -0.037
(0.002) (0.003) (0.030)
Constant -0.385*** 0.475*** -0.586
(0.049) (0.057) (0.620)
R2 0.653 0.556 0.253
Adjusted R2 0.617 0.510 0.175
ANOVA 0.000 0.000 0.003
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in newspapers has a negative relationship decreasing the predictive inaccuracy for
the Centre-Right coalition. Concerning the model where the A
′
measure for the
Centre-Left coalition is the dependent variable, table 5.8 reports that newspapers
and DCEP variables affect the accuracy of polls for this coalition. However, this
evidence does not fulfill our expectations. Indeed, the dissemination of poll results
using newspapers increases their predictive inaccuracy (β = 0.046 p < 0.10). This
may be evidence of Berlusconi’s argument in favour of the centre-left bias in Italian
polls during the election campaigns. Moving to the model where the A
′
measure
for the Others coalition is the dependent variable, table 5.8 documents the same
evidence reported in table 5.7. Specifically, none of our expectations is supported
by the outcomes where the predictive inaccuracy of polls increases when they are
carried out on the Polling House’s own initiative (β = 0.974 p < 0.10) and their
results are disseminated by TV shows (β = 0.55 p < 0.10). Conversely, the use of
the CATI delivery system increases the predictive accuracy of poll predictions for
the small coalition of Others (β = −0.082 p < 0.05). In the light of these results,
we may conclude that the two variables playing an important role in the predictive
accuracy of poll readings are the CATI delivery system and the DCEP across all
the measures employed as dependent variables. These results are also in line with
the evidence provided by the models used for the 2006 Italian General Elections. In
contrast to the previous election, tables 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8 report that the predictive
accuracy of poll readings has been affected by other variables like the media used
to disseminate their results and who commissioned the polls.
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5.4 Voter Sentiment Results
Although the previous section confirmed one of two hypotheses on which this
thesis has been based, it is not possible to completely rule out that there was a voters
sentiment change during the election campaign especially concerning the Partito
Democratico and Others coalition. In order to estimate these movements, we will
undertake a statistical analysis using two different approaches. Firstly, we will
estimate the error in our sample span in both the last six and the last two months
of the election campaign to see what evidence they provide concerning the true
voters sentiment change and, therefore, the reliability of the poll readings. Secondly,
we will employ the autoregressive model (AR(1)) to investigate the true over time
voters sentiment change in the 2008 general election using the well-established model
proposed by Erikson and Wlezien (1999). Italy has a multi-party system, whereas
the procedures in the literature have been developed on the basis of the US, which
has a two-party system. In order to estimate the true over time voters sentiment
change, we will employ the autoregressive model using the poll readings for each
coalition as dependent variables. Doing so, we will be able to estimate the change
for each coalition and the degree of those movements.
5.4.1 Analysis of Variance
The accuracy of poll predictions may be comprised by different measures on the
basis of their various purposes. In this thesis, specific measures (A, A
′
, and Bw)
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have been already applied to estimate the difference between the poll readings and
the election outcomes. The evidence showed a high presence of inaccuracy in Italian
polling during the 2008 general elections. Following the main purpose of this thesis
estimating the major and, in particular, the strongest cause of inaccuracy we have
undertaken an analysis of variance of the poll readings in order to identify their
amount of error and voters sentiment change. To do that, we employed the follow-
ing measures: observed variance, error variance (and sampling error), true variance,
and reliability. According to the evidence provided by house effect analysis, the ex-
pectation is that the presence of voters sentiment change for the five coalitions - and,
in particular, for the Partito Democratico and the Others coalition - is comprised
in the true variance and reliability measures; in other words, when the amount of
true variance is higher than the error measures.
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Table 5.9 shows the outcomes of those measures covering the whole six months
of the 2008 election campaign for each coalition. For the sake of simplicity, we will
discuss the outcomes for each coalition separately. According to table 5.9, the polls
concerning Popolo delle Liberta` have 5.45 as observed variance and error variance
of 2.12 (sampling error 1.46). Subtracting the latter from the observed variance, we
obtain that the true variance over the six months for the Popolo delle Liberta` is
3.33, which means that the variance of those polls is not only due to the sampling
procedure employed by the polling houses but also to a certain degree of voters
sentiment movement. However, the estimate of statistical reliability (the ratio of
true variance and observed variance) is only 0.61, which is lower than expected.
In order to estimate whether the inaccuracy in the last two months of the election
campaign is also due to voters sentiment change on the basis of house effect and
lower procedure outcomes, we will compute the analysis of variance considering only
the months of February and March.
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According to table 5.10, we cannot argue that there was a shift in voters senti-
ments over the last two months of the election campaign concerning the Popolo delle
Liberta` coalition because the true variance and the reliability outcomes are nega-
tive. In other words, the error variance and the sampling error are higher than the
observed variance. Therefore, the error derives directly from the sampling procedure
employed by the polling houses.
Regarding the Partito Democratico coalition, table 5.9 reports a lower observed
variance (4.83) compared to Popolo delle Liberta` (5.45). Moreover, the error vari-
ance and its sampling error are 1.99 and 1.41 respectively. In addition, the true
variance (2.84) and reliability (0.59) are also lower compared to Popolo delle Lib-
erta`. According to the evidence provided earlier by house effect analysis, we expect
to obtain a higher true variance. Nevertheless, those measures comprise a voters
sentiment movement that is lower than expected. Focusing on the last two months,
the values obtained for the true variance and reliability are lower than the whole
election campaign (see table 5.10). Therefore, we may argue that there is evidence
of voters sentiment change over the election campaign both in the long- and short-
term with regard to the Partito Democratico. However, table 5.9 reports that the
observed variance for UDC poll readings is 0.97. Moreover, the error variance and its
sampling error are small: 0.49 and 0.69 respectively. Subtracting the error variance
from the observed variance, we obtain 0.48 of true variance, which comprises a small
shift in voters sentiment over the six months of the election campaign. According
to table 5.10, the true variance in the final months is more than doubled and, there-
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fore, the reliability is too. In the light of this, we may argue that any movement
in voters sentiment concerning UDC occurred more over the last two months than
in the election campaign overall. Moreover, the inaccuracy may be due to those
movements rather than to the sampling procedure employed by different polling
houses. This is consistent with the evidence provided by the correlation between
the house-adjusted poll readings and the number of days between poll readings and
Election Days, where there is a high dispersion in the series in the first parts of the
election (see figure 5.7(a)).
Regarding the small centre-left coalition Sinistra Arcobaleno, table 5.9 reports
1.80 of observed variance and error variance and its sampling errors are 0.58 and 0.76
respectively. To obtain the true variance, we subtract the error variance from the
observed variance. As table 5.9 shows, the true variance and its reliability are 1.23
and 0.68 respectively. Therefore, this evidence shows a small shift in voters sentiment
change in this coalition. This is also confirmed in table 5.10, where we computed the
two measures for the last two months of the election campaign. According to this,
the accuracy of those poll readings is in part affected by the sampling procedure
employed by polling houses, both in the long and final run of the election campaign.
In addition, this evidence is consistent with the higher presence of the house effect
in both poll readings and accuracy values estimated in the previous analysis.
Regarding the Others coalition, table 5.9 reports a high observed variance (5.93)
and low error variance (0.40) and sampling error (0.64). According to this, the
true variance (5.52) and reliability (0.93) obtained comprise a larger movement in
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voters sentiment. In other words, there was a significant shift in voters sentiment
over the six months of the election campaign. However, these outcomes are different
from those reported in table 5.10 concerning the last two months of the election
campaign. Indeed, the Others poll readings have lower observed variance (2) and
almost the same error variance (0.43) and sampling error (0.65). Accordingly, the
true variance and reliability are 1.56 and 0.79 respectively. With this in mind, we
may argue that the poll readings for Others are more affected by voters sentiment
change than the sampling error procedure employed by the polling houses both in
the long and in the final run of the election campaign.
Regarding the centre-right coalition14, the observed variance, error variance, and
sampling error are 2.69, 2.14, and 1.45 respectively. Accordingly, the true variance
is only 0.55, which comprises a small shift of voters sentiment. Moreover, reliability
(0.20) is also lower than expected. Table 5.10 reports these measures concerning
the last two months of the election campaign. According to the table, we cannot
draw any conclusions about true voters sentiment change because the true variance
and reliability obtained are negative. In other words, poll readings concerning the
centre-right coalition are strongly affected by the sampling procedure employed by
different polling houses.
According to table 5.9 the centre-left coalition15 presents the same pattern as the
centre-right coalition. Specifically, we obtained high error variance (2.11) and sam-
pling error (1.45). Subtracting the error variance from the observed variance (2.87),
14This is obtained by adding the Popolo delle Liberta` and UDC poll readings.
15This is obtained by adding Partito Democratico and Sinistra Arcobaleno poll readings.
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the true variance and the reliability comprise a small movement in voters sentiment.
Moreover, table 5.10 covering the last two months of the election campaign shows
negative values concerning the true variance and reliability. Therefore, we may argue
that any movement in voters sentiment concerning the centre-left coalition occurred
over long-term rather than in the final stages of the election campaign.
5.4.2 AR(1) Results
The previous analysis of variance of poll readings for each coalition provided
evidence of the presence of a small movement in voters sentiment, except for the
group of small parties not aligned with any coalition (Others). Specifically, in all
the major coalitions the voters sentiment change occurred throughout the entire
election campaign rather than in the last two months. This is in line with the
literature concerning movement in voters sentiment. In other words, over the last
months of election campaign there is less movement in voters sentiment.
In order to estimate properly the degree of those movements, we apply an autore-
gressive model (AR(1)) following the approach proposed by Erikson and Wlezien
(1999). Recalling the model, it assumes that the true voters sentiment on a given
day to be explained as a function of voters sentiment on previous days and shocks
from the election campaign. Specifically, the variance of daily shocks and their
persistence will comprise the real movement when it occurs. Assuming that poll
readings is a stationary series, the autoregressive parameter value will be between 0
and 1 and it will geometrically decay as the number of days between poll readings
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increases.
Table 5.11: 2008 Italian General Election: true voters sentiment change
using AR(1) for Popolo delle Liberta`.
In the column called ‘Correlation’, the values refer to the coefficient using the AR(1) - formula 3.34 - with different
lag of days. In the column called ‘True Correlation’, Heise’s procedure (1969) is applied by multiplying the observed
correlation to reliability (last row of table 4.5). The statistical level of significance follows the rules: *** p < 0.01;
** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
Correlation (γ) True Correlation (γ ∗ rel) R2 RMSE
Lag 1 0.392*** 0.239 0.14 2.24
Lag 2 0.217* 0.132 0.23 2.15
Lag 3 0.339** 0.207 0.15 2.30
Lag 4 0.349** 0.213 0.12 2.36
Lag 5 0.311** 0.190 0.14 2.37
Lag 6 0.318** 0.194 0.13 2.42
Lag 7 0.377** 0.230 0.13 2.47
As with the previous analysis, we will discuss the outcome of AR(1) for each
coalition separately. Table 5.11 presents the outcomes obtained when applying the
AR(1) model to the poll readings for the Popolo delle Liberta` coalition. The first
column gives the observed correlation between poll readings and their lagged values
over 1 to 7 days. The main expectation is that we will see a geometrical decay
of values of parameter (γ), which comprises the movement in voters sentiment as
the number between poll readings increases. However, the evidence provided by
table 5.11 shows the following pattern: 0.392, 0.217, 0.339, 0.349, 0.321, 0.318, and
0.377. Although it is not a stable increasing trend, these outcomes are not consistent
with the expectation concerning the AR(1) model. However, the analysis of variance
presented earlier confirmed these outcomes. Specifically, the values of the parameter
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satisfy the condition of being between 0 and 1 but they do not geometrically decay
as the number of days between poll readings increases. After an initial decreasing
trend over the first two lags, the values of the parameter rise as the number of days
increases, decreasing again using a lag of 5 days and then, rising up finally using the
two bigger lags. Despite the oscillating trend, all the parameters meet the statistical
level of significance. Therefore, we may argue that the accuracy of poll readings for
the Popolo delle Liberta` have been influenced by the poll readings in the long term.
However, this is evidence of an integrated rather than a stationary process given
the oscillating trend. Now, we take into account the statistical reliability of the
polls in order to estimate the degree of voters sentiment change - the true over time
correlation - excluding the amount of error that would result from random sampling.
To do that, we multiply the values of the parameter by the statistical reliability for
the six months of the election campaign (0.61). The second column of table 5.11
reports the outcomes of true over time correlation, but the pattern of values of the
parameter does not change so much.
Regarding Partito Democratico, table 5.12 reports the outcomes when applying
the AR(1) model. According to the previous analysis, the main expectation is to
estimate a small shift in voters sentiment both in the long run and in the final
stages of the election campaign. Therefore, we expect that both of the AR(1)
conditions to be satisfied. However, table 5.12 reports that the values of parameter
are negative and none of them meet the statistical levels of significance. In addition,
only using a bigger lag of days is the condition of geometrical decay of values of the
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Table 5.12: 2008 Italian General Election: true voters sentiment change
using AR(1) for Partito Democratico.
In the column called ‘Correlation’, the values refer to the coefficient using the AR(1) - formula 3.34 - with different
lag of days. In the column called ‘True Correlation’, Heise’s procedure (1969) is applied by multiplying the observed
correlation to reliability (last row of table 4.5). The statistical level of significance follows the rules: *** p < 0.01;
** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
Correlation (γ) True Correlation (γ ∗ rel) R2 RMSE
Lag 1 -0.089 -0.053 0.04 2.22
Lag 2 -0.141 -0.083 0.03 2.26
Lag 3 -0.114 -0.067 0.01 2.35
Lag 4 -0.117 -0.069 0.01 2.41
Lag 5 -0.108 -0.064 0.01 2.45
Lag 6 -0.105 -0.062 0.06 2.43
Lag 7 -0.089 -0.053 0.02 2.53
parameter satisfied. In other words, without taking into consideration the level of
significance, the voters sentiment change concerning the Partito Democratico follows
a stationary process only in the long run of the election campaign. Using the Heise
procedure to exclude the error among the series, the values of the parameter follow
the same pattern. All these outcomes are consistent with the evidence provided by
the accuracy measures. Recalling the main conclusion, the overall performance of
inaccuracy was only 22% in poll readings and in the last two months of the election
campaign almost all polls were accurate. In the light also of the house effect evidence,
we may argue that the inaccuracy of polls concerning Partito Democratico is due
to both the house effect and voters sentiment change in the long run of the election
campaign. Accordingly, in the last two months the inaccuracy is mainly due to the
house effect, which is almost absent.
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Table 5.13: 2008 Italian General Election: true voters sentiment change
using AR(1) for UDC.
In the column called ‘Correlation’, the values refer to the coefficient using the AR(1) - formula 3.34 - with different
lag of days. In the column called ‘True Correlation’, Heise’s procedure (1969) is applied by multiplying the observed
correlation to reliability (last row of table 4.5). The statistical level of significance follows the rules: *** p < 0.01;
** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
Correlation (γ) True Correlation (γ ∗ rel) R2 RMSE
Lag 1 0.093 0.077 0.10 1.29
Lag 2 0.048 0.040 0.10 1.25
Lag 3 0.222* 0.184 0.10 1.28
Lag 4 0.235* 0.195 0.06 1.30
Lag 5 0.238* 0.198 0.06 1.32
Lag 6 0.233* 0.193 0.06 1.34
Lag 7 0.253* 0.210 0.07 1.36
Table 5.13 reports the outcomes of the AR(1) model concerning the UDC. In
contrast to the previous coalitions, we expect that the small movement in voters
sentiment occurs mainly in the final run of the election campaign. However, table
5.13 shows that the values of the parameter increase as the number of days between
polls increases. In addition, the parameters of the first two lags do not meet sta-
tistical levels of significance. However, the pattern followed by those values is fairly
stable with a slightly oscillating trend between the lag 4, 5, and 6 days. Neverthe-
less, the condition of stationary is not satisfied because when the number of days
between polls increase, the values of the parameter do not decay. This is also con-
firmed when applying the Heise procedure in order to estimate the true over time
correlation taking into account statistical reliability. Specifically, the values of the
parameter are less than 1 but they do not decay. Therefore, the voters sentiment
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change occurred more in the long run rather than in the final stages of the election
campaign. Accordingly, we may argue that the polls concerning the UDC do not
follow a stationary process but there is not evidence of a random walk process. With
this in mind, this evidence is not consistent with the main expectations.
Table 5.14: 2008 Italian General Election: true voters sentiment change
using AR(1) for Sinistra Arcobaleno.
In the column called ‘Correlation’, the values refer to the coefficient using the AR(1) - formula 3.34 - with different
lag of days. In the column called ‘True Correlation’, Heise’s procedure (1969) is applied by multiplying the observed
correlation to reliability (last row of table 4.5). The statistical level of significance follows the rules: *** p < 0.01;
** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
Correlation (γ) True Correlation (γ ∗ rel) R2 RMSE
Lag 1 0.011 0.007 0.08 1.33
Lag 2 0.068 0.046 0.06 1.36
Lag 3 -0.010 -0.007 0.09 1.38
Lag 4 0.085 0.058 0.01 1.48
Lag 5 0.091 0.062 0.01 1.51
Lag 6 0.103 0.070 0.03 1.52
Lag 7 0.116 0.079 0.02 1.52
Regarding the Sinistra Arcobaleno coalition, table 5.14 shows the outcomes of
the AR(1) model. According to the previous analysis, the main expectation is a
small change in voters sentiments throughout the entire election campaign. As table
5.14 reports, the values of the parameter follow an oscillating trend. In addition,
the third value is negative, which is in contrast with one of the conditions of the
stationary process. However, none of those values meet the statistical levels of
significance. Applying the Heise procedure, the pattern of values of the parameter
does not change much. Therefore, we may argue that the high inaccuracy estimated
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for this small centre-left coalition is certainly due to the house effect and the voters
sentiment change was so small as to have only an insignificant effect on the poor
performance of the polls.
Table 5.15: 2008 Italian General Election: true voters sentiment change
using AR(1) for Others.
In the column called ‘Correlation’, the values refer to the coefficient using the AR(1) - formula 3.34 - with different
lag of days. In the column called ‘True Correlation’, Heise’s procedure (1969) is applied by multiplying the observed
correlation to reliability (last row of table 4.5). The statistical level of significance follows the rules: *** p < 0.01;
** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
Correlation (γ) True Correlation (γ ∗ rel) R2 RMSE
Lag 1 -0.002 -0.002 0.02 2.49
Lag 2 0.020 0.019 0.01 2.54
Lag 3 0.048 0.045 0.02 2.61
Lag 4 0.019 0.018 0.01 2.71
Lag 5 0.019 0.018 0.02 2.73
Lag 6 0.046 0.043 0.03 2.75
Lag 7 0.025 0.023 0.03 2.83
Table 5.15 reports the outcomes of the AR(1) model applied to the group of
small parties not aligned with any coalition (Others). According to the previous
analysis, we expect a significant change in voters sentiment both in the long run
and final stages of the election campaign. However, none of the values of parameter
meet the statistical levels of significance (table 5.15). Moreover, they do not follow
a geometrical decay as the number of days between poll readings decreases. Now,
we apply the Heise procedure in order to take into account the statistical reliability
excluding the error that would result from random sampling. However, the true
over time correlations follow the same pattern of observed correlation. Therefore,
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we may argue that the inaccuracy of poll readings concerning the Others are more
due to the house effect than to any movement in voters sentiment.
Table 5.16: 2008 Italian General Election: true voters sentiment change
using AR(1) for Centre Right.
In the column called ‘Correlation’, the values refer to the coefficient using the AR(1) - formula 3.34 - with different
lag of days. In the column called ‘True Correlation’, Heise’s procedure (1969) is applied by multiplying the observed
correlation to reliability (last row of table 4.5). The statistical level of significance follows the rules: *** p < 0.01;
** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
Correlation (γ) True Correlation (γ ∗ rel) R2 RMSE
Lag 1 -0.125 -0.025 0.03 1.60
Lag 2 0.083 0.017 0.06 1.60
Lag 3 0.144 0.029 0.07 1.62
Lag 4 0.163 0.033 0.03 1.61
Lag 5 0.138 0.028 0.04 1.66
Lag 6 0.155 0.031 0.02 1.66
Lag 7 0.163 0.033 0.03 1.69
Regarding the centre right coalition, table 5.16 reports the results of applying
the AR(1) model. In the light of the previous analysis, the main expectation is
a small shift in voters sentiment in the long run election campaign, due to the
negative true variance and reliability estimated in the last two months (see table
5.10). According to table 5.16, the values of the parameter do not geometrically
decay as the number of days between polls increases. Therefore, we argue that
the inaccuracy of polls concerning this coalition is more due to the house effect
because any movement in voters sentiment does not follow a stationary process and
the values of the parameter do not meet the statistical levels of significance. In
addition, applying the Heise procedure, this pattern does not change.
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Table 5.17: 2008 Italian General Election: true voters sentiment change
using AR(1) for Centre Left.
In the column called ‘Correlation’, the values refer to the coefficient using the AR(1) - formula 3.34 - with different
lag of days. In the column called ‘True Correlation’, Heise’s procedure (1969) is applied by multiplying the observed
correlation to reliability (last row of table 4.5). The statistical level of significance follows the rules: *** p < 0.01;
** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
Correlation (γ) True Correlation (γ ∗ rel) R2 RMSE
Lag 1 0.106 0.029 0.01 1.75
Lag 2 0.104 0.028 0.02 1.78
Lag 3 0.096 0.026 0.02 1.83
Lag 4 0.100 0.027 0.02 1.88
Lag 5 0.114 0.031 0.01 1.92
Lag 6 0.136 0.037 0.09 1.88
Lag 7 0.101 0.027 0.02 1.98
Regarding the centre left coalition, table 5.17 reports the results in applying
the AR(1) model and the Heise procedure. On the basis of previous analysis, the
main expectation is that there is only a small shift in voters sentiment throughout
the whole election campaign. According to table 5.17, none of the values of the
parameter meet the statistical levels of significance. Moreover, the values for the first
three lags present a geometrical decay (0.106, 0.104, and 0.096) and, then, the values
rise showing evidence of an integrated process (random walk with drift). Applying
the Heise procedure, the true over time correlations follow the same pattern. In
other words, the final run of the election campaign follows a stationary process but
when increasing the lag the values of the parameter rise and do not follow a stable
trend. Therefore, we may argue that the inaccuracy of the poll readings concerning
the centre left coalition are caused more by the house effect and the error in the
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series than by a significant movement in voters sentiment.
5.5 Conclusion
Was the 2008 Italian polling more accurate than in 2006? According to what
emerged in the previous analysis, the answer to this question is not easy. Despite
the overall better performance in terms of accuracy in the 2008 poll readings, there
was still a high percentage of polls classified as inaccurate among the coalitions.
Specifically, there was a slight decrease in the percentage of inaccurate polls, except
for the case of the Partito Democratico16, where the percentage drops from 91%
to 22% of polls classified as inaccurate. However, the most interesting outcomes
concern the performance of centre- right and -left coalitions. Theoretically, adding
the poll readings of two or more parties/coalitions, the amount of error should
decrease providing better predictions. Instead, adding together the poll readings
of coalitions on the basis of their centre-right or -left orientations, the outcomes
provide evidence of a poorer performance in terms of accuracy, especially for the
centre-right coalitions.
According to this, we applied the OLS regression and the lowess procedure to
poll readings and accuracy values in order to estimate the degree of the house
effect and random error in them. The evidence provided in tables 5.4 and 5.5
confirmed that there was a strong impact of the house effect especially using the poll
readings as dependent variables in all the models proposed. However, the outcomes
16In the previous election, it was named Unione.
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concerning the accuracy as dependent variables showed that the house effect has a
lower impact over this election campaign. This is consistent with the evidence of
overall better performance in terms of accuracy. Moreover, the evidence concerning
the lowess procedure for each coalition estimated a low degree of random error in
the series that could suggest voters sentiment change, especially over the first part
of the election campaign. Using the multivariate regression model to estimate the
impact of methodologies employed by polling houses on the predictive accuracy of
polls, we can draw at least three main conclusions. Firstly, the results confirm
that the CATI delivery system and the DCEP plays an important role without
regard to the accuracy measures employed as for the 2006 Italian General elections.
Secondly, the predictive accuracy of poll readings has been affected by other variables
like the media used to disseminate the results or who commissioned the polls (see
tables 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8). Thirdly, the use of a random sampling procedure does
not increase the accuracy of poll readings. However, this is also consistent with
their overall better performance compared to the previous election. To estimate the
degree of voters sentiment change, we employed two different analyses: the variance
and autoregressive models. Despite the low presence of error variance due to the
sampling procedure especially in the last two months of the election campaign, the
autoregressive model provides evidence that the voters sentiment change was so
small as to have an insignificant effect on the poll readings especially in the final
stages of the election campaign17. With this is mind, the performance of polls in
17Moreover, only the values of the parameter of Popolo delle Liberta` meet the statistical levels
of significance allowing us to draw substantial and reliable inferences.
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terms of accuracy in the 2008 general election is more influenced by the house effect
than any movement in voters sentiment over the election campaign.
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Chapter 6
2013 Italian General Election
6.1 Introduction
The 2013 Italian general election was characterized by the presence of six coali-
tions and a very small coalition of unaligned parties. The actual results of the
elections were: 29.55% for Italia Bene Comune, 29.18% for Popolo delle Liberta`,
10.5% for Coalizione di Centro, 25.55% Movimento 5 Stelle, 2.2% for Rivoluzione
Civile, 1.1% for Fare per Fermare il Declino and 1.92% for others parties. The elec-
tion results actually did not give a real victory to any coalition. However, there were
three ‘false’ winners: Popolo delle Liberta`, Italia Bene comune, and Movimento 5
Stelle.
This chapter is devoted to providing evidence concerning the accuracy and the
causes of inaccuracy of all polls that were published during the 2013 Italian gen-
eral election campaign and asked respondents about their voting intentions for the
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Chamber of Deputies.
We analyzed the polls published on the official website between 9 August and 8
February 20131.
With this in mind, the remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The
next section will be devoted to presenting the analysis of accuracy using the A, A
′
,
and Bw measures and the discussion of the evidence provided by their outcomes.
In the third section, we will present the house effect analysis in order to estimate
how much of the variance of poll readings is affected by the methodologies em-
ployed by different polling houses. To do that, we will first apply a well-established
econometric method (OLS) and the lowess procedure (Cleveland 1979), following
the approach proposed by Erikson and Wlezien (1999). Then, we employ a mul-
tivariate regression model to estimate the extent of the house effect caused by the
methodologies employed by polling houses using the accuracy indexes as dependent
variables. In the fourth section, we will employ two different analyses in order to
estimate the voters sentiment change for each coalition over the election campaign.
Specifically, we will undertake a traditional analysis of variance, using measures like
sampling error and reliability, to estimate the error in the poll readings. Then, we
will employ a more sophisticated analysis using an autoregressive model (AR(1)) in
order to estimate whether the error is due to sampling procedures or voters senti-
ment change. Finally, in section five, we will draw the main conclusions on the basis
of the evidence provided by all the analysis undertaken.
1That means 182 days before Election Day, which covers the election campaign. On the basis
of Italian law, polls cannot be published during the 15 days before Election Day.
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6.2 Accuracy Results
Recalling formula 3.1 used to measure the accuracy of polls in the 2013 Italian
national election, we applied the formula to all six coalitions treating each of them as
a party and those small unaligned parties (“Others”) as seventh-party candidates.
Therefore, we rewrite equation 3.1 as follows:
A
′
pdl = ln
[
(pdl/(pd+m5s+ cdm+ rc+ ffd+ o))
(PDL/(PD +M5S + CDM +RC + FFD +O))
]
(6.1)
where pdl is the Popolo delle Liberta` poll prediction, pd is the Italia Bene Co-
mune2 poll prediction, m5s is Movimento 5 Stelle poll prediction, cdm is Coalizione
di Centro, rc is Rivoluzione Civile poll prediction, ffd is Fare per Fermare il Declino
poll prediction and o is Others poll prediction. Conversely, PDL is the actual result
obtained by the Popolo delle Liberta`, PD is the actual results for the Italia Bene
Comune, M5S is the actual vote for Movimento 5 Stelle, CDM is the actual results
for Coalizione di Centro, RC is the actual results for Rivoluzione Civile, FFD is
the actual vote for Fare per Fermare il Declino and O is the actual results achieved
by the others. We do the same for the other six parties3. As for the other two
elections, if the value of A
′
is positive, the poll overestimates support for the party.
Conversely, if the value is negative, the poll underestimates support. To measure
the extent to which under- and overestimates are significant as opposed to falling
2The centre left coalition is mainly composed by the Partito Democratico (PD) and other small
parties of centre left. For the sake of simplicity, the Italia Bene Comune will be referred to as
Partito Democratico and/or PD in order to be easily compared with the two previous elections.
3Please refer to Appendix for the full list of A
′
measures.
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within the margins of what can be expected due to sampling error, we calculate the
standard error of A
′
using a 95% confidence interval. Therefore, polls given values of
A
′
falling outside the confidence interval we regard as inaccurate, those given values
within it as accurate. Recalling equation 6.1, we rewrite equation 3.2 as follows:
V ariance(A
′
pdl) = 1/(n · pdl · (pd+m5s+ cdm+ rc+ ffd+ o)) (6.2)
We do the same for the other parties4. To compare the results with the other
two elections, we apply the formula 3.1 to the Partito Democratico, Popolo delle
Liberta`, treating each coalition as a party and the Movimento 5 Stelle as third-party
candidates5:
A
′
coal13 = ln
[
(pdl/(pd+m5s))
(PDL/(PD +M5S))
]
(6.3)
V ariance(A
′
coal13) = 1/(n · pdl · (pd+m5s)) (6.4)
In addition, we will employ the original formula in order to compare the outcomes
with those of the other two general elections. Following Martin, Traugott, and
Kennedy’s measure, Popolo delle Liberta` and Partito Democratico coalitions will
be treated as parties6.
To estimate the overall error for each poll reading, we employ the measure (B)
4Please refer to Appendix for the full list of variance of A
′
measures.
5Please refer to Appendix for the full list of A
′
measures.
6Please refer to the Appendix for the measure.
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proposed by Arzheimer and Evans (2014) which takes into account all the par-
ties/coalitions running the elections race at the same time and which corrects for
the dependency of A
′
on the reference party (see formula 3.5). Given the presence
of small unaligned parties in the Italian political system, we apply the weighted
version of this measure: Bw.
Following the literature on election studies (Gelman and King 1993; Erikson
and Wlezien 1999; Jennings and Wlezien 2015), we expect the polls in 2013 to have
been accurate closer to Election Day. To estimate this assumption, we will check
the timing of accuracy/inaccuracy on the basis of the evidence provided by the A,
A
′
, and Bw measures. Specifically, we compare the monthly averages of all measures
and the monthly percentages of the polls classified as inaccurate by A and A
′
and
the monthly percentages of polls statistically biased by the χ2 for the Bw measures
using the threshold of p ≤ 0.05.
6.2.1 Findings
Were the Italian pollsters less accurate in 2013 than in the previous two elections?
To answer this question we have undertaken an empirical analysis of the accuracy of
those polls published during the six months prior to Election Day. The analysis only
covers polls concerning voting intentions for the Chamber of Deputies election and
excluding those for the Senate7. In addition, we also include in the analysis those
where the pollster did not specify which of the two branches of Parliament was being
7Given the difference in the electoral system for the two Chambers of the Italian Parliament,
we prefer to exclude from the analysis those polls referring to the Senate.
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referred to. On this basis there were 158 polls for the Chamber of Deputies.
Figure 6.1: 2013 Italian General Election polls for the six parties/coalitions
over six months of election campaign
y-axis = percentage support according to poll readings. x-axis = dates n which poll readings were taken.
Figure 6.1 shows the poll readings for each coalition over the election campaign.
According to this, the centre-left was leading the race especially over the first four
months of the campaign and, after the Christmas break, its share in poll readings
steadily decreases closer to Election Day. In contrast, the share estimated for the
centre-right coalition, Popolo delle Liberta`, presents an oscillating trend which is
steady between 25% and 35% with a slight increase in the last month of the election
campaign. Of the other coalitions, only the share for the Centre coalition in support
of incumbent Prime Minister, Mario Monti, presents an increasing trend across time.
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Concerning the anti-system coalition, the Movimento 5 Stelle presents an oscillating
and decreasing trend.
Table 6.1: 2013 Italian General Election polls on Chamber of Deputies:
comparison of percentage of inaccuracy applying A, A
′
, B and Bw
The percentages for the A and A
′
measures refer to their values falling outside the 95% confidence interval. The
A measure is computed considering only two coalitions (PDL and PD) using the formula 3.1. The A
′
measures is
computed using all the coalitions competing the election (formula 6.1, A.17,A.18, A.19, A.20, A.21, and A.22). The
percentages for the Bw measure refer to proportion of their values that are statistically biased on the basis of the
χ2 test using p ≤ 0.05 threshold. The Bw measure is computed using the formula 3.5.
Polls PDL PD M5S Centre RC FFD Others
A 82% — — — — — — —
A
′
(3 parties) — 88% 100% 59% — — — —
A
′
(7 parties) — 70% 100% 95% 83% 96% 28% 75%
Bw (3 parties) 100% — — — — — — —
Bw (7 parties) 100% — — — — — — —
N 158 158 158 158 158 94 69 158
As explained earlier, we revised the A measure in two versions in order to allow us
to compare the extent of inaccuracy in the last three Italian general elections. Doing
so, we are also able to estimate whether there is a rising or decreasing trend in terms
of the extent of inaccuracy in Italian polling during the elections. Therefore, table 6.1
compares the percentages of polls classified as inaccurate where the first row reports
the outcomes using the measure of A; the second row reports the outcomes using the
measure of A
′
applied to three coalitions (Popolo delle Liberta`, Partito Democratico,
and Movimento 5 Stelle); the third row reports the outcomes of measure of A
′
applied
to all coalitions; and the last two rows document the total percentage of polls that
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are statistically biased using the χ2 test with the threshold of p ≤ 0.05 for the Bw
measure computed using three and seven parties/coalitions respectively. For the
sake of simplicity, we will discuss the results for each measure separately. Focusing
on the first row where the measure of A (formula 3.1) is applied, overall 82% of
polls are classified as inaccurate, which show a high percentage of inaccuracy in
polls. Compared with the two previous elections, the percentage of polls classified
as inaccurate rises from 22% to 82%. The story does not change so much when
using the two versions of the A
′
measure. Specifically, when computing only three
parties/coalitions, the performance of polls for the centre left is so high reaching
100%. However, surprisingly, the performance of polls for the anti-system movement
(M5S) is lower than the two main centre- right and -left coalitions, which also shows a
higher percentage of inaccuracy compared with the previous two elections. Applying
the A
′
measure to all the coalitions, table 6.1 reports only a low percentage of polls
classified as inaccurate for the small party of Fare per Fermare il Declino (28%) where
the average among the rest is higher than 80%. Focusing on the Bw measure, the
percentages of statistically biased polls using the χ2 reaches 100% without regard
to the number of parties/coalitions employed in the computation process. These
percentages are higher than those provided by the other measures and they reveal
a significant presence of error estimated. Compared to the previous election, these
percentages rise from 76% (2006) and 65% (2008) to 100%. This is also consistent
with the results from the A and A
′
measures.
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Looking in more depth at these percentages of poll inaccuracy, tables 6.2 and 6.3
compare the monthly averages and percentages of values of the A and A
′
measures
applied to all and three coalitions respectively. In the second column, table 5.2
reports the monthly averages and the percentages of polls that are statistically
biased using the χ2 test for the Bw measure. For the sake of simplicity, we will
discuss firstly the evidence provided by table 6.2 and, then, that in table 6.3 for
each coalition separately.
According to table 6.2, when the A measure is applied, there is an underesti-
mation in Italian polling for the main centre-right coalition. The monthly averages
show negative values significantly different from 0, especially over the central part
of the election campaign. In other words, the monthly percentage of polls clas-
sified as inaccurate reaches 100% in the first part of the election campaign and
slightly decreases over the last two months. Moving to the results concerning the
Bw measure, table 6.2 reports a fairly stable monthly average across the campaign.
Specifically, there is a slight increasing trend over the first four months of the elec-
tion campaign followed by a decrease of estimated error in the last two months. The
monthly percentages of statistically biased polls using the χ2 stand steadily at 100%.
Regarding the main centre-right coalition (Popolo delle Liberta`), table 6.2 reports
interesting patterns. Specifically, over the first four months of the election campaign
the monthly average of A
′
values is negative showing a constant underestimation.
However, table 6.2 also reports that in the final two months there was an overesti-
mation concerning the Popolo delle Liberta` shown in the values of A
′
, there being
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positive and significantly different from 0. Focusing on the main centre-left coali-
tion Partito Democratico, table 6.2 reports a constant overestimation with positive
values significantly different from 0. Specifically, the monthly percentages of polls
classified as inaccurate reaches 100% over the entire election campaign. Regarding
the anti-system movement, Movimento 5 Stelle has been constantly underestimated
over the election campaign showing a monthly negative average of A
′
values (see
table 6.2). In addition, the percentage of polls classified as inaccurate is very high
reaching 100% in the first fourth months of the election campaign and then slightly
decreasing in the final two months. Concerning the centre coalition supporting the
incumbent Prime Minister, Mario Monti, table 6.2 reports a similar pattern to the
Popolo delle Liberta`. According to the table, the monthly averages between August
and early December are negative revealing an underestimation for this coalition.
However, in the last part of the election campaign the average of A
′
is positive.
In other words, the poll readings overestimated the electoral performance of this
coalition. What is also interesting is that the percentage of polls classified as inac-
curate increases closer to Election Day. In other words, in the second part of the
election campaign (between November and February) the ability of polls to predict
the electoral results is lower than in the previous months. Moving to the small
party of Rivoluzione Civile, table 6.2 reports a high percentage of polls classified as
inaccurate. It must be noted that this coalition entered the race only two months
before Election Day and for this reason there are polls reading featuring it only in
the last part of the election campaign. However, table 6.2 reports that the monthly
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average of A
′
is positive and significantly different from 0. Regarding the party of
Fare per Fermare il Declino, table 6.2 reports that the timing of inaccuracy in the
poll readings decreases as the number of days between the time the poll was carried
out and the Election Day decreases. In other words, from 100% of polls classified
as inaccurate between September and October, the percentage that are inaccurate
decreases to 17% of polls published in the last month of election campaign. Indeed,
the overall percentage of polls classified as inaccurate is 28% as reported in table
6.1. Regarding the group of small parties not aligned with any coalition (Others),
table 6.2 reports a constant overestimation of this small coalition. Specifically, the
monthly average of A
′
values is positive and significantly different from 0 especially
in the first part of the election campaign. Indeed, during the first and the last month
there are both positive and negative A
′
values. In addition, the percentage of polls
classified as inaccurate is stable at 100% in the first four months of the election
campaign, but in the last two months it is almost half that (60% and 58%).
To look in more depth at these results, figure 6.2 shows the values of A and A
′
measures and their confidence intervals over the election campaign, where the values
outside the confidence interval are classified as inaccurate and vice versa.
According to figure 6.2(a), the trend of values of A was steadily unstable over
a large part of the election campaign. As can be seen in the figure and as was
pointed out earlier, the percentage of polls classified as inaccurate decreases closer
to Election Day. Therefore, it may be possible to argue that in the very last days
of the election campaign when it was still possible to publish polls, their overall
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performance was more accurate than in the previous months.
Figure 6.2: Accuracy values applying A and A
′
measures and their confi-
dence intervals: Popolo Delle Liberta`, Partito Democratico and Movemento
5 Stelle
y-axis = accuracy values using the formula 3.1, 6.1, A.17, A.18 for panel (a), (b), (c) and (d) respectively.
x-axis = days on which poll readings are taken.
(a) A: PDL and PD (b) PDL
(c) PD (d) M5S
According to figure 6.2(b) and table 6.2, the percentage of polls classified as inac-
curate for the Popolo delle Liberta` increases as the number of days between the time
the poll has been carried out and the Election Day decreases. Indeed, figure 6.2(b)
clearly shows that almost all the values of A
′
dated before December are negative
and different from 0 which in a few cases reach the line of 0 (representing perfect
agreement between poll readings and actual election results). After December, all
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the values become positive and fall outside the confidence interval for the last two
weeks of the election campaign. Conversely, the poll readings in the 2008 general
election initially overestimated the Popolo delle Liberta` and underestimated it in
the last part of the election campaign.
Regarding the Partito Democratico, figure 6.2(c) shows that all the values of
A
′
largely fall outside the confidence interval above the line of 0. In the light of
this, we can argue that the polls seriously overestimated the electoral performance
of the Partito Democratico with more magnitude than the previous two elections.
In other words, Italian pollsters constantly overestimated the centre-left coalition
across time.
According to table 6.2, the anti-system movement (M5S) has been constantly
underestimated. This can be easily seen in figure 6.2(d) where almost all the values
largely fall outside the confidence interval below the line of 0 in the first part of
the election campaign and between the second part of December and early January
there are A
′
values that fall inside the confidence interval but they are still below
the line of 0.
According to table 6.2, the Centre coalition presents a similar pattern to the
Partito delle Liberta`. This is can be seen in figure 6.3(a) which shows the A
′
values
and their confidence intervals concerning the Centre coalition. The A
′
values are
negative and more accurate over the first part of the election campaign. Around mid-
November, the accuracy values are negative and fall inside the confidence intervals.
However, as already pointed out, over the last two months of the election campaign
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Figure 6.3: Accuracy values applying A
′
measures and their confidence in-
tervals: Centre, Fare per Fermare il Declino, Rivoluzione Civile and Others
y-axis = accuracy values using the formula A.19,A.21, A.20, and A.22 for panel (a), (b), (c), and (d) respectively.
x-axis = day on which poll readings were taken.
(a) Centre (b) FFD
(c) RC (d) Others
almost all A
′
values fall outside the confidence interval assuming positive values.
In the light of this, we can argue that the polls were not able correctly to predict
the electoral performance of this coalition, especially during the final rush of the
election campaign. This may be due to the incumbent effect of Prime Minister
candidates for this coalition. As figure 6.3(b) shows, the A
′
values for Fare per
Fermare il Declino party almost always fall inside the confidence interval becoming
more accurate closer to Election Day (see also table 6.2). Regarding the small
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party Rivoluzione Civile, figure 6.3(c) shows its constant overestimation over the
campaign, shown in the A
′
values falling outside the upper bound of 95% level of
significance. Figure 6.3(d) shows that the A
′
values for the Others coalitions fall
outside upper bound of the 95% level of significance especially over the first four
months of the election campaign. However, the last two months are characterized
by the presence of A
′
values significantly different from 0 both positive and negative.
Table 6.3: 2013 Italian General Election polls on Chamber of Deputies:
monthly average and percentage of inaccuracy of A
′
, and Bw using three
parties/coalitions
The percentages A
′
measures refer to their values falling outside the 95% confidence interval. The A
′
measures is
computed using only three parties/coalitions competing the election (formula 6.3, A.29, and A.30). The percentages
for the Bw measure refer to proportion of their values that are statistically biased on the basis of the χ2 test using
p ≤ 0.05 threshold. The Bw measure is computed using the formula 3.5.
PDL PD M5S Bw
9 Aug - 9 Sept average -0.085 -0.968 0.406 0.394
% 33 100 100 100
10 Sept - 9 Oct average -0.226 0.806 -0.927 0.426
% 64 100 100 100
10 Oct - 9 Nov average -0.299 0.758 -0.722 0.383
% 68 100 100 100
10 Nov - 9 Dic average -0.291 0.812 -0.724 0.465
% 75 100 96 100
10 Dic - 9 Jan average 0.4491 0.179 -0.055 0.438
% 100 100 28 100
10 Jan - 9 Feb average 0.656 1.047 -0.143 0.392
% 100 100 38 100
Table 6.3 compares the monthly averages of A
′
and Bw measures applied only to
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three coalitions (Popolo delle Liberta`, Partito Democratico, and Movimento 5 Stelle)
and percentages of polls classified as inaccurate and statistically biased using the
χ2 test. The table reports similar outcomes to the previous table (6.2) with regard
to the two main coalitions of the centre-right and -left and the Movimento 5 Stelle.
Although the sign of the monthly average for the Popolo delle Liberta` changes from
negative in the first four months to negative in the last two when applying the A
′
measure to all the coalitions, the timing of predictive inaccuracy is the opposite.
In other words, table 6.2 reports that the percentage of polls classified as accurate
increases closer to Election Day but when applying the A
′
to only three coalitions,
the percentage of these polls decreases closer to Election Day. Instead, the outcomes
provided by table 6.3 concerning the Partito Democratico are consistent with those
in table 6.2. Thus, there was a constant overestimation during the election campaign
reaching 100% of monthly percentages of polls classified as inaccurate. Concerning
the Movemento 5 Stelle, table 6.3 documents the same pattern as table 6.2. Indeed,
the anti-system movement has been constantly underestimated over the election
campaign. The percentages of polls classified as inaccurate suddenly drops from
100% over the first four months to 28% and 38% in the last two months of the
election campaign. According to table 6.3, the degree of error estimated by Bw
using only three parties/coalitions in the computing process shows a very similar
pattern to that obtained when using all the competing parties/coalitions. Indeed,
the monthly averages reported in table 6.3 are fairly stable across time with a
slight decrease over the last two months of the campaign. Moreover, percentages of
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statistically biased polls on the basis of the χ2 test steadily stand at 100%.
6.3 House Effect Results
The previous section showed that in the 2013 Italian general election there was a
high percentage of polls classified as inaccurate in the poll readings without regard
to the coalitions. Indeed, this has been confirmed by applying all the accuracy mea-
sures employed (A, A
′
, and Bw). Specifically, the Popolo delle Liberta` and Centre
coalitions were underestimated in first part of the election campaign on the one
hand and on the other hand the Partito Democratico was constantly overestimated
over the entire election campaign, shown by positive values significantly different
from 0 (see table 6.2). In addition, the anti-system movement, Movimento 5 Stelle,
was the only coalition constantly underestimated over the entire election campaign.
Therefore, what causes this high percentage of inaccuracy? In this thesis, two hy-
potheses have been described concerning the causes of inaccuracy: the house effect
and voters sentiment changes. In this section, we undertake a statistical analysis of
the house effect. The latter refers to biases caused by the methodologies employed
by different polling institutions.
The model proposed by Erikson and Wlezien (1999) assumes that the variance
of poll readings from one day to the next is caused by the house effect. To estimate
it, they regress with no intercept poll readings in a set on N-1 polling houses and
k dummy variables for each day with at least one poll reading (see formula 3.6).
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The coefficient of day dummy variables expresses the house effect. In addition, they
employ the lowess procedure proposed by Cleveland (1979) to estimate the presence
of random error in the series. In order to estimate which methodology used by
polling houses most affects the predictive accuracy of Italian polling, we employ a
multivariate regression model where A, A
′
and Bw are the dependent variables (see
formula 3.15).
6.3.1 Findings
As for the accuracy measures, the house effect model proposed by Erikson and
Wlezien (1999) has been developed on the basis of the American system. Therefore,
to fit with the Italian case, we apply the OLS to each coalition. In other words,
we will regress the poll readings for each coalition on a set of 14 dummy polling
house variables (N - 1) and 78 dummy variables for each day with at least one
poll reading. Then, we will apply the lowess procedure in order to estimate the
amount of random error in the series. Applying this model to each coalition will
allow us to estimate the house effect separately. In other words, it may be possible
that the methodologies employed by different polling houses affect one coalition
more than the others. Tables 6.4 and 6.5 present the outcomes of three models to
investigate the house effect in the polls published over the 2013 general election.
Specifically, the first table (6.4) refers to the models using the poll readings for
each coalition as dependent variables. The second table (6.5) refers to the models
using the values of A, A
′
, and Bw applied both to all coalitions and only to three
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coalitions as dependent variables. As already explained in the previous two chapters
concerning the 2006 and 2008 general elections, the reason for using the accuracy
values measures as dependent variable lies with the main purpose of investigating
the causes of inaccuracy in depth. In other words, the use of the values of A and
two versions of A
′
as dependent variables rather than the poll readings allows us
to estimate how much of their variance over the days is due to the house effect.
Recalling the expectation, the variance of days and houses explains the variance
of poll readings and accuracy values: it is due to inaccuracy. We will discuss the
results of poll readings and accuracy values as dependent variables. For the sake of
simplicity, the discussion of the evidence provided by table 6.4 will be presented for
each model separately.
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Table 6.4 reports the outcomes of OLS regressions using the poll readings for
each coalition as dependent variables. Regarding the first model where the poll
readings are regressed with no intercept on th days dummy variables, overall the
Adjusted R2 is higher than 0.80 for the coalitions, except for Others. In addition, all
the regressions meet the highest level of statistical significance using the ANOVA
test. However, this is consistent with the outcomes of the previous two general
elections, where the poll readings for the group of the small parties not aligned with
any coalition are less affected by the variance of days. In the second model, poll
readings for each coalition are regressed on the polling house dummy variables. As
for the previous model, table 6.4 provides evidence of high Adjusted R2 , which
varies between 0.75 and 0.98. Indeed, in this model too the coalition of Others is
affected less by houses than the rest of the coalitions. In addition, these results are
higher than in the two previous elections (see tables 4.3 and 5.4). Moreover, all the
regressions meet the highest level of statistical significance using the ANOVA test. In
the third model, we fully apply the model proposed by Erikson and Wlezien (1999)
regressing poll readings on days and polling houses dummy variables. As reported in
table 6.4, the Adjusted R2 varies between 0.86 and 0.99. Also, the full model presents
stronger evidence of the house effect than in the previous two models. Specifically,
poll readings concerning the Partito Democratico and Movimento 5 Stelle are the
most affected by the house effect reaching the 0.99 as Adjusted R2. Moreover, all the
regressions meet the highest level of statistical significance using the ANOVA test.
In the light of this evidence, one of the hypotheses of this thesis has been strongly
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confirmed by all the models employed.
Table 6.5 reports the outcomes using the accuracy values for each coalition as
dependent variables. Specifically, the first panel of table refers to the accuracy
values when applying the formula 6.1, A.17, A.18, A.19, A.20, A.21, and A.22
(see Appendix) and the Bw measure. The second panel of the table refers to the
accuracy values when applying the formula 6.3, A.29, and A.30 (see Appendix) and
Bw measure. The third panel refers to accuracy values when applying the measure
of A (formula 3.1). For the sake of simplicity, we will discuss the evidence provided
by table 6.5 for each model separately as for the previous table.
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In the first model (dummy days as explanatory variables), Adjusted R2 varies
between 0.46 and 0.96, which shows a different degree of house effect in the series of
accuracy values. Specifically, the lower Adjusted R2 belongs to Popolo delle Liberta`,
Fare per Fermare il Declino, and Others. This is consistent with the results for the
accuracy measure, where the poll readings present the lowest overall performance
in terms of inaccuracy percentages. However, all the regressions meet the highest
level of statistical significance using the ANOVA test. Applying this model, there
is evidence with varying magnitude that the accuracy of poll readings is affected by
the days. This is clear when comparing the outcomes from the accuracy values of
poll readings of Popolo delle Liberta` in the first panel with those on the second one,
where the Adjusted R2 is 0.93. This is an interesting outcomes because in previous
chapters the same procedure applied to Others provided the same evidence regarding
the degree of impact by days on poll readings. In the second model (dummy polling
house as explanatory variables), the values of Adjusted R2 vary between 0.21 and
0.96. Also in this model, the lower Adjusted R2 belongs to Popolo delle Liberta`
but it does not change so much in the panel overall. Table 6.5 provides less strong
evidence concerning the impact of the house effect on the accuracy values compared
with model 1 and, also, with the 2006 election where the Adjusted R2 values vary
between 0.65 and 0.96. This is also confirmed by the evidence provided in panels
2 and 3, where the degree of variation of accuracy among the series depends on
the polling houses with different extents. For instance, the accuracy values for the
Movimento 5 Stelle is less affected by polling houses when the A
′
is applied only to
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three coalitions (see formula A.30) than when it is applied to all coalitions (A.18).
Moreover, all the regressions meet the highest level of statistical significance using
the ANOVA test. In the third model (dummy days and polling houses as explanatory
variables), the Adjusted R2 varies between the 0.76 and 0.96 in the series. Therefore,
when applying the full model there are higher values of Adjusted R2 than in the
previous two models. Moreover, the evidence provided in table 6.5 confirm that the
accuracy values concerning the poll readings for Popolo delle Liberta` and Others
are the least affected by the house effect. This is consistent with the previous two
general elections. Also in this model, all the regressions meet the highest level
of statistical significance using the ANOVA test. According to this evidence, the
hypothesis concerning the house effect as the main cause of inaccuracy in Italian
polling has been confirmed by all three models employed.
Figure 6.4 shows the correlation between the house-adjusted poll readings for
the Popolo delle Liberta` and the number of days between poll readings and Elec-
tion Day using linear and smoothed scatter plots. Figure 6.4(a) does not show a
clear relationship between them and, therefore, it is not easy to argue whether the
house effect increases or decreases closer to Election Day. Despite the high variance
explained by the house effect among the series, the linear scatter plot also shows a
certain amount of error. In order to estimate the latter in the house-adjusted series
for each coalition, we will employ a well-established statistical procedure designed
by Cleveland (1979): the lowess. We will apply the following bandwidth for each
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Figure 6.4: Linear and smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggre-
gated by date: Popolo Delle Liberta`
y-axis = house-adjusted polls the poll readings. x-axis = number of days remaining before Election Day.
The smoothed scatter plot is computed following the model 3.7.
(a) Linear
(b) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.30 (c) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.10
smoothed house-adjusted series: 0.40, 0.30, 0.20, and 0.10 8. For the sake of sim-
plicity, we report only the smoothed scatterplot using the bandwidth of 0.30 and
0.10 given that they generate a better fitted line for the purpose of this thesis.
Therefore, figures 6.4(b) and 6.4(c) show the smoothed versions using different
bandwidths (0.30 and 0.10) for the Popolo delle Liberta`.
The bottom right panel (6.4(c)) shows the fitted line using the bandwidth of
8We also applied the bandwidth 0.05, which is considered the most robust in order to estimate
the random error, but the all the scatterplots obtained were illegible because the fitted lines were
outside the box figure. Please refer to the Appendix for the smoothed scatterplot with bandwidth
0.40 and 0.20
204
0.10, which is able to closely follow the series with a lower random error than the
other panel. Indeed, the latter(6.4(b)) reports a less sensitive smoothed series in
representing the random error. Therefore, the outcomes provided by the lowess
procedure confirm that inaccuracy of poll readings for the Popolo delle Liberta` is
not only due to the house effect but there is also a degree of random error caused
by other factors.
Figure 6.5: Linear and smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggre-
gated by date: Partito Democratico
y-axis = house-adjusted polls the poll readings. x-axis = number of days remaining before Election Day.
The smoothed scatter plot is computed following the model 3.7.
(a) Linear
(b) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.30 (c) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.10
Figure 6.5 shows the correlation between the house-adjusted poll readings for the
Partito Democratico and the number of days between poll readings and Election Day
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using linear and smoothed scatter plots. According to figure 6.5(a), there is a slight
positive correlation between them: the house effect decreases closer to Election Day.
All the values in the last 50 days are comprised between 30% and 35% of the share.
However, during the first part of the election campaign, figure 6.5(a) shows a lot of
dispersion in the series with house-adjusted poll readings varying between 35% and
45% of the share. Therefore, the greater the difference between the Election Day
and the poll readings, the higher the dispersion in them. This is also consistent with
the evidence provided by accuracy (see table 6.2) and the house effect (see tables
6.4 and 6.5) analysis.
Using the lowess procedure, the series presents a similar pattern to Popolo delle
Liberta`. Figures 6.5(b) and 6.5(c) show the presence of random error in the series9.
As expected, the lower the bandwidth, the more the new values created by the
smoothed version follow the house-adjusted series. In the light of this evidence, we
may argue that there are also other factors that affect the accuracy of poll readings
for the Partito Democratico.
Figure 6.6 shows the correlation between the house-adjusted polls for the Movi-
mento 5 Stelle and the number of days between polls and Election Day using linear
and smoothed scatter plots. According to figure 6.6(a), it is not possible to draw
any relationship between them due to the high presence of dispersion throughout
the series. However, this is consistent with the previous analysis presented in this
9Moreover, all the other series created using higher bandwidth are very similar to each other,
which means that none of them are able to estimate correctly the degree of random error in the
Partito Democratico house-adjusted series. Please refer to the Appendix to see figures.
206
Figure 6.6: Linear and smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggre-
gated by date: Movimento 5 Stelle
y-axis = house-adjusted polls the poll readings. x-axis = number of days remaining before Election Day.
The smoothed scatter plot is computed following the model 3.7.
(a) Linear
(b) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.30 (c) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.10
chapter concerning the accuracy and the house effect in the poll readings for the
Movimento 5 Stelle. In other words, the high percentages of polls classified as in-
accurate is certainly due to the strong presence of the house effect, but also to the
high amount of error in the series. To look in more depth, we will apply the lowess
procedure with different bandwidth (0.30 and 0.10) in order to estimate correctly
the random error in the house-adjusted poll readings.
According to figures 6.6(b) and 6.6(c), the lower bandwidth follows the series
more closely than the other series. Despite this, the smoothed series shows a high
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presence of random error which allows us to argue that the high percentage of polls
classified as inaccurate could also be due to factors other than the strong house
effect revealed in the previous analysis.
Figure 6.7: Linear and smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggre-
gated by date: Centre
y-axis = house-adjusted polls the poll readings. x-axis = number of days remaining before Election Day.
The smoothed scatter plot is computed following the model 3.7.
(a) Linear
(b) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.30 (c) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.10
Figure 6.7 shows the correlation between the house-adjusted poll readings for the
Centre coalitions and number of days between poll readings and Election Day using
linear and smoothed scatter plots. According to figure 6.7(a), there is a negative
correlation between them: the accuracy of poll readings decreases closer to Election
Day. This is especially consistent with the evidence provided in table 6.2 concerning
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the monthly average of A
′
measure. In other words, the percentage of polls classified
as inaccurate for the Centre coalition increases closer to Election Day. In addition,
figure 6.7(a) shows a lower dispersion in the series compared with the previous three
coalitions.
Therefore, we apply the lowess procedure in order to estimate the degree of
random error in the house-adjusted poll readings for the Centre coalition. In the
bottom right panel (6.7(c)), the new values created by the smoothed version are
able to estimate the random error in the series. In other words, the smoothed series
closely follows the house-adjusted series presenting lower random error compared
to the other smoothed series (6.7(b)). With this is mind, we may argue that the
house-adjusted poll readings for the Centre coalition were affected by the house
effect as also confirmed by the previous analysis, but the low presence of random
error suggests that other factors may have caused the high percentage of inaccuracy
(particularly at the end of the election campaign): for instance, voters sentiment
change.
Figure 6.8 shows the correlation between the house-adjusted poll readings for
the Fare per Fermare il Declino coalitions and the number of days between poll
readings and Election Day using linear and smoothed scatter plots. According to
figure 6.8(a), it is not possible to draw any relationship between them due to the
high presence of dispersion in the series. Therefore, we apply the lowess procedure
in order to estimate the degree of random error among the house-adjusted poll
readings. In the bottom right panel (6.8(c)), the new values created by smoothed
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Figure 6.8: Linear and smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggre-
gated by date: Fare per Fermare il Declino
y-axis = house-adjusted polls the poll readings. x-axis = number of days remaining before Election Day.
The smoothed scatter plot is computed following the model 3.7.
(a) Linear
(b) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.30 (c) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.10
versions are able to estimate the random error in the series, which is high.
Regarding the small party of Rivoluzione Civile, figure 6.9(a) does not show a
clear relationship between polls and the number of days to Election Day. Indeed,
there is the presence of high dispersion in the series where the values vary between
2% and 7% of the share. By applying the lowess, figure 6.9(c) documents the low
presence of random error and, therefore, does not closely follow the series as for the
other parties/coalitions.
Figure 6.10 shows the correlation between house-adjusted polls for the small
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Figure 6.9: Linear and smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggre-
gated by date: Rivoluzione Civile
y-axis = house-adjusted polls the poll readings. x-axis = number of days remaining before Election Day.
The smoothed scatter plot is computed following the model 3.7.
(a) Linear
(b) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.30 (c) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.10
coalitions of Others parties using linear and smoothed scatter plots. According
to figure 6.10(a), there is a positive relationship between the house-adjusted polls
and the number of days to the Election Day. However, the smoothed scatter plots
(6.10(d) and 6.10(c)) do not report a strong presence of random error in the polls
series for the Others. Therefore, we may argue that other factors caused the inac-
curacy of polls.
As the aim of this thesis is to ascertain the factors that cause bias in Italian
polling, we employ a multivariate regression model using the methodologies used
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Figure 6.10: Linear and smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls ag-
gregated by date: Others
y-axis = house-adjusted polls the poll readings. x-axis = number of days remaining before Election Day.
The smoothed scatter plot is computed following the model 3.7.
(a) Linear
(b) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.30 (c) Smoothed: Bandwidth = 0.10
by different polling houses as explanatory variables (see model 3.15). Recalling the
model, we regress the accuracy index on a set of dummy variables for each method-
ology employed as documented by polling houses and an exogenous variable (the
difference between the two main parties/coalitions as reported by poll readings) to
estimate the house effect. Specifically, we take into account the sampling procedure
(random and no-random), the delivery method (CATI and CAWI), who commis-
sioned the poll (media, polling house, and political parties) and where its results
have been disseminated (TV, newspapers, and the Internet). For each dummy vari-
ables we expect a different relationship with the accuracy index. Accordingly, the
main expectation is a positive relationship between the accuracy index and the fol-
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lowing variables: no-random sample, CATI, CAWI, media and political parties as
buyers, and the difference between the two main parties/coalitions estimated in the
poll readings (hereafter referred to as DCEP). For instance, the use of no- random
sampling procedure increases the inaccuracy (error) of poll readings10. For the rest,
we expect a negative relationship and, therefore, these variables increase (decrease)
the accuracy (error) in Italian polling. Table 6.6 reports the results of this model
applied to the 2013 Italian General Elections using the two overall accuracy indexes
A and Bw as dependent variables. For the sake of simplicity, the results will be
discussed for each accuracy measure separately.
We start by considering the model where Bw is the dependent variable. Ac-
cording to table 6.6, the error estimated in poll readings has been affected by the
actors who commissioned the polls without taking into account the number of par-
ties/coalitions. Specifically, there is a strong significant relationship between these
variables and the estimated error. This outcome fulfills our assumptions concerning
the Media and Polling House variables. Indeed, we expect that the Political Party as
commissioner is a source of bias and, therefore, error. The outcomes of the models
employing different versions of the Bw measure as dependent variables differ only by
the fact that using three parties/coalitions in the computing process, the DCEP has
a strongly significant positive relationship with it (β = 0.005 p < 0.01). This does
not occur when all the parties/coalitions are taken into account when computing
the Bw measure. Focusing on the model where the A measure is the dependent vari-
10Please refer to section 3.3.1 of chapter 3 for further explanation.
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Table 6.6: House effect across the 2013 Italian General Election polls on
Chamber of Deputies: Multivariate Regression model using A and Bw mea-
sures as dependent variables.
The model is computed using formula 3.15, where set of methodologies employed by the polling house and the
difference between the two major party/coalitions (referred as DCEP) are the explanatory variables. The A and
Bw measures used as dependent variables are computed using the formula 3.1 and 3.5. The standard errors for the
coefficient are in parentheses and the statistical level of significance follows the rule: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *
p < 0.10.
Bw(7 Par./Coal.) Bw (3 Par./Coal.) A
Random -0.032 -0.036 -0.007*
(0.027) (0.030) (0.004)
Other Sample 0.049 0.028 -0.001
(0.031) (0.035) (0.004)
CATI 0.032 0.027 0.013***
(0.028) (0.031) (0.004)
CAWI 0.042 0.002 0.015**
(0.044) (0.049) (0.006)
B: Media -0.705*** -0.833*** -0.020
(0.104) (0.115) (0.012)
B: Polling House -0.711*** -0.839*** -0.018
(0.103) (0.114) (0.023)
B: Political Party -0.779*** -0.922*** -0.20
(0.157) (0.174) (0.017)
M: TV -0.042 -0.049 0.003
(0.050) (0.056) (0.007)
M: Newspaper -0.036 -0.053 0.002
(0.048) (0.053) (0.006)
M: Internet -0.030 -0.210 -0.003
(0.056) (0.062) (0.007)
DCEP 0.002 0.005*** 0.032***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.00)
Constant 1.175*** 1.314*** 0.033**
(0.084) (0.092) (0.016)
R2 0.393 0.436 0.999
Adjusted R2 0.347 0.394 0.998
ANOVA 0.000 0.000 0.000
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able, the predictive accuracy of polls is affected by the following variables: Random,
CATI, CAWI, and DCEP. The sign of their coefficient comprises the house effect
as assumed. In other words, the use of random sampling procedures increases the
predictive accuracy of poll readings (β = −0.007 p < 0.10) whereas the two delivery
systems included in the model and the DCEP have a strong opposite effect (see last
column of table 6.6). This is consistent with the results of the analysis discussed
so far. Table 6.7 reports the outcomes of the multivariate regression model applied
to the A
′
measures for all the parties/coalitions as dependent variables. As with
the other analysis, we discuss the results for each coalition separately. We start
by considering the model where the A
′
measure for the Popolo delle Liberta` is the
dependent variable.
According to table 6.7, the house effect on the predictive accuracy of poll read-
ings for this coalition is comprised of the following variables: CAWI, Media (as
buyer), Polling House, Political Party, DCEP. Specifically, most of them present
a significant positive relationship with the dependent variable and, then, they de-
crease the predictive accuracy of poll readings. This fulfills our expectation only in
part given that we assumed that when a poll is carried out on a Polling House’s
own initiative, the predictive accuracy increases. This also occurred for the CAWI
delivery system, showing a significant negative relationship with the A
′
measure for
the Popolo delle Liberta`.
Regarding the model where the A
′
measure for the Partito Democratico is the
dependent variable, the evidence provided by table 6.7 shows that the CATI delivery
215
Table 6.7: House effect across the 2013 Italian General Election polls on
Chamber of Deputies: Multivariate Regression model using A
′
measures as
dependent variables.
The model is computed using formula 3.15, where set of methodologies employed by polling house and the difference
between the two major party/coalitions (referred as DCEP) are the explanatory variables. The A
′
measures used
as dependent variables are computed using the formula6.1, A.17,A.18,A.19, A.20,A.21, and A.22 . The standard
errors for the coefficient are in parentheses and the statistical level of significance follows the rule: *** p < 0.01; **
p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
PDL PD M5S Centre FFD RC Others
Random 0.044 0.005 0.097** 0.167* -0.233 -0.247*** 0.046
(0.041) (0.017) (0.049) (0.086) (0.202) (0.055) (0.218)
Other Sample -0.027 0.006 0.014 -0.076 0.161 -0.066 -0.156
(0.048) (0.020) (0.057) (0.120) (0.214) (0.071) (0.255)
CATI 0.070 0.059*** -0.093 0.033 -0.152 0.073 -0.422*
(0.043) (0.018) (0.050) (0.090) (0.195) (0.055) (0.225)
CAWI -0.176** -0.029 -0.337*** -0.462*** 0.151 0.425*** 0.786**
(0.068) (0.029) (0.081) (0.142) (0.320) (0.109) (0.359)
B: Media 0.429*** 0.089 0.464* -0.137 – – -1.530*
(0.161) (0.68) (0.236) (0.335) – – (0.851)
B: Polling House 0.413*** 0.104 0.489* -0.171 -0.413* 0.184* -1.847**
(0.159) (0.067) (0.237) (0.331) (0.243) (0.074) (0.840)
B: Political Party 0.421* 0.116 0.337 -0.023 -0.610 0.212 2.143*
(0.243) (0.102) (0.321) (0.504) (0.592) (0.198) (1.279)
M: TV -0.077 -0.030 -0.102 -0.036 – 0.428*** -0.001
(0.078) (0.033) (0.092) (0.261) – (0.110) (0.410)
M: Newspaper 0.011 0.007 -0.126 0.120 0.558** 0.229** -0.460
(0.074) (0.031) (0.088) (0.155) (0.249) (0.104) (0.392)
M: Internet -0.042 -0.024 0.073 0.188 0.193 0.135 -0.129
(0.087) (0.037) (0.103) (0.180) (0.332) (0.121) (0.457)
DCEP 0.041*** -0.023*** 0.006 0.002*** 0.036** 0.003 -0.036**
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.018) (0.005) (0.015)
Constant 0.093 -0.023*** 0.006 0.022*** 0.036** 0.003 -0.036**
(0.129) (0.540) (0.223) (0.268) (0.231) (0.133) (0.680)
R2 0.644 0.760 0.185 0.259 0.330 0.263 0.239
Adjusted R2 0.617 0.740 0.123 0.203 0.218 0.178 0.181
ANOVA 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.000
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system and DCEP comprise the house effect. However, our expectations are satisfied
only in part given that the sign of the coefficient of DCEP variables is negative
(β = −0.023 p < 0.01).
Moving to the model where the A
′
measure for the Movimento 5 Stelle is the
dependent variable, table 6.7 reports that the following variables affected the predic-
tive accuracy of poll readings: Random, CAWI, Media and Polling House. However,
none of them confirms our assumptions. For instance, the CAWI delivery system
has a negative relationship with the A
′
measure for this movement (β = −0.462
p < 0.01). Conversely, when the poll is carried out on the polling house’s own ini-
tiative or commissioned by a media actor, its predictive accuracy decreases. What
is most surprising in the evidence reported for this movement is that the use of ran-
dom sampling procedure has a significant positive relationship with the dependent
variable (β = 0.097 p < 0.05). This is also documented in the model where the A
′
measure for the Centre coalition is the dependent variable. Indeed, table 6.7 reports
that the predictive accuracy of poll readings for this coalition decreases when using
a random sampling procedure (β = 0.167 p < 0.10). Conversely, the CAWI delivery
system shows a strong significant negative relationship with the dependent variable
(β = −0.462 p < 0.01). In addition, the DCEP plays an important role in increasing
inaccuracy in the poll readings for this coalition (β = 0.002 p < 0.01).
Focusing on the model where the A
′
measure for Fare per Fermare il Declino is the
dependent variable, the house effect is showing in the Polling House, Newspaper, and
DCEP variables. Our expectations concerning their relationship with the predictive
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accuracy are not satisfied only for the Newspaper variable. Indeed, table 6.7 reports
a significant positive relationship with the A
′
measure for this small party (β = 0.558
p < 0.05).
Concerning the model where the A
′
measure for Rivoluzione Civile is the depen-
dent variable, the predictive accuracy of poll readings is affected by the following
variables: Random, CAWI, Polling House, TV, and Newspaper. According to our
expectations, the use of a random sampling procedure increases the accuracy of poll
readings (β = −0.247 p < 0.01). All the rest of the variables that meet the statisti-
cal level of significance present a positive relationship with the dependent variable
(see table 6.7) and they do not fulfill our expectations. What is most surprising in
these results is that the two variables concerning the media used to disseminate the
poll results decrease their accuracy.
Moving to the last column of table 6.7, the A
′
measure for the small coalition of
Others has been affected by the following variables: CATI, CAWI, Media, Polling
House, Political Party, and DCEP. Most of them do not satisfy our assumptions
about their relationship with the dependent variable. For instance, the DCEP has
a significantly negative relationship with the predictive accuracy of poll readings for
this small coalition (β = −0.036 p < 0.05). This is also documented for the CAWI
and the Political Party variables. In line with our expectations, having a Polling
House and the Media as commissioner of a poll increases its predictive accuracy.
Table 6.8 reports the outcomes of the multivariate regression model applied to
A
′
measures for only three parties/coalitions as dependent variables. As with the
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previous analysis, we discuss the results for each coalition separately.
We start by considering the model where the A
′
measure for the Popolo delle
Liberta` is the dependent variable. The house effect is shown in the CAWI and
DCEP variables. This is in line with the results of the previous model where seven
parties/coalitions are taken into account to compute the A
′
measure. However, in
this version the three buyers’ (Media, Polling House, and Political Party) variables
do not meet the statistical level of significance anymore. Moving to the model
where the A
′
measure for the Partito Democratico is the dependent variable, the
predictive accuracy of poll readings for this coalition is affected by the CAWI and
DCEP variables. As for the Popolo delle Liberta`, this has also been documented in
the previous model. However, in this model the sign of the coefficient for the CAWI
variable becomes negative and, therefore, its use increases the predictive accuracy
of poll readings. Regarding the model using the A
′
measure for the Movimento 5
Stelle, the last column of table 6.8 reports similar results to those documented in
the previous model (see table 6.7) except that the DCEP variable does not meet the
statistical level of significance anymore.
In the light of this evidence, we may conclude that the house effect is mainly
comprised in the delivery methods, buyers, and media. Specifically, the use of the
CAWI delivery system during this election increases the predictive accuracy of polls
in almost all the models employed. Surprisingly, the dissemination of poll results
using the media has a negative effect on the accuracy of polls for the small parties.
In a similar vein, this kind of relationship has only been documented also with the
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Table 6.8: House effect across the 2013 Italian General Election polls on
Chamber of Deputies: Multivariate Regression model using A
′
measures for
only three parties/coalitions as dependent variables.
The model is computed using formula 3.15, where set of methodologies employed by polling house and the difference
between the two major party/coalitions (referred as DCEP) are the explanatory variables. The A
′
measures used
as dependent variables are computed using the formula 6.3, A.29, and A.30. The standard errors for the coefficient
are in parentheses and the statistical level of significance follows the rule: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
PDL PD M5S
Random 0.120 0.063 0.177**
(0.077) (0.043) (0.078)
Other Sample -0.037 0.017 -0.010
(0.090) (0.050) (0.091)
CATI 0.056 0.042 -0.114
(0.079) (0.044) (0.080)
CAWI -0.397*** -0.188*** -0.563***
(0.127) (0.071) (0.128)
B: Media 0.421 0.096 0.685*
(0.372) (0.208) (0.376)
B: Polling House 0.380 0.062 0.669*
(0.373) (0.208) (0.376)
B: Political Party 0.347 0.107 0.572
(0.505) (0.282) (0.510)
M: TV -0.152 0.089 -0.174
(0.145) (0.081) (0.146)
M: Newspaper 0.024 0.034 -0.120
(0.139) (0.078) (0.140)
M: Internet -0.040 -0.001 -0.070
(0.161) (0.090) (0.163)
DCEP 0.063*** -0.019*** 0.019***
(0.006) (0.196) (0.354)
Constant 0.580 0.696*** -0.662*
(0.351) (0.196) (0.354)
R2 0.514 0.276 0.224
Adjusted R2 0.447 0.221 0.165
ANOVA 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Polling House as buyer for the bigger parties/coalitions. Conversely, it increases the
predictive accuracy of polls for the small parties (see table 6.7).
6.4 Voter Sentiment Results
Although the previous section confirmed one of the two hypotheses on which
this thesis has been drawn, it is not possible to rule out completely that there was a
voters sentiment change over the election campaign especially concerning the Partito
Democratico and Movimento 5 Stelle. In order to estimate this movement, we will
undertake a statistical analysis using two approaches. Firstly, we will estimate the
error in the sample during both the last six and the last two months of the election
campaign to see what evidence they provide concerning the true voters sentiment
change and, therefore, the reliability of the polls. Secondly, we will employ the
autoregressive model to investigate the true over time voters sentiment change in
the 2013 general election using the well-established model proposed by Erikson and
Wlezien (1999). Italy has a multi-party system, whereas the procedures in the
literature have been developed on the basis of the US, which has a two party system.
In order to estimate the true over time voters sentiment change, we will employ the
autoregressive model using poll readings for each coalition as the dependent variable.
Doing so, we will able to estimate the change for each coalition and the degree of
these movements.
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6.4.1 Analysis of Variance
The accuracy of poll predictions may be shown by different measures on the
basis of their various purposes. In this thesis, specific measures (A, A
′
, and Bw)
have already been applied to estimate the difference between poll readings and the
election outcomes. The evidence showed a high presence of inaccuracy in Italian
polling over the 2013 general election, higher than in 2006 and 2008. Following the
main purpose of this thesis in discovering the major and, in particular, the strongest
cause of inaccuracy, we have undertaken the analysis of variance of poll readings in
order to identify their amount of error and voters sentiment change. To do that, we
employed the following measures: observed variance, error variance (and sampling
error), true variance, and reliability. According to the evidence provided by house
effect analysis, the expectation is that the presence of voters sentiment change for
the seven coalitions is shown in the true variance and reliability measures.
Table 6.9 shows the outcomes of those measures covering the entire six months
of the 2013 election campaign for each coalition except the Rivoluzione Civile, which
appeared only in the last two months. For the sake of simplicity, we will discuss the
outcomes for each coalition separately.
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According to table 6.9, the poll readings concerning the Popolo delle Liberta`
has 8.45 as observed variance and error variance of 1.67 (sampling error: 1.29).
Subtracting the error variance from the observed variance, we obtain that the true
variance over the six months of the election campaign by the Popolo delle Liberta`
is 6.77 which means that the variance of these polls is largely due to a degree of
voters sentiment movement rather than the sampling procedures employed by the
polling houses. In addition, the estimate of statistical reliability (the ratio of true
variance and observed variance) is 0.80, which is higher than expected. In order to
estimate whether the inaccuracy over the last two months of the election campaign
is also due to voters sentiment change on the basis of the house effect and lowess
procedure outcomes, we will compute the analysis of variance considering only the
polls carried out between 10 December 2012 and 9 February 2013.
Table 6.10 reports similar evidence for the Popolo delle Liberta`. In other words,
the true variance (4.06) shows a higher degree of voters sentiment than the error
due to sampling procedures. In addition, the reliability is slightly lower than that
reported in table 6.9 for the six months of the election campaign. Therefore, we
may argue that in 2013 the inaccuracy of poll readings was also due to the voters
sentiment change during the election campaign.
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Regarding the Partito Democratico, table 6.9 reports a higher observed variance
(10.51) and error variance (1.98) than for the main coalition of the centre right.
Consequently, the true variance for the Partito Democratico also shows a bigger
voters sentiment change because of the higher observed variance. This is consistent
with 100% of polls classified as inaccurate using all accuracy measures employed
(A, A
′
, and Bw). The story does not change very much when we consider only
the last two months of the election campaign. As table 6.10 shows, the difference
between the observed variance (7.22) and the error variance (1.93) is still comprising
a bigger voters sentiment change than the centre right coalition. Therefore, we may
argue that the outstanding percentage of inaccuracy among the poll readings for
the Partito Democratico is mainly due to voters sentiment change, although the
analysis so far has showed the presence of error caused by the house effect.
Regarding the main anti-system movement (Movimento 5 Stelle), table 6.9 re-
ports that observed variance and the error variance over the six months of the
election campaign are 5.62 and 1.11 respectively. Therefore, the true variance and
the reliability are 4.62 and 0.80 respectively. In other words, over the six months
of the election campaign the variance of poll readings for the Movimento 5 Stelle is
caused more by movement in voters sentiment than the error caused by the sampling
procedures. This is in line with the evidence provided by the house effect analysis
presented in the previous section. Focusing on the last two months of the election
campaign, the true variance still shows a shift in voters sentiment even if with less
magnitude (3.10), confirmed also by a lower poll reliability (see table 6.10).
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Regarding the centre coalition supporting the incumbent Prime Minister, table
6.9 reports the higher observed variance (11.69) in the series over the six months of
the election campaign. In addition, both the error variance and sampling error are
1.11 and 1.05 respectively. Consequently, the voters sentiment change expressed by
the true variance is the highest of the series (10.58). Therefore, we may argue that
over the six months of the election campaign the inaccuracy of the poll readings for
the main centre coalition is mainly due to a shift in voters sentiment. This is also
consistent with the accuracy analysis reported in table 6.1, where the percentage of
polls classified as inaccurate reaches 83%. However, when computing these measures
for just the last two months of the election campaign both the observed variance
and the true variance are halved. In other words, the shift in voters sentiment has
less magnitude in the last part of the election campaign.
Concerning the Fare per Fermare il Declino party, table 6.9 reports that observed
variance and error variance are 1.31 and 0.13. Given that the mean of poll readings
over the six months of the election campaign is 1.57, the observed variance is con-
sidered high. Therefore, the true variance and the reliability show a shift in voters
sentiment change. However, table 6.10 shows that the observed variance decreases
over the last months of the election campaign. Consequently, the evidence shows
less movement in voters sentiment expressed in lower values of true variance and
reliability. We may argue that the inaccuracy of poll readings concerning the Fare
per Fermare il Declino is mainly due to a shift in voters sentiment rather than er-
ror caused by the sampling procedures and that this change occurred with stronger
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magnitude over the whole six months rather than in the last part of the election
campaign.
As already pointed out in this chapter, the Rivoluzione Civile movement came
into the race only in the last two months of the election campaign and therefore,
we do not compute these measures for the whole election campaign. As table 6.10
reports, the observed variance and the error variance are 0.58 and 0.35 respectively.
The true variance and the reliability show a small shift in voters sentiment. There-
fore, we may argue that the inaccuracy of the small group of polls classified as
inaccurate is caused both by the house effect and by voters sentiment change.
With regard to the small group of parties not aligned with any coalitions (Oth-
ers), table 6.9 reports a very high observed variance (14.69) and low variance error
(0.41). Therefore, very little error comes from the sampling procedure. Indeed, the
values of true variance and reliability confirm a large shift in voters sentiment over
the six months of the election campaign. The story does not change so much when
focusing on the last two months of the election campaign. Although the observed
variance and true variance values are halved, these measures still show a big shift in
voters sentiment (see table 6.10). This is also consistent with the results of accuracy
analysis. Therefore, we may argue that the inaccuracy of polls is mainly due to a
shift in voters sentiment rather than the sampling procedures.
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6.4.2 AR(1) Results
The previous analysis of the variance of poll readings for each coalition provided
evidence of voters sentiment change in all the coalitions especially for the Partito
Democratico and Others coalitions. In addition, these movements occurred both
over the last six and during the last two months of the election campaign. This is
also consistent with the outcomes given by the accuracy measures where there was
a higher proportions of polls classified as inaccurate in 2013 than in the previous
two general elections, except for the Rivoluzione Civile, which was the last to join
the race (see table 6.1).
In order to estimate properly the degree of this movement, we will apply the au-
toregressive model (AR(1)) following the approach proposed by Erikson and Wlezien
(1999, 2012). The model assumes that the true voters sentiment on a given day to
be explained as a function of voters sentiment on the previous days and shocks from
the election campaign (see formula 3.34). Specifically, the variance of daily shocks
and their persistence will comprise the real movement when it occurs. Assuming
that the poll series is stationary, the autoregressive parameter value will be between
0 and 1 and it will geometrically decay as the number of days between poll readings
increases.
As for the previous analysis, we will discuss the outcomes of the AR(1) model
for each coalition separately. According to the evidence provided by the previ-
ous analysis, we will apply the AR(1) model only to Partito delle Liberta`, Partito
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Table 6.11: 2013 Italian General Election: true voters sentiment change
using AR(1) for Popolo delle Liberta`.
In the column called ‘Correlation’, the values refer to the coefficient using the AR(1) - formula 3.34 - with different
lag of days. In the column called ‘True Correlation’, Heise’s procedure (1969) is applied by multiplying the observed
correlation to reliability (last row of table 4.5). The statistical level of significance follows the rules: *** p < 0.01;
** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
Correlation (γ) True Correlation (γ ∗ rel) R2 RMSE
Lag 1 0.082 0.066 0.02 2.92
Lag 2 0.109 0.087 0.03 2.87
Lag 3 0.088 0.070 0.02 2.91
Lag 4 0.073 0.058 0.02 2.95
Lag 5 0.086 0.069 0.01 3.01
Lag 6 0.091 0.073 0.01 3.01
Lag 7 0.084 0.067 0.01 3.03
Democratico, the Movimento 5 Stelle, and Centre coalitions, which show the biggest
movement in voters sentiment. Therefore, table 6.11 presents the outcomes of ap-
plying the AR(1) to the poll readings for the Partito delle Liberta` coalition. In the
first column are reported the observed correlation between polls and their lagged
values over 1 to 7 days. The main expectation is to observe a geometrical decay
of values of the parameter (γ), which shows the movement of voters sentiment as
the number of days between polls increases. However, table 6.11 reports that none
of those correlations meets the level of statistical significance and the values of the
parameter do not geometrically decay over time. However, the values meet the
condition that the parameter is between 0 and 1. These outcomes do not provide
evidence of a stationary process. Now, we take into account the statistical reliability
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of poll readings in order to estimate the degree of voters sentiment change - the true
over time correlation - excluding the amount of error that may result from random
sampling. To do that, we apply the Heise procedure where we multiply the values
of the parameter by the statistical reliability for the six months of the election cam-
paign (0.80). The second column of table 6.11 reports the outcomes of the true over
time correlation but the pattern of values does not change very much.
Table 6.12: 2013 Italian General Election: true voters sentiment change
using AR(1) for Partito Democratico.
In the column called ‘Correlation’, the values refer to the coefficient using the AR(1) - formula 3.34 - with different
lag of days. In the column called ‘True Correlation’, Heise’s procedure (1969) is applied by multiplying the observed
correlation to reliability (last row of table 4.5). The statistical level of significance follows the rules: *** p < 0.01;
** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
Correlation (γ) True Correlation (γ ∗ rel) R2 RMSE
Lag 1 0.260∗∗∗ 0.211 0.12 3.08
Lag 2 0.205∗∗ 0.166 0.18 2.97
Lag 3 0.182∗∗ 0.147 0.14 3.03
Lag 4 0.134 0.109 0.09 3.11
Lag 5 0.182∗∗ 0.147 0.08 3.09
Lag 6 0.159∗ 0.129 0.08 3.04
Lag 7 0.158∗ 0.128 0.04 3.11
Regarding the Partito Democratico coalition, table 6.12 reports the results ob-
taining when applying the AR(1) model. According to the previous analysis, the
main expectation is to see a large shift in voters sentiment both in the long run and
in the final stages of the election campaign. Therefore, we expect both the AR(1)
conditions to be satisfied. According to table 6.12, the values of the parameter
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mostly decay as the number of days between polls increases and most of them meet
the statistical level of significance with different degrees. This series of poll readings
does not fully satisfy the condition of geometrical decay, because of the values of
lag of 5 days which rise up 0.182. In addition, the outcomes provide evidence that
the shift in voters sentiment is bigger over the short than the long run. This is also
confirmed by the Heise procedure which shows the true over-time correlation, tak-
ing into account the statistical reliability and excluding the error caused by random
sampling.
Table 6.13: 2013 Italian General Election: true voters sentiment change
using AR(1) for Movimento 5 Stelle.
In the column called ‘Correlation’, the values refer to the coefficient using the AR(1) - formula 3.34 - with different
lag of days. In the column called ‘True Correlation’, Heise’s procedure (1969) is applied by multiplying the observed
correlation to reliability (last row of table 4.5). The statistical level of significance follows the rules: *** p < 0.01;
** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
Correlation (γ) True Correlation (γ ∗ rel) R2 RMSE
Lag 1 0.199∗∗ 0.159 0.30 2.02
Lag 2 0.243∗∗∗ 0.194 0.21 2.16
Lag 3 0.259∗∗∗ 0.207 0.21 2.18
Lag 4 0.328∗∗∗ 0.262 0.20 2.21
Lag 5 0.390∗∗∗ 0.312 0.18 2.29
Lag 6 0.433∗∗∗ 0.346 0.19 2.26
Lag 7 0.415∗∗∗ 0.332 0.19 2.27
Regarding the main anti-system movement (Movimento 5 Stelle), the expectation
is to observe a large shift in voters sentiment over the election campaign but with
less magnitude in the last part. Therefore, both the AR(1) conditions must be
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satisfied. However, table 6.13 reports that the values of the parameter increase as
the number of days between polls increases. In addition, they all meet the highest
level of statistical significance, except the value of the parameter using the lag of
1 day between polls. According to this, the condition of geometrical decays is not
clearly satisfied and the model seems to follow an explosive rather than a stationary
process. This is also confirmed when using the Heise procedure in order to take
into account the statistical reliability and excluding the error caused by random
sampling. In the light of this evidence, we may argue that there was a significant
movement in the voters sentiment concerning the Movimento 5 Stelle that affected
the accuracy of polls reading over the election campaign. This is also confirmed by
the previous analysis on the accuracy measures and the house effect.
Table 6.14: 2013 Italian General Election: true voters sentiment change
using AR(1) for Centre.
In the column called ‘Correlation’, the values refer to the coefficient using the AR(1) - formula 3.34 - with different
lag of days. In the column called ‘True Correlation’, Heise’s procedure (1969) is applied by multiplying the observed
correlation to reliability (last row of table 4.5). The statistical level of significance follows the rules: *** p < 0.01;
** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
Correlation (γ) True Correlation (γ ∗ rel) R2 RMSE
Lag 1 0.337∗∗∗ 0.303 0.35 2.77
Lag 2 0.421∗∗∗ 0.379 0.33 2.84
Lag 3 0.487∗∗∗ 0.438 0.32 2.88
Lag 4 0.465∗∗∗ 0.419 0.33 2.89
Lag 5 0.459∗∗∗ 0.413 0.32 2.93
Lag 6 0.443∗∗∗ 0.399 0.33 2.92
Lag 7 0.501∗∗∗ 0.451 0.30 2.99
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Regarding the Centre coalition supporting the incumbent Prime Minister, table
6.14 reports similar patterns as those shown earlier for the Movimento 5 Stelle. In
other words, all the values of the parameter meet the level of statistical significance
and do not geometrically decay as the number of days between poll readings in-
creases. As with the previous series, the values of parameter also present the same
pattern when using the Heise procedure. According to this, we may argue that
the inaccuracy of poll readings is caused by the strong presence of voters sentiment
change over the six months of the election campaign.
6.5 Conclusion
Was the 2013 Italian polling less successful in predicting the election outcomes
than in the previous two elections? According to what has emerged from the analysis
presented in this chapter, the answer to this question is: yes, it was. Indeed, all
the accuracy measures employed (A, A
′
, and Bw) showed a high percentage of polls
classified as inaccurate for almost all the parties/coalitions competing in the election
campaign (see tables 6.1 and 6.2).
In the light of this, we applied the OLS regressions and the lowess procedure to
poll readings and accuracy values to see the degree of the house effect and random
error in them. The evidence provided by tables 6.4 and 6.5 confirmed the strong
impact of the house effect in Italian polling. Therefore, this hypothesis has been
strongly confirmed in all the poll readings series using both OLS regression model
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and the lowess procedure. Using the multivariate regression model to estimate the
impact of methodologies employed by the polling house on the predictive accuracy
of poll readings, we can draw at least three main conclusions. Firstly, the CAWI
delivery system has a greater positive impact than in the previous elections especially
for the bigger parties/coalitions. Secondly, who commissioned the poll plays different
roles depending on the measure employed. Indeed, in the models where Bw is the
dependent variable the three variables have a negative relationship and, therefore,
increase the estimated error (see table 6.6). Conversely, in the models where A
′
measures are the dependent variables, the signs of their coefficients become positive.
Thirdly, the evidence reported a negative impact on the accuracy of polls by the
media actors especially concerning the small parties.
To estimate the degree of voters movement over the election campaign, we em-
ployed two different analyses: the variance and the autoregressive models. Despite
the low presence of error variance, the autoregressive model does not provide evi-
dence of large voters movements over the campaign. Instead, Italian voters senti-
ment follows more of a random walk with drift than a stationary process as expected.
Specifically, voters sentiment change occurred in the first part of the election cam-
paign with regard to the Movimento 5 Stelle and the Centre coalition (see tables
6.13 and 6.14). There is also evidence of stronger presence of long-term effects on
the election campaign.
With this is mind, the performance of polls in terms of accuracy in the 2013
general election is more affected by the house effect than any movement over the
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election campaign, especially with regard to the two main coalitions of centre-right
and centre-left. Therefore, all the methodologies employed by the pollsters in car-
rying out the polls to predict voting intention is the main reason for inaccuracy of
their performance.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
We always want the best man to win the
election. Unfortunately, he never runs.
W. Rogers
Over the last two decades, the use of polls during an election campaign has be-
come increasingly commonplace and have at least two purposes. Firstly, polls are
used as a tool to forecast actual election results (Hillygus 2011). Secondly, the infor-
mation provided by polls concerning the level of support among voters is employed
to determine and/or emphasize issues on the political agenda and manifestos by
campaign strategists (Hillygus 2011; Eisinger 2003). Moreover, some scholars have
pointed out how polls are able to bring home important information (fundamentals)
to voters (Gelman and King 1993; Erikson and Wlezein 2012). The main purpose of
this thesis is to shed light on the causes of inaccuracy in Italian polling over the last
three general elections (2006, 2008, and 2013). Accordingly, explaining what has
most caused inaccuracy of polls over an election competition, allows us to explain
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to what extent the fundamentals actually do matter and how voters sentiment has
been influenced by the campaign itself. Therefore, two main hypotheses have been
derived:
• H1: The inaccuracy of polls is caused by the house effect;
• H2: The inaccuracy of polls is caused by voters changing their decisions be-
tween the time the polls are carried out and Election Day;
The previous chapters have discussed the role of polls and all the issues concern-
ing their use in the literature so far. In addition, chapter 3 was devoted to explaining
the methods applied to test the two hypotheses. Specifically, we employed the well-
established A accuracy measure and its revision to fit the Italian case (A
′
) in order
to estimate the proportion of polls classified as inaccurate in Italian polling. More-
over, A
′
measure also provides evidence on the under- or overestimation for a given
political party/coalition. To estimate the overall statistical error among poll read-
ings, we employ the Bw measure that also allows us to correct the dependency for
the given political party using the A
′
measure. Then, we applied a well-established
econometric procedure in order to estimate the house effect using the OLS regression
model and the lowess procedure. Moreover, we employed a multivariate regression
model to estimate the impact of each methodology used by polling houses on the
predictive accuracy of poll readings. To do that, we regressed the accuracy indexes
on a set of dummy variables for each methodology employed as documented by poll-
sters and an exogenous variable (see formula 3.15). This allows us also to estimate
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the methodological robustness of Italian polling. To test voters sentiment change,
we employed the autoregressive model (AR(1)) assuming that the level of support
for a given political party/coalition in a day is a function of voters sentiment change
from the previous day and shocks from the election campaign (see formula 3.34).
The last three chapters have been devoted to presenting the empirical results of
those methods.
7.1 The predictive accuracy
According to the three previous chapters, the outcomes of the accuracy measures
show that all the general elections taken into account have been characterized by
a high percentage of polls classified as inaccurate. Moreover, the main centre-right
coalitions (Casa/Popolo delle Liberta`) have been constantly underestimated over
time and especially in the final part of election campaigns (see tables 4.2, 5.2, and
6.2). Conversely, the main centre-left coalitions (Unione/Partito Democratico) have
been overestimated in all three general elections (see tables 4.2, 5.2, and 6.2). Sur-
prisingly, adding together the poll readings of parties/coalitions on the basis of their
centre-right or centre-left orientation, the outcomes of accuracy measures (A and
A
′
) provide evidence of a weaker performance in terms of accuracy of polls both for
the centre-right and centre-left coalitions (see table 5.3). Therefore, we can argue
that there is evidence of source of error in Italian polling. Indeed, the degree of error
estimated by the Bw measure increases across the three general elections. This is
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also confirmed by the percentages of statistically biased polls using the χ2 test with
the threshold of p ≤ 0.05. This percentage increases from 76% in 2006 to 100%
in 2013 (see tables 4.1, 5.1, and 6.1). Accordingly, we can conclude that there is a
persistent degree of inaccuracy in Italian polling over time.
7.2 The degree of house effect
Regarding the house effect, this hypothesis has been confirmed using both the
OLS regression model and the lowess procedure in all three elections, especially in
the model where the poll readings are dependent variables. Therefore, the variance
of polls is fully explained by the variance of days and the polling houses carrying
them out during election campaigns (see tables 4.3, 5.4, 5.5, 6.4, and 6.5).
According to the multivariate regression model outcomes, we can draw at least
three conclusions. Firstly, the use of random sampling procedures does not always
increase the predictive accuracy of poll readings. This is also evidence of lack of
methodological robustness in Italian polling. Secondly, the delivery system has a
different impact on the accuracy of poll readings on the basis of parties/coalitions.
For instance, the use of the CATI system decreases the predictive accuracy of polls
for the bigger parties/coalitions, whereas it increases it for the small coalition of
Others (see tables 5.7 and 5.8). Thirdly, in the last two election campaigns the
media and the buyers played an important role in the predictive accuracy of poll
readings. For instance, in 2013 all the dummy variables employed as buyer have a
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statistically positive relationship with the bigger parties/coalitions in the election
campaign (see table 6.7).
7.3 The extent of voters sentiment change
The hypothesis of voters sentiment change has not been fully confirmed by the
autoregressive model in any of the elections. Instead, the outcomes provided ev-
idence that Italian voters sentiment follows a random walk with drift rather than
a stationary process as assumed by the model employed. In addition, those series
that are statistically significant show that any change among Italian voters occurred
at the beginning of election campaigns. Accordingly, the fundamentals of Italian
campaigns do matter only at the start of campaigns where there is reliable evidence
of change among voters.
To sum up, there is strong evidence that inaccuracy in Italian polling is caused
more by the house effect than by any movement in voters sentiment over the last
three general election campaigns.
7.4 The overall type of polls performance
At the end of the chapter concerning the literature on the use of polls during elec-
tion campaigns, we classified the performance of polls in predicting electoral results
into four different types of accuracy/inaccuracy (see figure 2.1). We also specified
that this thesis aims to investigate only two types of accuracy/inaccuracy: when
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the poll performance is classified as bad and failed predictors. Recalling their fea-
tures, the former occurs when a poll is statistically inaccurate but methodologically
robust. The second type is represented by a poll that is statistically inaccurate and
methodologically not robust. In the light of the outcomes provided by the accuracy
measures and the house effect (in particular by the multivariate regression model),
we conclude that Italian polling can be defined as failed predictors. Specifically, the
high percentages of polls classified as inaccurate using the A and A
′
measures and
the percentages of statistically biased polls using the χ2 test with the threshold of
p ≤ 0.05 using the Bw are strong evidence of statistical inaccuracy.
On the other hand, almost all the multivariate regression models failed to pro-
vide evidence of methodological robustness across the poll readings over the course
of the last three Italian general elections. Therefore, the answer to the broad ques-
tion of this thesis is that the strong presence of statistical inaccuracy and lack of
methodological robustness are the conditions under which polls are not accurate as
predictors of voters’ behaviour.
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Appendix A
Appendix
Revised A measure for the 2006 Italian General Election
To obtain a measure of the accuracy of poll predictions for the Unione, we rewrite
equation 3.1 as follows:
A
′
u = ln
[
(u/(cdl + o))
(U/(CDL+O))
]
(A.1)
and to obtain a measure of the accuracy of poll predictions for Others parties:
A
′
o = ln
[
(o/(cdl + u))
(O/(CDL+ U))
]
(A.2)
To obtain the variance of A
′
for the Unione, we rewrite equation 3.2 as follows:
V ariance(A
′
u) = 1/(n · u · (cdl + o)) (A.3)
To obtain the variance of A
′
for the Others, we rewrite equation 3.2 as follows:
V ariance(A
′
o) = 1/(n · o · (cdl + u)) (A.4)
Revised A measure for the 2008 Italian General Election
To obtain a measure of the accuracy of poll predictions for the Partito Demo-
cratico, we rewrite equation 3.1 as follows:
A
′
pd = ln
[
(pd/(pdl + sa+ udc+ o))
(PD/(PDL+ SA+ UDC +O))
]
(A.5)
and to obtain a measure of the accuracy of poll predictions for the Sinistra
Arcobaleno
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A
′
sa = ln
[
(sa/(pdl + pd+ udc+ o))
(SA/(PDL+ PD + UDC +O))
]
(A.6)
and to obtain a measure of accuracy of poll predictions for the Unione dei Demo-
cratici Cristiani e di Centro (UDC)
A
′
udc = ln
[
(udc/(pdl + pd+ sa+ o))
(UDC/(PDL+ PD + SA+O))
]
(A.7)
and to obtain a measure of accuracy of poll predictions for Others:
A
′
o = ln
[
(o/(pdl + pd+ sa+ udc))
(O/(PDL+ PD + SA+ UDC))
]
(A.8)
To obtain the variance of value of A
′
for the Partito Democratico, we rewrite
equation 3.2 as follows:
V ariance(A
′
pd) = 1/(n · pd · (pdl + sa+ udc+ o)) (A.9)
To obtain the variance of value of A
′
for the Sinistra Arcobaleno, we rewrite
equation 3.2 as follows:
V ariance(A
′
sa) = 1/(n · sa · (pdl + pd+ udc+ o)) (A.10)
To obtain the variance of value of A
′
for the Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e
di Centro (UDC) we rewrite equation 3.2 as follows:
V ariance(A
′
udc) = 1/(n · udc · (pdl + pd+ sa+ o)) (A.11)
To obtain the variance of value of A
′
for Others, we rewrite equation 3.2 as
follows:
V ariance(A
′
o) = 1/(n · o · (pdl + pd+ sa+ udc)) (A.12)
To obtain a measure of accuracy of poll predictions for the Partito Democratico,
we rewrite equation 3.1 as follows:
A
′
coal;pd = ln
[
(pd/(pdl + o))
(PD/(PDL+O))
]
(A.13)
and to obtain a measure of accuracy of poll predictions for Others:
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A
′
coal;o = ln
[
(o/(pdl + pd))
(O/(PDL+ PD))
]
(A.14)
To obtain the variance of values of A
′
for the Partito Democratico, we rewrite
equation 3.2 as follows:
V ariance(A
′
coal;pd) = 1/(n · pd · (pdl + o)) (A.15)
To obtain the variance of values of A
′
for the Others , we rewrite equation 3.2
as follows:
V ariance(A
′
coal;o) = 1/(n · o · (pdl + pd)) (A.16)
Revised A measure for the 2013 Italian General Election
To obtain a measure of the accuracy of poll predictions for the Partito Demo-
cratico, we rewrite equation 3.1 as follows:
A
′
pd = ln
[
(pd/(pdl +m5s+ cdm+ rc+ ffd+ o))
(PD/(PDL+M5S + CDM +RC + FFD +O))
]
(A.17)
and to obtain a measure of the accuracy of poll predictions for the Movimento
5 Stelle:
A
′
m5s = ln
[
(m5s/(pdl + pd+ cdm+ rc+ ffd+ o))
(M5S/(PDL+ PD + CDM +RC + FFD +O))
]
(A.18)
and to obtain a measure of the accuracy of poll predictions for the Coalizione di
Centro:
A
′
cdm = ln
[
(cdm/(pdl + pd+m5s+ rc+ ffd+ o))
(CDM/(PDL+ PD +M5S +RC + FFD +O))
]
(A.19)
and to obtain a measure of the accuracy of poll predictions for Rivoluzione Civile:
A
′
rc = ln
[
(rc/(pdl + pd+m5s+ cdm+ ffd+ o))
(RC/(PDL+ PD +M5S + CDM + FFD +O))
]
(A.20)
and to obtain a measure of the accuracy of poll predictions for Fare per Fermare
254
il Declino:
A
′
ffd = ln
[
(ffd/(pdl + pd+m5s+ cdm+ rc+ o))
(FFD/(PDL+ PD +M5S + CDM +RC +O))
]
(A.21)
and to obtain a measure of the accuracy of poll predictions for Others:
A
′
o = ln
[
(o/(pdl + pd+m5s+ cdm+ rc+ ffd))
(O/(PDL+ PD +M5S + CDM +RC + FFD))
]
(A.22)
To obtain variance of the values of A
′
for Partito Democratico, we rewrite equa-
tion 3.2 as follows:
V ariance(A
′
pd) = 1/(n · pd · (pdl +m5s+ cdm+ rc+ ffd+ o)) (A.23)
To obtain variance of the values of A
′
for the Movimento 5 Stelle, we rewrite
equation 3.2 as follows:
V ariance(A
′
m5s) = 1/(n ·m5s · (pdl + pd+ cdm+ rc+ ffd+ o)) (A.24)
To obtain variance of the values of A
′
for the Centre, we rewrite equation 3.2 as
follows:
V ariance(A
′
cdm) = 1/(n · cdm · (pdl + pd+m5s+ rc+ ffd+ o)) (A.25)
To obtain variance of the values of A
′
for Rivoluzione Civile, we rewrite equation
3.2 as follows:
V ariance(A
′
rc) = 1/(n · rc · (pdl + pd+m5s+ cdm+ ffd+ o)) (A.26)
To obtain variance of the values of A
′
for Fare per Fermare il Declino, we rewrite
equation 3.2 as follows:
255
V ariance(A
′
ffd) = 1/(n · ffd · (pdl + pd+m5s+ cdm+ rc+ o)) (A.27)
To obtain variance of the values of A
′
for Others, we rewrite equation 3.2 as
follows:
V ariance(A
′
o) = 1/(n · o · (pdl + pd+m5s+ cdm+ rc+ ffd)) (A.28)
To obtain a measure of the accuracy of poll predictions for the Partito Demo-
cratico, we rewrite equation 3.1 as follows:
A
′
coal;pd = ln
[
(pd/(pdl +m5s))
(PD/(PDL+M5S))
]
(A.29)
and to obtain a measure of the accuracy of poll predictions for the Movimento
5 Stelle
A
′
coal;m5s = ln
[
(m5s/(pdl + pd))
(M5S/(PDL+ PD))
]
(A.30)
To obtain variance of the values of A
′
for Partito Democratico (only three
party/coalition), we rewrite equation 3.2 as follows:
V ariance(A
′
coal13;pd) = 1/(n · pd · (pdl +m5s)) (A.31)
To obtain variance of the values ofA
′
for Movimento 5 Stelle (only three party/coalition),
we rewrite equation 3.2 as follows:
V ariance(A
′
coal13;m5s) = 1/(n ·m5s · (pdl + pd)) (A.32)
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2006 Italian General Election: Smoothed Scatter Plots
Figure A.1: Smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggregated by
date: Casa Delle Liberta´.
(a) Bandwidth = 0.40 (b) Bandwidth = 0.20
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Figure A.2: Smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggregated by
date: Unione.
(a) Bandwidth = 0.40 (b) Bandwidth = 0.20
Figure A.3: Smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggregated by
date: Others.
(a) Bandwidth = 0.40 (b) Bandwidth = 0.20
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2008 Italian General Election: Smoothed Scatter Plots
Figure A.4: Smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggregated by
date: Popolo delle Liberta`
(a) Bandwidth = 0.40 (b) Bandwidth = 0.20
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Figure A.5: Smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggregated by
date: Partito Democratico
(a) Bandwidth = 0.40 (b) Bandwidth = 0.20
Figure A.6: Smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggregated by
date: UDC
(a) Bandwidth = 0.40 (b) Bandwidth = 0.20
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Figure A.7: Smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggregated by
date: Sinistra Arcobaleno
(a) Bandwidth = 0.40 (b) Bandwidth = 0.20
Figure A.8: Smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggregated by
date: Others
(a) Bandwidth = 0.40 (b) Bandwidth = 0.20
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Figure A.9: Smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggregated by
date: Centre Right Coalition
(a) Bandwidth = 0.40 (b) Bandwidth = 0.20
Figure A.10: Smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggregated by
date: Centre Left Coalition
(a) Bandwidth = 0.40 (b) Bandwidth = 0.20
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2013 Italian General Election: Smoothed Scatter Plots
Figure A.11: Smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggregated by
date: Popolo Delle Liberta`
(a) Bandwidth = 0.40 (b) Bandwidth = 0.20
Figure A.12: Smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggregated by
date: Partito Democratico
(a) Bandwidth = 0.40 (b) Bandwidth = 0.20
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Figure A.13: Smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggregated by
date: Movimento 5 Stelle
(a) Bandwidth = 0.40 (b) Bandwidth = 0.20
Figure A.14: Smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggregated by
date: Centre
(a) Bandwidth = .40 (b) Bandwidth = 0.20
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Figure A.15: Smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggregated by
date: Fare per Fermare il Declino
(a) Bandwidth = 0.40 (b) Bandwidth = 0.20
Figure A.16: Smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggregated by
date: Rivoluzione Civile
(a) Bandwidth = 0.40 (b) Bandwidth = 0.20
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Figure A.17: Smoothed scatter plots of house-adjusted polls aggregated by
date: Others
(a) Bandwidth = 0.40 (b) Bandwidth = .20
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